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An American general who formerly headed the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization in Palestine stated recently: "The American mind
is being manipulated as far as Palestine is concerned."
to Zionist manipulations.

He was referring

My own experiences with the Zionist Organization

of America, which refused to answer any of my requests for varied info:rmation,
confi:rm the general's charge.

Ny own acquaintance with the Palestine

problem has revealed that the equities involved in the area have been
buried under a mass of distortion,

misinfo:rmation and insidious propaganda

which have misrepresented the actual facts and veiled the historical and
legal truth to the extent that the Palestinian victims are made to appear
as being the wrongdoers and the Zionist wrongdoers as the victims.

'Ihe

present problem in Palestine is the derivative of an extraordinary accumu
lation of injustices,

illegalities and violations by Zionism of many decen

cies: violations of international law,
United Nations provisions,

violations of League of Nations and

violations of fundamental human rights.

For more than three-quarters of a century there has been interminable
conflict between the indigenous Palestinian Arab people and alien-imported
Zionist ideology which maintains that Palestine belongs to "the Jews."
the other hand,

On

there is the international law perspective which rejects

the Zionist ideological claim and its form of extralegal logic.

It may be

stated with historical assurance that the great powers and organized inter
national Zionism have used power politics,

including a large measure of

military methods, to deal with the problems of Palestine.

From this accu

rate premise it may be erroneously deduced that international law has been
a failure in the Palestine question.

It would be far more accurate to con

clude that international law has not even been applied in the Zionist-Pal
estinian issue.

'·

A careful legal and historical analysis demonstrates beyond doubt
that the B:i.lfour Declaration is invalid under the criteria of modern inter
national law; it should also be recalled that the instruments of Zionist
discrimination and oppression of the Palestinian people in Palestine
Israel have not been established in a day or even as short a period of
time as a half century,

Zionist beginnings, at the latest, were at the

First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland in 1897,

From there Zionism

has proceeded extralegally one step at a time in a carefully planned pro
gram utilizing political, m.ilitary and propaganda instruments, culminating
in the illegal military fait accompli of 1948 when "the Jewish State" of
Israel was installed by organized Zionism.
'!he native Arab people were ruthlessly driven out as part of an
Israeli master-plan to rid Palestine of its Arab people in order to build
an exclusivist "Jewish" state, and the few Arabs who remained in "Israel"
have been exploited and repressed by the Israeli Zionist establishment.
Any objective student of the Middle East will reach these conclusions if
he analyzes Zionist history and its consistent violations of international
legal principles and norms,

Moreover, without an understanding of these

causative factors of the Palestine problem, it is important to recognize
that the plight of the Palestinian people will continue to be ignorantly
ignored,

What must be axiomatically recognized is that the violent uproot

ing of the Palestinians from their native land by international Zionist
Jewry and their suppliants can have no legal or moral justification.

Not

only is it a violation of international law and the principles of the United
Nations Charter, it also constitutes an unparalleled violation of elementary
principles of humanity and civilization.

'Ibis, the writer has disclosed

in his analysis of the Balfour Declaration in the context of international
law.
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1ora1gn 0!!1ce.
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear LOrd nothsch1ld,
I have much pleasure 1n conve¥1ng to you. on
.

.

behal! o� l:l1s M�jesty's Goverr.rnent. the follow1ng
.
doclarat1on o! sy::patny w1th Jew1sh z�on1st aspirations

which nas been submitted to, and appr oved by,
'His Ma.Jesty •a Goverru:ient

,\

view

establishment tn Palest1ne of a

the Cebinet

w1 th favour the

nat1oo al

home tor the

Jewish people. and \1.1 ll use their b.est endeavours to
fac111 tat� the achievement of th1s object, 1t being.
c.laa.rly undarstood that. r.oth1ng shall be don3 v.nict.

may p rejud ic e the c1v11 and reltg1oua rights ot

eXl s ting non-Jewish CCtm':'�n1t1es 1n _Pal9st1na. o r the

..

rlgh_ts and pol1ttcal status enjoyed by Jews 1n any
other country"

.

1 shou ld be gra t eful

·

1! you would bring th1s

declaration to th9 lOlowledge o! toe Z1on1st Federation.

CHAPTER I

Ilf'l'RODUCTION

Statement of Purposes 'l'he Concept and Applicability of International Law
What is meant

by international law?

In basic conception, inter-

national. law consists of a common body of norms or principles which are
used in the sctlution of diverse international problems.

It is essential

that such norms or principles be applied consistently in order to promote
the objectivity and uniformity associated w1 th "law" as opposed to ad hoc.
or unprincipled decisi on-making in which a different ulterior rule is
developed or executed for each problem.

Upon the basis of this premise,

international law may be accurately regarded. as a set of lllliform principles which require at least minimum standards of reasonable and humane
conduct in the world community.

It is also important to recognize that

the principles of international law are established.
ment.

by consent and agree-

Express agreement is usually termed treaty or conventional law,
'

and implicit agreement is usually te:nned customary law.

Both are based

primarily upon the consent of states as manifested by their governments,

although

other pa.,rticipants including international public bodies and

individuals have a role to play.

Among the public bodies which act in

the development and acceptance of international law, the League of Nations
and United. Nations are particularly important.

The League of Nations

Covenant and the United Nations Charter are multilateral treaties agreed

to by their members, as well as being the basic constitutions for the
world community at their respective time periods.
A third element is legally indispensable to a practical conception
of international law: Even the most just and widely accepted. principles

2
of

law, such as those contained i n the League Covenant

and

United

Ja:tions Charter, are ineffectual i n protecting human rights unless
"they are actually enforced

and sanctioned.

International law involves

a whole sanctioning process ra?\ging from exclusive reliance upon per

suasive procedures at one extreme to heavy reliance upon coercive
aeasures at the other extreme, w1 th many intermediate stages including
economic sanctions.

As a general approach, the more coercive sanctions

15houl.d be increasingly used where the persuasive ones have been found
to be ineffective., There are very few situations either in international

ar.11unicipal law where �nforcement procedures are either completely effec
-tive or totally ineffective.

Consequently, the most relevant questions

concerning sanctions ares How effective is the present sanctions process
and what steps may be taken· to improve it?
A fourth element which requires specification is that among the

inst!tutions created to serve mankind, the state is not above international
law.

Since states and their governments have the preeminent role in making

international law, it i s essential that they be held accountable for full
compliance w1 th 1t.

As a practical matter this means the personal account

abill ty of government officia;ls which was established in international law

by the N uremberg Trial before the International Mi.11 tary Tribunal.

'The

Nuremberg Principles of the individual responsibility of government
officials adopted by the United Nations General Assembly! are applicable

to

officials of all governaents.
V1 th

regard to the historical Palestine Question, concerning

international law we aay

asks

Is it a relevant

and

practical aeans

achieve justice and peace in the Zionist-Palestinian.issue
Mlddle Ea.st in general?

It aay be stated

w1 th

to

and in the

historical assurance

that the great powers have used power politics, including a large aeasure
ot ailitary methods, to deal

w1th

the probleas of this area.

From this

historically accura'tie assurance it may be erroneously deduced that inter
national law has been an abysmal failure in the Middle Ea.st.
be

far more accurate to conclude that international law

Covenant ) has not even been applied or tried.

It would

( even of the

The unprincipled power

politics, conducted both domestically and intemationally, played in the
Ml.ddle Ea.st have papered over the fundamental causes of the conflict
s1 tuation and

have not even deal. t with the results of injustice and

Yiolation of law. 2

The outcome of this dismal approach to the problems

ot the area has been further militarization accompanied by indef1ni tely
protracted conflict and the increasing destruction of international

human ,

aa.terial. and legal values.
Because of the abysmal failure of the techniques which have been
utilized, international law is no longer only an ideal altemative, it is
also, considering the eighty-year old ongoing ideology of Zionism, the
only practical al temative to

an

indefinite continuation of the present

'

1!1ttaat1on which today has now. extended over nearly a full century. J
So.bsequently, the purpose of this thesis is to reveal that the Balfour
.Declaration is invalid under the criteria of international law and that
1nteznational law has, in actual! ty, never been invoked in the case of
the Palestinian Arab people nor in the Palestine Question.

Where the

provisions of the League Covenant and United Nations Charter on the
·•ndates and trusteeships system have been flouted or ignored over a
perl.od of nearly sixty yea.rs

(1919-1977), there is a juridical obligation

of intervention to maintain the legiL]. principles of each and to provide
sanctions and enforcement to establish peace through justice and law.
Statement of the Propositions
Seven basic legal and historical propositions are advanced·with
-regard to the rights of the Palestinian people as defined under international
law.

Recalling that it is historically. obvious that the two promises

vbich Britain made in regard to Palestine, that is, the promise through

Sir Henry McMahon then British High Commissioner in Egypt

and

the Balfour

Declaration. were mutually exclusive and contradictory, the interesting
fact about the Balfour Declaration, however, is that 1 t was invalid and
incapable in law of affecting the rights which the Arab people have to
Palestine as the indigenous inhabitants whose ancestors had been in continuous occupation of the country for centuries previous to the Hebrew
invasion and in continuous occupation of the country for fourteen centuries.

s
Secomly, when the Br1 tish Cabinet aade the Balfour Declara.tion
1t did not possess sovereignty over Palestine and Britisb troops

had not

•t foot on Palestine soil, although llilitary occupation would have dis
allowed tmder the Laws of War., the

arbl trary

transfer or usurpation of the

country which was still w1 thin Turkish legal sovereignty.

The legal

position in this regard is depicted by the well-known legal maxim that
•no one can glve that which he has not got."
'lhimly, the fact that the Bal.four Declaration was poll tically
incorporated into the Palestine Mandate (not in the international man

dates system) would not be valid against the Palestinian Arabs to dis
possess them of title to Palestine, or to give t1Ue to the alien Zionists,
tor

the League of Nations also did not own Palestine.

law a country belongs to 1 ts people,

1 ts

Under international

rightful indigenous

1nhab1 tants.

Fourthly, the Balfour Declaration and the provisions of the man
date were contrary to the letter and the spirit of the League of Nations
Covenant, Article 22(1) of wh+ch provides that in regard to mandated ter
ri torles the League acted on "the principle that the well-being and devel
oiaent of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization."

It should

be logically and legally noted that an unprincipled plan designed to con
'Mrt

the Arab

1nhab1 tants

of Palestine, who formed more than. 93 per cent

of the cotmtry' s population at the end of World W'ar I, into a minor! ty
in a preplanned predominantly--or, as

1t

eventually turned out, an almost

6

exclusively--Jewish State
is not a plan which can

(and

one controlled by Zionist institutions

)

be said to take genuine cognizance of the "well

being and developnent" of the Palestinian Arab people.
Fifthly, even assuming that the Briti.sh government was in law
capable of making a "promise" about the future of Palestine to people
other than the country's inhabitants, the Bal.four Declaration did not
mean what the Zionists have erroneously claimed it aeant.

For the Declar

ation spoke of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people
in Palestine--not a state comprising the whole or part of Palestine.
other woxds, even in violation of international law,

In

there was to be an

arbitra.rily declared and invoked against the will or assent of the people
of Palestine a shelter or refuge for "Jews" in Palestine, no more.
Sixthly, unprincipled decisions created against those whose
rights are effected but not legally consulted for concurrence are invalid
in international law.

'Ihe negotiating history of the Balfour Declaration

not only reveals secret and private negotiations but, also, that the
Palestinian peo1'J.e were completely excluded from the stealthy discussions
despite the fact that their future status was being secretly jeopardized.
Lastly, in the context of international law and universal morality,
the Palestine Arab case--if a case needs to be made at all--stems in
essence from the principle that the only title which any people has to
its country comes from birth and long and continuous possession.

This is

7

a crlterlon which is recognized as the international legal basis of the
btegrity and security of all nations; no just and stable international
cn:der

can

endure in the world on any other foundation.

Contribution to Political Science
The object of this thesis is to analyze the legal issues that
arlse from the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and its inclusion in
the Palestine Mandate.

The wr1ter has subjected to a critical legal anal

ysis the principal facts and developments in the evolution of the Declarat1on and Zionism's dependence upon it as a "legal" title to the Arab home
land.

Until now no solution has been found or suggested for the Palestine

Z1on1st conflict that takes in-to account the principles of international
law and justice.

While one might wonder whether any useful purpose is

served by an examination of the legal aspec�s of· a Palestine conflict
.
created

by unprincipled extra-legal power politics and maintained by il

legal mill tary force, the wr1. ter believes that an analysis is needed of
the appropriate legal purview of this issue which has been buried under a
aass of distortion, misinformation and insidious one-sided propaganda
which, in turn, have misrepresented historical and legal facts and veiled
·the truth of the conflict to the extent that the victims are made to ap
pear as being the wrongdoers and the wrongdoers as the victims.
Vithout an understanding of the conflict in the light of the
principles of international. law and justice, regardless of conditions

8

created by force, peace efforts will remain futile.

To this end, the

historical analysis is largely derived from primary Zionist sources and
the official documents now available from British Cabinet, Foreign Office
and Colonial Office papers w1 th minutes and memoranda wr1 tten by those
who have gone down in history.

'Ihese documents are left to speak for

themselves and to show what led to one of the most intractable problems
of today.

'nle legal methodology of this paper simply applies the rele-

vant legal crl terla of universal international law in which the law applicable to Palestine appears from the fundamental principles of the
League's Covenant and mandates system and the legal rulings of the international courts of justice.

Integrated into these international juristic

principles is the legal criteria establishing the universally applied
doctrine of self-determination that was so jarringly effaced in the case
of Palestine.
'lh1 s effacement was succinctly stated by Ambas sad.or Loy W.
Henderson, then serving as the director of the Office of Near Eastern and
African Affairs in the United States Department of State.

In a top-secret

aemoran�µm to the American Secretary of State of September 22, 1947
Henderson declared:

[

'lbese proposals of the majority of the United Nations Special
Comm! ttee on Pales tin
, for instance� ignore such principles as
self-detennination and majority rule.
'!hey recognize the principles
of a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances
as to discriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons
outside of Palestine.4

�

Inevitably, it was necessary to be selective in the choice of

)
.
extracts from the wealth of material available, but selection has been
made on the basis of relevance to the sequence of events.

It has not

been possible in every case to give a document or source in its entirety

9
far

reasons of length,

repetition or the inclusion of irrelevant aatter,

but references are given in each case so that readers wishing to study the
fDll version aay do

so.

-Finally, the wr1 ter fervenily hopes that those

interested in the Palestine problea will avail theasel�es of the h1stor1eal and legal information on this topic to objectively acquaint them
selves with the serious issues of the ongoing Palestinian-Zionist conflict.
Because the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government depends on
an

1nfomed and intelligent c1 tizenry.

Nowhere is the making of intelli

gent choices more important than in foreign affairs.

It may be safely

adjmged that had Americans in,formed themselves of the Zionist program
in Palestine, had all its defects, violations and policies been examined
cr1 tically and dispassionately, it is pos� ble that the American people
would never have allowed its government to support politically a Zionist
aovement whose aim was to create an exclusivist Jewish State on the
absurdity of a racial ideology postulating lineal descent from ancient
Hebrews.
Clarif'lcat1.on of Word and Concept Symbols
Words without specified referents are highly ambiguous and are
capable of having multiple and inconsistent meanings ascribed to them by
1lrl ters and readers.

In order to achieve ·clarity it is important to set

forth def'lnitions connected with key word symlx>ls which appear throughout
this stuiy.

It is recognized that dependent on pol1 tical exigencies and

biased ignorance these same word symlx>ls. are used by others, especially
Zionists, with different interpretations than those employed here.

The

m. ter has consistently applied definitions utilized by anti-Zionist
1.Dlividuals and organizations most of which are Jewish.

In se.tting forth

10

a religious concept.ion of "Jew" and "Judaism" the wr1 ter is adopt.1.ng a
basic tenet of tra.di t.1.onal.

and

contemporary Judaism.

It should be immedi

ately noted that Jews are not accepted by scientific social science
disciplines as composing a dist.1.nct racial type, that is, they
llembers of a •race".
between Israelis,

are

not

Moreover, it is of utmost importance to distinguish

Zionists and Jews.

'lbese fundamental defini t.1.ons must

be understood at the beginning in order to provide clarl ty for the subsequent appraisals in this study.
Palestine is the area bordered by the Mediterranean on the east, the
Jordan River on the west, the Golan Mountains and the Sea of Galilee
on the north, and the Negev and Sinai Deserts on the south. 'lbe
Palestinian Arabs have inhabited this area since t.1.me immemorial.
Since 1948, however, after the forceful military creation of the
"State of Israel" on the same territory, the Palestinian people have
been living in forced exile.
'lbroughout the entire Islamic era pre
ceding the creation of the Turkish Ottoman empire, Palestine remained
an identifiable region with more or less autonomous local government

and administration. 'Ihis system was not only continued but in fact
markedly increased under Turkish rule when Palestinian elected rep
resentatives actually sat in the Turkish national assembly.
Palestine
remained, with its people, an identifiable part of the Islamic nation
as well as the Turkish Ottoman empire as did other regions, such as
Egypt, until England perfidiously established with the help of the
League of Nations a protectorate over Palestine.
However, even that
colonial device, the mandate system, created against the will of the
Palestinian people, spoke of the "provisionally independent state of
Palestine."
'lbe mandate system was predicated on the existence of a
Palestinian entity which under the mandator's administration was to
develop into complete independence.
While it should be emphasized that "Jews" are not a race, neither are
the "Arabs" a race nor is the word "Arab" identical with Islam, the
religion which sprang up among the Arabs and to which the majority
of the Arabs today adhere. Primarily, the word Arab is a linguistic
concept and with the language comes a culture, a literature.

Broadly, Arabs are those who speak the Arabic language as. their
mother tongue and inhabit what has been called, traditionally, Arabia,
or in more recent days, the Arab world.
There are Arabs who are
Moslems, Christians and who are Jews.
As for example, the Jews of
Iraq, dating from ,586 B.C., if not earlier, were a completely Arabized
community, spoke Arabic among themselves, introduced Arabic into their
religious services, and wrote Arabic in Hebrew characters for their
correspondence.

'lbeir social life was that of Arabs.5
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Jew refers to a voluntary adherent of the religion of Judaism. '!he
word is used by the writer to refer to an adherent of Judaism in the
same way that Christian refers to an adherent of Christianity.
Consequently, the sole element in the writer's use of the world Jew
is the religious one. Sepha:rdim Jews are Arabs while Ashkenazim
Jews are Europeans. Many Jewish communities like the one in Russia
are descendants of the Kha zars who are not Semites but rather, ac
co:rding to Encyclopedia Judaica "a Turkish stock", who merely con
verted to Judaism. Palestinian Arabs ( both Muslims--of the Islamic
religion--and Christians ) and Sepha:rdim Jews, who are Arabs ( some are
converts from Islam to Judaism ), are extracted from Semitic peoples
that inhabited the Middle East for the last 10, 000 years. It should
not be necessary to emphasize the fact that there is no empirical
basis upon which Jews can be deemed to be members of a single racial
group which is a postulate of Zionism. For an excellent review of
the distinction between racial conceptions in anthropology and non
scientific racist ideologies see Comas, Racial Myths ( UNESCO, 19;8),
pp. 27-32·
Judaism refers simply to one of the universal monotheistic religions.
A Zionist ls an adherent or supporter of the poll tical doctrine of
programs of Zionist organizations and need be neither an Israeli
national nor a Jew, examples of which are Senator Henry Jackson,
Vice-President Walter Mondale and Patrick Moynihan, fo:rmer American
Ambassador to the United Nations! Significantly, a Zionist adheres
to the doctrine that all Jews are possessors of a universal "Jewish"
nationality and that the State of I'srael constitutes the national
home of all Jewry, which is described in Zionist poll tical ideology
as "the Jewish people" doctrine. American Zionist are part of an
intricate organizational structure of the World Zionist Organiza.tion
Amertcan Section, which is registered w1 th the United States De·partment
of Justice as an "agent for a foreign govemment." Interestly, the
United Jewish Appeal, which 1 s part of this organizational and inter
locking corporate structure, is a United States tax-exempt organization
despite being part of a structure that is an adm1 tted and registered
agency of a foreign government and that channels its collected funds
to Israel. To illustrate the degree of the Israeli Government's
control over such organizations as the B'Nai B'Rith, see Joftes v.
Kaufman, Civil Action Suit No. 3271-67 (1969), United States District
Court, District of Columbia, wherein Mr. Joftes, the International
Secretary of the B'Nai B'Rith revealed that that organization fell
under Israeli Zionist control.
Non-Zionist is a tenn created by Chaim Weizmann for those who are
generally Jews, that is, they may be non-Jews as well, but reject
"Jewish" nationalism ( Zionism ) but do not actively or vocally oppose
1 t.
*For a description of the Zionist and pro-Zionist poll ti cal activities
on the part of these and many other American poll tical figures for the
State of Israel, see any of the various reports by the American Jewish
Alternatives to Zionism organization which rejects Zionism and the
Zionist ideology of the State of Israel.
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anti-Zionist is a Jew who identifies himself or herself as "Jewish"
by virtue of religious affiliation which entails no acceptance o f
I n short, they do
transnational nationalistic o r ethnic obligations.
not accept the Zionist "the Jewish people" nationality claim or racial
doctrine.

An

Isxael constitutes the poll tical embodiment of "the Jewish people"
ideological doctrine relied upon by Zionism, an ideology that controls
"'I'he Jewish people" doctrine is the most
the Israeli Government.
a11b1guous concatenation of world and word symbols employed by Zionism.
Although the term does not appear in Holy Writ, it was g:t ven an almost
exclusively religious meaning until the founding of political Zionism
in 1897.
Its most usual use was as a synonym for "Jews," for
"Israleites," "the Children of Israel,"
"the people of the nook,"
aaong other Biblical depictions. The Zionist political movement has

and

captured the term for its own political purposes and, consequently,
the writer uses "the Jewish people" to refer to the claimed trans
national constituency of Zionist secular nationalism. Even though
the Zionist State of Israel gives a specific nationalistic meaning
to the words, they have not rejected whatever political advantages
Incidentaly, inter
accrue to them from the ambiguities of the words.
national legal instiutions and municipal law of all states except
Israel reject this purely political doctrine.

An

Israeli is simply a national of the State of Israel or a legal

citizen of Israel under principles of naturalization recognized by
customary international law. It should be noted that most of the
remaining Palestinian Arabs in Israel do not have, nor are allowed,
"Isxaeli" citizenship by the Israeli Government.
1he tem World Zionist Organization is used to refer to the poll ti.cal
entity constituted by the First Zionist Congress in 1897.
It is an
international instrumentality controlled by Israel and designed to
achieve the political objects -Of Zionism.
Since the 1922 League of
Nations mandate for Palestine the term has been equivalent to the
tem "Jewish Agency." Article 4 of the mandate recognized the
Zionist Organization as the Jewish Agency.
'!he writer consequently
uses the term to refer to the World Zionist Organization, including
its individual and group members such as its affiliate the Zionist
Organization of America. "Israel" and the World Zionist Organization
are employed as the two principal political instruments of Zionist
nationalism.
'!he term Zionist-Israel Sovereignty is used to refer to the integral
relationship between the State of Irael and the Zionist Organization.
'lbe public law character of this relationship between Israel and the
Zionist Organization is recognized explicitly in the Israeli Status
Law of 1952 and the ensuing Covenant between the Government of Israel
the Zionist Executive of 19.54.
'!he Covenant spells out an allo

and

cation and coordination of goYernmental functions as between State

and Organization in furthering the Zionist poll tical objectives of both.
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Political Zionism, founded in 1897 by Theodor. Herzl, postulates that
anll-Semit!S11 is ineradicable and upon this doctrine, the Zionists
l:ase their jurldical-political. objectives that "the Jewish people"
be constituted as a national! ty entity and that meabership in 1t be
conferred upon all Jews wherever they are liVing. We must recall
that the Zionist interpretation of "Jews" is a racial group interpre
tation. A juridically novel device is the distinction in Israeli
aunicipal law between "nationality" reserved. to Jews and "citizenship"
tor Israelis (or those who live in Israel) who may also be non-Jews,
such as in the case of a few Arab Palestinians. 'lbis distinction appears
in identification documents released in Israel by the Ministry of
Interior and was brought to world attention by the famed Shallt case
where the children of Commander Shalit of the Israeli Navy, an Israeli
and a Jew, were denied Jewish national!ty because their mother was a
6
.
Christian.
Since the word J udenstaat is used frequently throughout this paper 1t
is iaportant to acknowledge 1 ts Z1on1stic defi.ni tion. The word
Judenstaat derives from the publication of Theodor Herzl's political
document Der JOO.enstaat (The Jewish State).7 Herzl proposed a schematic
plan for the national consolidation of all Jews which in Zionist political
jargon translates into "the Jewish people." Herzl concluded that the
solution to what he called "the Jewish question" was to separate Jew
t'roa non-Jew by creating an exclus1v1st Jewish State.
To Herzl the
location of such a Jewish State was immaterial. He regarded Argentina,
Uganda (which today is Kenya) and Palestine as equally accepta.ble.8
F.ach of these areas represented to Herzl the national homeland of all
Jews to which the "world Jewish nation" was to be centered and exclusively
Jewish. Under the influence of the existing Love of Zion movement in
Eastern Eu.rope, however, Herzl soon came to regard Arab Palestine as
the desirable Jewish homeland or JOO.enstaat.9 Herzl wrote in Der
Judenstaats "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an old
ones It is the establishment of a State for the Jews." In German it is:
"Der Gedanke, den ich in dieser Schrtft ausfiihre, 1st ein ural ter. Es 1st
die Herstellung des Judenstaat.es." The meaning of Herstellung in French
"
is etablissement. In modem Zionist texts--for example, 'llle Zionist Idea,
ed. Arthur Herzberg, New York, 19 59--the meaning is subtly altered to be
coae 1 "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is an ancient one:
It is the restoration of the Jewish State." The German for "restoration..
would be Wiederherstellung; if Herzl had used 1 t, it would have implied
that he wanted the revival of the ancient entity in Palestine called
wisrael", which was far from his political national conception in Der
Judenstaat. It should be noted that no "Jewish State" or "Israelite nation"
in ancient Palestine or Canaan had ever exercised control over the coastal
plain, inhabited by Phoenicians and Philistines, let alone Sina.1, Lebanon
and northern Syria.
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'Ibe term "the Jewish people" in Zionist jargon is the most ambiguous
concatenation of word symbols employed in this study of the :Balfour
Declaration. Al though the term does not appear in Holy Writ, 1 t was
given an almost exclusively religious meaning until the founding of
poll tical Zionism by Herzl in 1897. 1be Zionist movement has captured
the term for its own juridical-political purposes and , consequently,
the writer uses "the Jewish people" to refer to the claimed consti
tuency of Zionist secular nationalism although extremist religious
groups in Israel employ the term in the same way. Even though the
Zionists give a specific secular nationalistic meaning to the words,
they have not rejected whatever.political advantages accrue to them
from the ambiguities of the words. This Zionist doctrine is based on
a genetical or racial affinity between the Hebrews of 4000 years ago
and the Russian, Polish, American and European Jews of today; in
essence 1 t is the embodiment of a distinct Jewish race by which
Zionists mean an undiluted racial continuity of blood, culture,
history and destiny similar in doctrinal principal to the Nazi Aryan
racial concept. In actual fact, _the Jews of Europe have no anthropo
logical connection whatsoever with the Jews of Pal�stine. '!be current
European political leaders of Israel, as well as the Jewish immigrants
who hail from Central :s:urope, Poland, Russia and even the United States,
are of Khazar extraction, descendants of Caucasian Russians whom
Byzantine Jews converted to Judaism in the mid-eight century.
The confusion arising out of the novel "Jewish people" Zionist claim
is easily understood. Prior to the political creation of the 1897
Zionist Judenstaat scheme, which· was mill tarily imposed in 1948, a
political concept which would replace nationality or citizenship and
emotionally attract some form of political allegiance was tacticaJ.ly
indispensable to the Zionist scheme for a Judenstaat. Consequently,
once the Zionist State was established and the municipal legal power
to arbitra.ri. ly but unila terially confer Israeli citizenship was gained,10
the "Jewish people" concept had to be legitimized in order to further
Zionist goals. "Jewish nationality, 11 which is borrowed from Halakahic
law or the religious law of the ancient Hebrews, is decreed by contem
porary Israeli secular laws. Halakah, or the religious law of the
ancient Hebrew people, religiously applied to adherents of Judaism;
the group to which it appl.te·s transposes to the Hebrew Le'om, or
•peoplehood." Zionist secular! sts or n�tionalists (such as Herzl,
Sokolov and Weizmann) captured the most meaningful words and phrases
from Halakahic law, gave them secularist definitions in order to achieve
secularistic/nationalistic ambitions: these purely secular goals are
outlined in the Zionist Ba.sle program of 1897.
From the religious premise of the ancient Hebrew Halakalic law, Zionists
easily transposed political or secular definitions, the "Jewish people"
polltical concept being one. Am Yi sroel, the "people of Israel," a
phrase in the lituigy of Judaism, has been similarly transformed into
"the Jewish people. 11 "The Jewish people" in recent centuries had been
the most appropriate term to describe or depict (Jewish) religionists
who still religiously respect the theological Covenant and its reli
gious calling. Th.is definition of the Jews was particularly appropri-

l.S

ate in the Middle Ages and through the nineteenth century when Jews
neither a land-base nor the organ!zed, secular demand for one.
During that period, "the Jewish people .. was a purely religious des
crtption for Jews.* It simply acknowledged the religious collectivity
which had made a sincere com.mi tment to God, and the ind1viduality which
1.aplled the fulfillment of that c ommi taent at any place on earth, with
out a common secular or polltical coma.1 tment. 'lba.t clear distinction
became blurred in the drive of the nineteenth century minority national
isas, and purposely so in the Zionist insistence upon "Jewish" .national
isa. The creators of "Jewish" nationalism (or Zionism) adopted the
phrase "the Jewish people" and made 1t synonymous with nineteenth
century political-nationalistic aspirations }l
bad

Lastly, the

wr1

ter acknowledges that Palestine is historically

a geographical name of rather ioose application. Et111ological strictness would require it to denote exclusively the

w s1:trip of coast-

narro

land once 1nhab1ted by the Philistines, from whose name it is derived.
'lbe modern sub:livisions under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Eapire
were in no sense conterminous with those of antiquity, and hence do not
&ffo:rd a boundary by which Palestine can be separated exactly froll the
rest of Syria in the north, or from the Sinai and Arabi.an deserts in
the south and east. Consequently, there is no ancient geographical
tem
any

that 1nflex1 bly delineates the

known as Palestine; nor 1s there

reason as pertains to this thesis to reach back into antiquity be

cause

the Zionist-Palestinian conflict begins with the 1880s, with

specific
an

area

ag1tation

starting after the 1897 Basle meeting which implemented
activist and organized political Zionism in Palestine. Consequently,

*It has been stated by Chaim Weizmann himself that his claimed constituency
of "the Jewish people" in the discussions leading to the Balfour Declaration
was a fabrication subsequently conceded by him. Refer to the public
address by Weizmann at Czernowitz, Roumania, December 12, 1927, in Goodman,
ed., Chai m Weizmann, Tribute in Honour of His Seventieth Birthday (1945),
P• 199 .

16

�r the purposes of this paper, the wr1ter J!lUSt select an &rb1 trary
mt appropriate historical departure point on what entails the area

of "Palestine."

'lberefore, the demographic area w�ch included a

people known historically as Palestinians at the time of the Zionist
.alien encroachments is designated as Palestine in this paper.
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FOOTNOTES
Chapter One
11 United Nations GAOR 1144 (1946); G . A. Res. 95 ( I ) ; Uni ted Nations
Doc. A/2'36 (1946 ) . The principles also appear in 45 American Journal
of International Law Suppl ement, Documents (195 1 ) , p. 125 .
2'lbe most recently declassified. and published United States Govern
aent materials which demonstrate this appear in (1947) Foreign Relations
of the United States, vol. 5, (1971), pp. 999-1328. Recently released.
official documents of the British Government show how decisions were
made and policy fonnulated. Doreen Ingrams presents anhistorical
compilation of these records in Palestine Pa ers 1917-1 22: Seeds of
Conflict (New York: George Braziller, Inc . , 1973
•

3rt may be easily predicted with considerable assurance that i f the
present Middle East Peace Conference is to reach toward peace based upon
justice, i t will have to utilize the principled criteria of international
law. Another so-called "practical settlement" based upon naked power
bargaining and expedient unprincipled calculation will provide a short
interlude between more serious intense hostilities.
4 Forei
Relations of the United. States 1 47, Vol. V ( Washington,
D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 , p. 1157.
5ror a discussion of the rights, duties and roles of the non-Muslim
communities during the Islamic and Ottoman ( 15 34-1914 ) rule periods see:
H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West (London : Oxford
University Press, 1957), Vol. I, part II, pp. 207-261 ; Majid Khadduri,
"Intemational Law, " in Majid Khadduri and Herbert J. Liebesny, eds . ,
Law in the Middle East ( Washington, D. C. : The Middle East Institute, 1955 ),
Vol . I, pp. 349-373; Yusif Ri zq-Allah Ghanimah , A History of the Jews of
!!!:9. (Arabic ) ( Baghdad : al-Furat Press, 1924 ) ; Cecil Roth, The Sassoon
Dynasty (London: Robert Hale Ltd . , 194 1 ) ; Israel Joseph Benjamin II,
Ei
t Years in Asia and Africa from 1846 to 18
(Hanover: Published
by the author, 1859
When Palestine was illegally dismembered in 1948,
Palestine ' s Arab population numbered. l, J98, 000. According to the best
estimates, that population is now approximately 3,500, 000 scattered about
in forced exile by Zionism.
•

6 shalit v . Minister of Interior, 2 3 P.D. 477-608 (1969), noted in
Israel Law Review (1970 ) , pp. 259-263. For an excellent review of
citizenship complex! ties in the State of Israel see Dr. Uri Davis, "'!be
Land Where Palestinians are 'Non-persons' , " Palestine Digest, July, 1976,
PP• l- J 1 Noman F. Dacey, "Democracy"in Israel, Southbury, Conn. 1 The
American-Palestine Committee, 1976, pp. 7-9. It will simply be noted here
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that the Israeli Nationall ty Law makes 1 t possible for a non-Jew to be
born in the terrl tory under Israeli poll ti.cal jurisdiction and yet be
clooaed to inherited statelessness.
'!be Israeli Ministry of Interior
bas to date refused to publish official. statistics on the number of
stateless Palestinian Arab residents under Israeli law. 'Ibis is one
of Israels most guarded secrets.
It is also interesting tO n<?te that
according to the Israel National!ty Law Part 1 , ·Section 2s Nationa.11 ty
by Return, a Jewish infant born in Israel. after the establishment of
the state in 1948 acquires Israel nationality not by birth, but by
return as a Jewish immigrant under the law of Return. In Israel, once
Palestinians have passed 21 years of age w1 thout applying for citizen
ship, they have completely lost their right to ci tizen·ship and must
pass their "stateless" status on to their offspring.
·

7'lheodor Herzl, '!be Jewish State (New Yorki The Maccabean Publishing
Ccapany, 1904) .
&rbeocior Herzl, '!be Jewish State {Der J\K!.enstaat ), trans. by Harry
(New Yorks The Herzl Press, 1970), p. 10. In keeping with Zionist
pollti.cal doctrines the esta,blishment of Jewish setilements was :f'.rom
the outset based. on the displacement of the indigenous population. See,
for example, the provisions of the Jewish National Fund as early as the
turn of the century. · It should be noted that Israel ha.s been ruled since
1948 by a group of Zionists predominantly of F.a.stern European origin
to whom a Jewish State and Jewishness mean a state b&sed on the culture
of F.astern European Jewry. Herzl wrote, "Is Palestine or Argentina
preferable? '!be Society {of Jews) will take whatever it is given and
whatever is favored by the public opinion of the Jewish people. The
Society will detel.'mine bOth points" (p. 10).
Zohn

·

9rb1.d. � p . 27 . "The idea which I develop in this pamphlet is
age oldOne s the establishment of a Jewish State.•

an

1°tsrael1 c1 tizenship, under Zionist ideology, · 1s distinguished from
J"9wish national! ty and religious a.ffillation The Zionist State main
tains 1 ts exclusive secular jurisdiction over religious matters by
conveniently preserving a misleading category of Jewish nationality in
adM. tion to Israeli citizenships Israeli identity cards and birth
certificates not only have those two categories listed separately,
but to further accentuate the Zionist ideology, a third category for
religion is added. Thus,
Israeli Jew i s a. citizen of Israel, a.
Jewish national and a. Jew by faith. In the case of "Jewish nationals"
Israel' s Zionist establishment ell tes are applying "the Jewish people"
Tacl.al concept.
•

a.n

.
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11

A distinction must be made in Zionist ideology between the
"Israel" const1 tutes
concepts "the Jewish people" and "Israel . "
the 1948 geographical poli ti.cal embodiment of the "Jewi sh people"
doctrine relied upon by Zionism.
'!be distinction may be made clear
by recognizing that the Israeli Supreme Court, a Zionist instrument,
held in Attorney General of Israel v . Eichmann , that "'!be connection
between Jewish people and the State of Israel constitutes an integral
part of the law of nations • • • • "
Supreme Court of Israel , Criminal
App . No. '.336/61 , ft'ay 29 , 1962 ) .
It should also be noted that in this

(

·case of Eichmann's trial the Zionist doctrine of "the Jewi sh peopl e"
was clearly enunciated by the Israeli Court.
Israel is, in Zioni st
doctrine, one of the two principal political instruments of Zionist
nationali SJll .
'!be other i s the World Zionist Organization, which i s
as o f 19.54 an official poli ti.cal 1nstr'llle
l nt o f the Israeli government.
The public law relationship between the State of Israel and the World
Zionist Organization or Jewi sh Agency i s recognized expli citly in
the Israeli Status Law of 1952 and the ensuing Covenant between the
Israeli government and the Zionist Organi zation ' s Executive body of
19.54. It must be made clear that contrary to. the Israeli Supreme
Court interpretation in the Eichmann case the connection between
"Jewi sh people" and "Israel" has never been accepted as an "integral
part of the law of nations . "

(

)

CHAPTER II

IN PERSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF
PRE-WORLD WAR I JEWISH-ZIONIST IMMIGRATION ACTIVITIES
· p.ALE:)'.I'INE

An

analysis of juridical rights of fore1:gners under the Ottoman

Ca.pitulations treaties and in accordance wi:th the diplomatic customs of
this period is technical .
to·

But we can contribute some legal ·thoughts

thi s problem, for which Turkey, naturally wishing to be sovereign

in its own terrl tory, 1 shortly upon the outbreak of World War I denoimced the imposed Western Capi tul.ations:
'!he Department of State was officially informed by the Turkish
Ambassador on September 10, 1914 , that on and after the first of
October the Ottoman Government had determined to abrogate the con
ventions known as the "Capitulations" which he stated "restrict the
sovereignty of Turkey in her relations with certain P.owers. " The
United States is one of these Powers. It was further stated that
"all privilege and immunities accessory to these conventions or
issuing therefrom are equally repealed . " The purpose was to re
move "an intolerable obstacle to all progress in the Elnpire , "
and the relations of Turkey to the Powers were . to be regulated
henceforth by "the general principles of international law. 112
Through the Capitulations the Ottoman Empire formulated the
custom of granting legal immunity to non-citizens (foreigners or non
Turkish residents based on Turki sh territory) and peoples conq.uered and
incorporated under Istanbul 0 s ruling authority (�n - example i s PalestiID;an s ) .
'lhe Istanbul. authorities were inclined to do so by means of the reason
·of the difference between the law of the Koran applying to subjects of
the Islamic faith and the laws of the non-Islamic countries.

The es-

sential fact to be denoted i s simply that the Turks in the midst of their
territorial acquisitions spontaneously and generously recognized the
right of the conquered to be governed by their own laws and customs in
21atters held sacred by the Muslims, as well as in matters not of vi tal
concern to the state.

Thi s ruling concept is what the Zionist Israel
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Za.ngwill partially referred to when he stated in 1921 :
Were the Arabs given their own way, i t i s certain they would put
a total em'OO.rgo upon Jewish immigration. But they are not to have
their way. Palestine is to be ruled like a Br1 tish crown colony,
and its inhabitants have lost the democratic rights which they
enjoyed even under Turkey. J
Whatever may have been the historical reasons and political mot.1.ves guiding the Ottoman Turks in their policy towards their non-Muslim
subjects, whether of tolerance, statesmanship, or practical political
necessity, i t is sufficient for the purpose of determining the origin
and nature of the extraterri tori.al prvileges of foreigners in Turkey,
simply to note in thi s connection that without the threat of powerful
armies and battleships, the Chri stians, Jews and other subjects of the
Sultan received extensive immunities of legal jurisdiction resembling in
certain respects those subsequently granted to non-subject foreigners.

'!be origin of the juridical rights of foreigners, commonly
termed Capitulations, in the Ottoman Empire reveals the distinction
between Ottoman law and the concept of international law or legal custom
employed by the Western nations.

'Ibe contrast reveals how alien peoples

(foreigners) coming together have been allowed to retain their legal
customs and to have their actions tested or reviewed juridically by
their separate legal standards; that i s to say, how law was regarded as
personal, traveling with the person and controlling his actions, instead
of territorial, in the Anglo-Saxon sense of applying to all persons irrespect!ve of national! ty within the poll tically recognized sovereign
boundaries.

'!be Turks by reason of their reverence for custom in general

felt constrained to recognize the customs of subject nationalities or
peoples incorporated in the Empire .

It was rather the acknowledgment of

the general practice of the times--a conformity to the accepted rules of
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international intercourse .

If, however,

of international legal custom

(i . e . ,

the act of voluntary acceptance

the confirmation by Sultan Mohammed

of the ancient poll tical and commercial privileges granted to the mer
chants of Genoese of Galata i n

1453)

i s accepted,

legal rights of the Venetians a year later

the recogni tion o f the

( April 15, 1454)

assumed still

the legal context of voluntary arrangements even though the rights o f the
Venetians resulted from a treaty concluded at Adrlanople.

'Ibis treaty

looms as very significant because i t became the precursor ,

but net. proto

type , of later agreements between Turkey and Western nations,
temed Ca.pi tulations,

commonly

but in a different context.

The two treati e s standing out beyond all others in the matter of
Western world Ca.pi tulations are the treaty of

a.nd Francis I of France, and that of
these treati es,

w1th

1740

1535

between Sul tan Soliman

tetween Turkey and France ;

as well as others, inured to the benefit of the nations

polltical and commercial interests in �he Ottoman Empire and would

help generate the destruction of sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire .

It

may be said that France first obtained for the rest the major immunities
of legal jurisdiction claimed by all the Powers in the subsequent treati e s ;
incrementally these Powers secured special privileges through the process
of forcing " juridical" extraterrl tori.all ty, making the Ottoman authorities
legally impotent against foreign non-subject nationals in the Empire .
'!be United States was one of the beneficiaries of the French treatie s ,
claiming and exercising legal juri sdiction in the Ottoman Empire i n ac
cordance with the Treaty of

1830

between the two countri es, until

1914

when Turkey denounced the imposed Western Capitulati ons.
This juridical system of one-sided "international law" obtaining
in Turkey,

by which foreign governments exercised legal jurisdiction on
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Turkey' s soil (Palestine was part of Turkish sovereignty) , was humiliating;
in fact, it denoted that up to 1914 ( the First World War) that Turkey
was not .al.lowed, in the context of the dichotomous Western view of
"international. law" due respect to the sovereign rights of Turkey as
an

independent, equal state in the family of nations.

In other words,

aven in 1914, according to the basic principlesof international. law as
regards the juridical. concept of soverei gnty, Turkey should have

had

legal jurisdiction over foreigners, as well as subjects, in all matters
affecting municipal public law and order in the Empire .

'!he presence

of usurper foreign consular courts, which decided all questions regarding their respective foreign nationals, violated the international law
concept of sovereignty.

'lhese foreign tribunals illegally disavowed

Turkey's sovereign rights.

A

nation subnits to �uch illegal inroads

upon its sovereignty and its legitimate exerci se of jurisdiction over
those in its boundaries only when forced to do so; for these reasons
of violation of national. sovereignty, the Turkish Ambassador on Septem
rer 10, 1914, informed the American Government that his government
"determined to abrogate the conventions known as the ' Capitulations ' "
which "restricted the sovereignty of Turkey."
'!he subject of foreign imposed Capitulations is very relevant
to the subject treated in this paper because of the juridical violations,
in the context of international. law principles, of Turkish sovereignty
previous

to

the war ' s outbreak, and the illegal immigration, under the

imposed Capitulations, of Jews (and Zionists) into Pal.estine4 under the
external. protection (extraterritoriality) of foreign Powers .

Consequent

ly, it becomes necessary to di scuss the official policies of the Ottoman
Government with regard to illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine.
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Official Ottoman policy regarding Jewish settlement in Palestine5
1881 to 1917 was that the Ottoman state was strongly opposed from
·
the outset to modern Jewish settlement in Palestine . 6 'Ihe Ottoman
from

Government' s policy must be seen as a reaction to nationalism in general
and to Zionist nationalism in particular.

After 1880. the Ottoman Govern-

m�nt viewed nationalism which had poli ti. cal statehood or nationhood aims
as

a threat to the multi.ethnic, multi.national principle of state organ-

iza.tion on which the Ottoman comity was 1::ased.

:But, along with its owri

internal admini strative problems and deficiencies, the Porte was militar:Uy

unable to stand up to the various powerful external constraints

effectively imposed by the Great Powers.7
To

put its policy into practice, the Ottoman Government placed

restrictions on Jews, many of which were Zionists, entering Palestine
from 1882 onward s, policies designed to preve.nt Jewi � settlement in the
country, especially Palestine.

Ottoman opposition to Jewish settlement

was intensified in 1897 when the Zionist international (European) movement, seeldng a Jewish State in Palestine , was founded; in 1901 the restrictions against Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine were revised in the form of consolidat�d regulations.

:But, although Ottoman

policy and the reasons for i t (Zionism being one) was clear and consistent,
I

it failed.

'Ibis was partly because the restrictions were not complete

(for example , Jewish "pilgrims" were never

barred

from Palestine ) and,

importantly, because the European Powers refused to acquiesce in the
restrictions on the reason that they ran counter to the fo:rei gn privileges
they and their nationals enjoyed under the imposed Capitulations. 8
lieville Mandel writes:
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Even when the entry restrictions were most severe , Jews could always
Palestine as "pilgrims" and outstay their welcome. If the
(Ottoman) police tried to expel them, they could appeal to their
consuls, whose files are full of accounts of Jewish immigrants being
harri ed on reaching Palestine--precisely because the Jews made full
use of their consuls' protection. And there were few obstacles that
could not be overcome by reference to the Capitulations, either by
the consuls on the spot or by the Embassies at Constantinople where
higher authorl ty could be brought to bear. 9

vis1 t

In the summer of 19 03 David Levontin arrived in Jaffa to open the
Anglo-Palestine Company (the APC) . '!hi s bank was the first Zionist
institution, properly speaking in Palestine . But the Porte had
known of the bank ' s connection with the Zionist .Movement from the
moment its parent company, the Jewi sh Colonial Trust, was set up in
London in 1898.49 An introduction to �zim Bey from the Brl tish
Consul in Jerusalem did not help, and Levontin, soon encountered
obstacles in Jaffa where the APC' s offices were to be established.. 50
Indeed, by September 1 the Consul learned that the Porte had ordered
�zim Bey to obstruct the APC' s openi ng51 (on the l:asi s of orders
from Al:xiulhamid, if one of 'lheodor Herzl ' s rather dubious contacts
in Constantinople is to be believed)52. Only pressure from the
Brl tish Embassy at Constantinople made the Porte relent in November
1903 .53 In December Levontin was infonned that "the Company would
be permitted to conduct its affairs without hindrance, so long as
(Words in
1 t confined its operations to commercial matters" ..54 10
parentheses are from the orlgtnal . )
•

An

excellent example of Western encroachment of Turkish sovereign

ty both before and after 18 5611 occurred in 1847 when the Russians had
received from the British consul in Jerusalem a plan to transfer the
Russian Jews ( citizens of Czarist Russia) who were residing in Palestine
to Brl tish Consular protection because many of them stayed in Jerusalem
more than one year, in violation of the Russian law (municipal ) , and
therefore under the Capitulations remained without legal proil.ection; the
Turkish state was not allowed, even after the 18.56 Paris Treaty, to assume
this jurisdiction.
'!he nationalist currents and the political threat of having one
ethnic or religtous group concentrated in one area and claiming it as
independent terrl tory, posed an immediate threat to the idea of multiethnic, mul tireligious coexistence, which was the constitutional basis
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of the Ottoman state .

'Ille Jews in the Ottoman state enjoyed absolute

freedom of religion, culture, travel and occupation.

Until the 1870s

Jews like other Ottoman subjects were free to settle wherever they de
sired. .

As late as 1876 Sul tan Al:dulhamid repelled a Jewish scheme, pre

sented by Rabbi Joseph Natonek of Budapest ( October 21), for settling
"a substantial contingent from among three million European Jews, but
mostly from among Russian Jews1112 in Palestine.

'Ille emphasis of this

plan was similar to that of post-1897 Zionism because Natonek' s letter
suggested that a " special law" be enacted to regulate relations between
the "Jewish colonists" and the "native" Palestine population . 13
The Ottoman Government, responding to Natonek, declared that al
most all lands in Palestine were occupied, that the autonomy (Natonek' s
"Jewish" autonomy) Natonek requested was incompatible with the adminis
trative principles of a mul tiethnic and multireligious Ottoman state,
and most significantly, the government called Natonek' s attention to the
fact that immigration into the Ottoman state was open to all individuals
(as individuals) who wanted to establish themselves permanently as sub
jects of the state, and that there were legal regulations for settlement
which the Jews could use to do so.1 4

The Ottoman Government' s political

and legal position on any immigration was clear.

It allowed individuals,

regardless of religion or nationality, to emigrate to Turkey, but i t
would restrict mass settlement--it would not permit one ethnic or religious
group to establish numerical majority or exclusiveness in one specific
area. 15
1888 .

Several decrees to this effect were issued, in 1884, 1887 and

Yet, despite these clear decrees, certain Jewish individuals and

organizations as late as 190916 continued to propose mass Jewish settle
ment in the Ottoman state .
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Not disregarding other historical Jewish settlement plans, beginning in 1890, the question of Jewish immigration into Ottoman territory
became more than a serious concern for off'lcial del:ate and policy announcements.

Large groups of Jews from Russia and Roumani a sought to migrate

to the Ottoman state using any means available .

Many of these were either

Zionists or migrated under Zionist organizational auspices.
In 1896 the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA was a non-Zionist
organization founded in 1891 by Baron Maurice de Hirsch) became interested
/

in Jewish colonies in Palestine, sending its agent Joseph Niego in 1897
1
to inspect possible colonization sites. 7 Specif'lcally, the JCA turned
their political sights to the north of Palestine and east of the Jordan
River for reasons which should be made clear.
of

Acre were not

as

Land purchases in the Sancak

difficult as in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem.

Niego' s
/

inspection and views on Jewi sh colonization were shared by the JCA ' s first
full-time official in Palestine, David Haym, who reported in a JCA correspondence that the Ottoman authorities in the Mutasarri flik of Jerusalem
were opposed to organized Jewish settlement and referred all questions
directly to Constantinople, whereas Ottoman authorities in the Sancak of
Acre were more flexible and were prepared to present their superior, the
Vali of Beirut, with fai ts accomplis.
ed.

Accordingly, JCA' s attentions turn-

northwards and in 1900 the author! ties in Beirut infonned the Ottoman

Minister of Internal Affairs that some landowners wanted to sell land in
the region of
had

Tl berias

to Narci sse Leven, president of the JCA.

The JCA

intentions of installing groups of foreign Jews on the purchased lands

while evicting the Arab fellahin tenants who rented the lands from the
large Arab landowners. 18
It i s interesting to note that -in 1901--shortly after the consoli-
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dated regulations19 on Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine were
issued by the Ottoman Government--the Council of Ministers in Constanti
nople ruled that Leven, as a foreigner, was legally entitled under the
ottoman Land Code of 1867 to buy land in the Ottoman Empire , provided
the ottoman authorities were assured that Leven would not install foreign
colonizing Jews on the land. 20 Leven, acting as " simply a French Jew"
while actually quietly acting as representative of the foreign b:i.sed
JCA, sought to illegally cir.cumvent the 1901 Ottoman regulations which
specifically prohibited the sale of Ottoman land to Jews who maintained
residence abroad.

'lhrough

illegal circuitous routes, the JCA had managed

to acquire enough land from 1898 to 1901 for six Jewish colonies to be
established. in the north of Palestine between 1899 and 1904.
In June of

1904 land sales to all foreigners were prohibited with

out authority from the Porte .

When Ahmed Resid Bey, the Ottoman governor

of the Mutasarrl flik of Jerusalem, succeeded Kazim Bey in July of 1904,
one of his first actions was to send an official document to the foreign
consuls in Jerusalem reminding them of the legal restrictions on land
purchases by foreign Jews acting on behalf of foreign Jewish colonization
organizations or maintaining re;:rl.dence. abroad .

It is interesting to note

that no tender offered by the Anglo-Palestine Company (APc)2 1 for any
commercial concession or construction project in Palestine was ever ac
cepted by the Ottoman Government . 22
'!hough the Ottoman Government placed restrictions on Jews entering
Palestine :from 1882 onward s, and though its opposition to Jewish settlement
was increased in 1897 when the Zionist Movement was founded and sought a
Jewish State in Palestine, and though in 1901 Ottoman restri ctions against
Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine were revised in the form of
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consolidated. restrictions (190 1 ) , Ottoman policy failed.

Largely, this

policy failed because of foreign interventionist restraints imposed by
the Ca.pi tulations; significantly, Ottoman policy failed o f effective
implementation even despite fears after the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905 )
which decided that Zionist Jewish State efforts should be directed exelusively at Palestine .

Even Ahmed Resid Bey, Ottoman governor of the

Mutasarri flik of Jerusalem 1904 through 1906 expressed grave concern
to the Porte in Constantinople (as did his predecessors) that i t was
impossible to restrain and prohibit foreign Jews from settling in Palestine
without the cooperation of the foreign consuls.23

Additionally, Resid Bey

subnitted a report in which he disagreed with continued Jewish immigration
into Palestine . 24

As early as 1906 he observed that the Jews sought

autonomy in Palestine.

To depict thi s Zionist poli ti.cal goal he quoted

from the Russian Zionist Menachem Ussishkin' s pamphlet, Our Programme ,
which was central to the debates at the Seventh Zionist Congress.25
In Aprll of 1907 Ali Ekrem Bey,

successor to Resid Bey in Jerusalem,

wrote to the president of the Alliance Israllite Universelle in Constantinopl e :
As for the business which you call poll tical--the business o f land

sales--1 t is incontestable that i t is taking on day by day an un
measured proportion which i s contrary to the spirit of the ( Ottoman)
Government
'lhe Jews, as well as other groups, can buy land, but
So counsel your
they must not appear to want to conquer Palestine
co-religionists moderation, equity and , above all, honesty. You
know me enough to be convinced that I shall do all I can to
event
a lan
sale in which I suspect some illegitimate interest.
• • •

• • •

[ c!i

�t

In June of 190 7 , Ekrem Bey, the Ottoman governor of the Mutasarri-

flik of Jerusalem, wrote to the Grand Vezir stating that the legal entry
restrictions needed the support of the foreign consuls to be effective . 27
As noted at thi s approximate time the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905) aimed

JO

at setillng as many Jews in Palestine as could be achieved and setting
up in Palestine an independent Jewish government with the help of the

Powers, notions not exactly designed to appeal to the Ottoman Government.
Ekrem Bey attributed the inconsistencies, violations and ineffectiveness
of the Ottoman entry provisions to the refusal of the European Powers to
accept them because they inured to the extraterritorial privileges
European national s enjoyed under the Capitulations.

Obviously, militarily

the Porte could not stand up to the Great Powers; hence, the Europeans
violated or overlooked the Ottoman legal provisions with impunity.
'!he 1901 consolidated regulations, though legally in force , had
not and could not be applied.

'Ihe Jews ignored the absolute "requirement"·

to carry a foreign national ' s passport or equivalent document indicating,
inter alia,

--

--

the purpose of their visit while the non-cooperation of the
.

consuls in Palestine assured the foreign nationals without passports
extraterritorial protection in Palestine though they were in violation
of Ottoman law.

Ironically, there was no hint in the Ottoman instruc-

tions to their own officials on how to de� with violations of legal entry
provi sions because, not so strangely, the M1.nister of Internal Affairs
had himself,

because of the power of the European states to intervene

in the Ottoman Empire, deprived the legal directives of all force by
instructing the Mutasarrif of Jerusalem in 1904 "not to permit a s1 tua-

8
ti.on in which problems ari se with foreign eml:a.ssies."2

Jews, even when entry restrictions were most severe, could always
visit Palestine as "Pilgrims, " as David Ben Gurion did, and stay.
Ottoman authorities tried to expel

If the

them, Jews of whatever current

nationality could appeal to their local consuls for protection despite

J1

the fact they would be in violation of Ottoman visa stipulations.

Archival

material. of consuls' files in the Ottoman Empire are full of historical
accounts of Jewish vi sitors ( "pilgrims" ) and illegal immigrants afforded

extraterritorial protection by their respective consuls in Palestine .
Records reveal that Jews made full use of thei r consuls ' protection.
And there were few. obstacles that could not be overcome by reference to
the Capitulati ons either by the foreign consuls on the spot or by the
foreign eml:assies at Constantinople where more powerful foreign political
authori ty could be placed against the Ottoman Government.

'Ihe severity

of foreign encroachment on behalf of legal and illegal Jewish immi grants
in Palestine i s transcribed in a detail report by Ba.haaddin Bey, a former
Commissioner for Jewish Affairs in Palestine at the Ottoman Mini stry of
the Intertor, Istanbul .

In this offi cial report he desc:ri bed the following

features of Jewish-Zionist colonization in Pale stine :
'!he attempt of the Jews to separate themselves from the rest of the
inhab1.tants; their retention of foreign nationality; their subni ssion
of litigation to Jewish courts ; thei r own paper-money ( by which he
referred to the cheque s of the Anglo-Palestine Company); their own
symbols of statehood, in parti cular the blue-and-white (Star of David)
flag; the Jewish National Fund stampe ; their supplanting Arab labour;
their purchase of land in an attempt to possess themselves of the
country; their disrespect of Turki sh authority and of the Turki sh
language in school s which inculcate Jewish nationalist and anti 
Turkish sentiment; and the autonomy of the Jewish colonie s , with
their own law-courts and defence servi ces.29
Already, upon the outbreak of the First World War the Zioni st
Organization in Palestine was attempting, under the name of Zionism, to
construct a Jewish government in the area . JO

Although Turkish authorities

legally deported some Russian Zioni sts, J1 the effective disruption of
Zionist activities was prevented by the direct intervention of the
American Government, certain neutral Powers and by admonitions from the
German Government,

which shortly would become an ally of the Turki sh state.
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Jews entering Palestine illegally did not necessarily have to seek
the political protection of consuls ; they found other means of bypassing
the Ottoman laws on entry,

Ottoman officials accepted br1 bes, Jews en

tered overland from Port Said (Egypt), they purchased land illegally in
the name of ind.igneous Ottoman Jews ( those legally resident in the Ottoman
Empire32 ) , in the names of Ottoman Arabs, and in the names of consuls and
consular-agents. 33

'lhe circuitous means need not be e xtended.

'lhe point

to be observed i s that despite the Ottoman immigration regulations and

land purchase laws, the Jewish community in Palestine grew larger,
1897 there were in Palestine 50, 000 Jews and 18 settlements .

13y

And, most

importantly, Zionism was already advancing its plans for a Jewish State .
Previously, the writer referred to the fact that the Jews ignored
the Ottoman absolute requirement to carry a passport or equivalent document
indicating, inter alia, the purpose of their visit.

Article 1? of Ottoman

law regulating foreign passports required that foreigners who entered the
nation without the requi site Ottoman papers must obtain a passport or
equivalent from their consul within

40 piastres. J4

48 hours as well as paying a fine of

'lhis legal provision offered Jewish pilgrims, unintendedly,

a way to circumvent the law and . enter Palestine.

It i s also interesting

to note that whereas European Powers regulated passport provisions in their
respective terri torlal sovereignties, Ottoman authorl ties were not allowed
to regulate the distrl bution of passports to foreign travellers in Ottoman
territory; those entering Ottoman territory illegally simply acquired a
passport or equivalent from their consul in requisite time and became
"legal , "

Jewish pilgrims utilized this enforced capitulation to enter

permanently while the Ottoman Government remained impotent to act.

Jewish

pilgrims utilized the three-month residence permit they received on arrival
in exchange for their passports , because i t guaranteed their entry to

33

Palestine, while their expulsion (unless voluntary) became impossible as
the Powers' regulated Ottoman actions.

On the other hand, once Jewi sh

Pilg:ri.ms re-acquired their passports at a later date, their status under
the Capitulations was now in i;;he hands of their consular government making
the Ottoman authorities unable to act even after (or before ) residence
Ul ti.mately,

permits expired.

Ottoman authorities in their own terrl tory

remained at the subservience of simple onerous non-cooperation from
foreign consuls in Palestine.
'!he significance of violation and external constraints on Ottoman
law regulating Jewish entry and land purchase in Palestine i s seen in the
fact that over half of the 50 , 000 Jewish settlers who remained in Palestine

by 1908 were Jewish nationalists (Zionists) who were dedicated to the
erection of a Jewish State made Arabrein .

'!hough a few of these Zionists

became Ottoman subjects, the vast majority did not,

so that they could con

tinue to enjoy the privileges and immunities allowed Europeans under the
C:i.pi tulations.

Benefi ting doubly under the Ottoman Millet system and the

�pi tulations these Zionists began laying the foundation for a Jewish State .
'!he Jewish population of Palestine, by 1908, had risen to about 8 0 , 000 or
over three times its number in 1882 when the first entry restrictions
were implemented .

'!he entry statistics underscore the failure of the

Ottoman Government to regulate Jewish settlement in Palestine .

'!his failure

must be attributed to the Capi tulati ons system in which the European Powers
uniformly refused Ottoman con1trol over their internal affairs.

In short,

1 t became impossible to restri ct Jews, including Zionist nationalists,

from settling in Palestine without the cooperation of the foreign consul s
and emmssies.
Consequently,

the Turks had evinced strong opposition to Jewish

coloni.zation, particularly Zionist, of Palestine even previous to the
emergence of Herzl and the World Zionist Organization.

'Ihis Ottoman

hostility to any large-scale Jewish/Zionist immigration was officially
predicated on contentions that settlers retained their original citizenship, usually in the case of Jews, as Czarist "Russians. "

In consequence ,

Ottoman courts possessed no legal jurisdiction over these settlers,

result of the foreign imposed Capitulations.

the

Juri sdiction remained under

the aegis of foreign consulates who in turn exploited these consular
powe.rs vi s-a-vis, and to the detri�ent of Ottoman sovereignty.

As a re

sult many alien Jews were settled in the area of Palestine against the
will of both the Palestinian people and the Ottoman Government.
'Ille author introduced this chapter .with a denouncement by the
Ottoman Government of Western intrusions into the sovereignty of Turkey
when that government declared that international relations between i t and
the Western world would be henceforth regulated as of 1914 by "the general
principles of international law . "

While the writer revealed the degree

to which Western nations under the Capitulations egregiously violated

Turkish sovereignty, little was related about Zionism ' s premeditated schemes
to violate international law principles by having installed over Arab

Palestine an illegal colonial protectorate scheme . 35

Zionism was prepared

long before the Balfour Declaration to collaborate wi th any imperial Power
willing to illegally impose a colonial protectoratte over a portion of
Turkey's territorial sovereignty . 36

From the time Herzl publi shed Der

Jud.enstaat in 1896, the Zionist movement was aware that its political
goals could only be achieved by the help of one or more of the imperi.ali st
Western Powers. 37

The history of early Zionism--that i s , the years between

1896 and 1917--is documented with unremitting schemes to secure imperialist
favor.38

Herzl , as early as 1896, offered Zionism as an agent for imperial-

35
colonial policy:
If His Majesty the Sultan (of Turkey) were to give us Palestine, we
could in return undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey.
We should fom there part of a wall of defence for Europe in Asia,
an outpost of civilization against 00.rbari. sm.39
Herzl was even clearer during the Second Zionist Congress in 1898:
Asia is the diplomatic problem of the coming decades
we may in all
modesty perhaps recall to mind that we Zionists whose practicality
of View people like to dispute, recognized and announced as imminent
the coming development of European rivalry (refers to the imperial
ist competition to divide the non-white world) a few years before
the others did�O
• • •

David Wolffsohn, the Zionist Cologne ( Germany) banker, who was
elected to succeed Herzl after the latter' s death in 1904, reported a
private talk between the German Grand Duke Friedrich von Baden ( a rela
tive of the Gennan Kai ser) and Kaiser Wilhelm II in October of 1898 :
'!he Kaiser was even
powers over the new
the wish to receive
could disclose thi s

said to have been ready to assume protectorate
( Jewish) state . He was said to have expressed
a Zionist deputation in Jerusalem so that he
to i t . 41

Dr. M. I . Bodenheimer, important German Zionist official , wrote :
In a communication addressed to Count Eulenburg, the German Ambassador
in Vienna., Herzl had compiled all points of view in order to move the
Kaiser into taking up the cause of Zionism in his hand
'!he return
of the Jews to Palestine would bring culture and order into that
neglected corner of the Orient. By means of the German protectorate
we would arrive at an orderly state of Affairs. In this letter, the
Grand Duke reportedly inf :rmed Herzl that the Kaiser was full o f
�
enthusiasm for the cause. 2
• • • •

Later, Bodenheimer wrote:
Our imagination had been urged on unchecked on account of the extra
ordinary event (Zionist delegation meeting with the Ge:rman Emperor in
Jerusalem in 1898 ) . So following the word of God in the Bi bl e , I
demanded the land stretching between the brook of Egypt and the
Euphrates, as the region for Jewish colonization. In the transitional
period the land would be divided into districts which would come under
Jewish administration (while under a German protectorate) as soon as
a Jewish majority was reached .43
�

This candid scheme, already in 1898 of a Greater Israel concept
(Eretz Israel ) , which today is still applied by controlling Zionist ide-
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ology and institutions in Israel , did not, for tactical reasons, meet
1 ld.th Herzl ' s approval . 44

Herzl told Bodenheimer:

('lhe) • • • time was not ripe for my (meaning Bodenheimer ' s) extensive
thoughts; i t would be more appropriate for the time being to create
a gem cell out of whi ch a (Jewish) state could grow organically.
He (Herzl) had in mind a land company in which sovereign rights and
royal prerogatives ( Germany ' s ) would be • • • safeguarded. We hoped
that when the Kai ser assumed power over the pro1i:ectorate, these
rights would show themselve s to be of such value that a chart�red
company similar to that of Rhodesia1 0 would be built on them.

45

After the Kai ser refused to accede to the Zionist scheme for a
Judenstaat in Pal estine46 Bodenheimer declared :
Despite the ( Zionist) failure in Jerusalem, Herzl did not want to
drop the idea of a German protectorate .
Already, then , Herzl repre
sented the view that for us (Zionism) the question was solely whether
we would come under German or British :protection .
Had the Kai ser
leaned towards our cause , the (Zionist) movement would have had a
German prientation .
'Ihe question pre ssed for a decision in the near
future .

47

'Ihe interests of German imperialism and those of German-speaking
Zionist leaders ,
an

though not always mutual in the sense that they perturbed

impotent Ottoman nation and ally, was symbioti c ;

the Zionists in which-

ever camp they may have wanted to stand--that i s , Britain or Germany--saw
political opportunities to trade their support in exchange for an imperial
promise on Palestine, which belonged legally to Turkey.

When the German

Kaiser refused to permit German · Zionism the territorial allocation o f
Turkish Palestine (should thi s deal have been consummated ,

Turkey' s sover-

eignty would have been egregiously violated although impotent to act against
a transfer of its terri tory) , Herzl , in 1900 at the Fourth Zionist Congress,
which was astutely held in London_, declared :
England the mighty, England the free, will understand us and under

stand our ( Zionist) aspirations.
With England as starting point we
could be certain that the Zionist idea ( Judenstaat) will grow mighty

and rise higher than ever before . 48

Herzl now cultivated British favor and the British Government put

.. ..

l'
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forward the proposal that a region in Central Africa (where the modern
state of Kenya now stands) be placed at the disposal of the Zionist move
ment for Judenstaa.t settlement.

Brita.in, having some imperial power in

Turkish sovereign affairs, despite its weakness and confronted by Ger
many' s military and political power over the Sublime Porte , was in no
position to illegally allocate a portion of Turkish territory
Zionists at this time .

to

the

Interestingly, while Herzl advocated acceptance

of the "Uganda Plan"49 and support from British imperialism, 50 wide
circles of Zionist officials and members were opposed to it, not least
among them the Gennan Zionist faction which saw its political connection
with Gennan imperialism wrecked if the British proposal was accepted . 5i
In thi s open drive of Gennan imperialism into the Near East (competing
with '.Br1. ti sh

imperialism in the area), the inchoate Herzl Zionist organi-

za.tion led by German-Austrian Zionist Jewry, cultivated the favors of the
Gennan
bul .

Empire since Germany retained supreme political leverage in Instan-

'Ihu:s,

among the opponents of the Uganda Plan at the 1903 Zionist

Congress the Gennan Zionist leader Dr. Nossig was prominent . 52
'Ihe hi story

of international Zionism ' s deployment and officious

use of ooth German and British imperialisms in order to achieve their
Judenstaat under either' s colonial-imperial protectorate umbrella is extremely interesting but not for explication in this paper.

'Ihe

wrl ter

simply reveals that .Turkish sovereignty, despite international law pre
cepts, was open to violation with impunity; moreover, Zionism had no regard
for these principles of international law . 53 Protectorates were one form
of terri tori.al annexations violating international law.

Finally, in 1914 ,

the Ottoman Government determined not only to "abrogate" the violations
of its terri tori.al sovereignty ( the Capitulations), Turkey also detennined
to

...

assert equity in international law:

that the ( international ) relations of TUrkey to the ( Western) Powers
were to be re gul ated henceforth by the general principles of inter
national law. *
Zionist documentation reveals that after the 1903 Zionist Congress,
German Zionist leaders did not relax their efforts to gain support and

!

I

II

assurances from the Imperial German Government for a colonial protectorate
over Palestine as a Judenstaat. 54

Gennan Zionist leaders still favored

a German annexation policy--that i s , the colonial protectorate scheme over
Palestine--in the Near East.

'!he outbreak of the First World War still

witnessed German Zionists standing in support of German annexation policy
in the Near East.

It is interesting to observe that leading political

officials of the German Empire allowed the Zionists many favors because
they considered them likely to yield poll tical rewards internationally
during the

war.55

Shortly after the start of the war the Ottoman Empire joined the
Central Powers in alliance against the Entente Powers.

'lhe international

Zionist movement could not permit itself the option of choosing sides.
Proclaiming to be an international "Jewish movement" the Zionist Actions
Committee moved to neutral Copenhagen, Denmark.

And in December of 1914

it announced that Zionist organizations on both belligerent sides were
to

adhere to the principles of strict neutrality at all times. 56
'Ibi s facade neutrality was breached by the political activities

of chaim Weizmann in England , whose admitted Anglophilia and Germanophobia
earned for him the strongest �ensure of the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau.
Formation of a "Jewish Legion, ..57 an organic link between the Zionist
political entrenous on the British side in Ottoman Palestine and the conquest of Palestine by Lord General Allenby, represented a most serious open
violation of Zionis� neutrality, and its creation called forth strong de
*see footnote two of chapter two .

I

I

nuncl.ation by the Zionist Bureau in Copenhagen , but not for reasons o f
neutrality, for i t was as much imbued

w1: th

the past important contributions

of and to Zionism in the Gennan Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monar
chy and did not wish to have current poli ti.cal achievements co-opted and

jeopardized.

lhe facts are that, in relationship to the Zionist organiza-

tions of all countrie s , with the sole exception of Czari st Russia,

Zionism

rei gned para.mount.

death in

1904

to the war of

German

Li.chtheim declared that from the time of Herzl ' s

1914 ,

German Zionism contributed more in terms

of propagandi stic effort , establishment of compani es and finances in Pales
tine than any other country ' s Zioni sts,· except those in Russia. 58

Zionism,

even on behalf of non-subject

(L e . ,

German

non-Germans ) Russian and

other F.a.stern European Jewry in Palestine, was able to officiously use
the preeminence of German imperial power over the Ottoman Sultanate, a
fact of which the Zionist Bureau i n Copenhagen was aware .
Consequently, Weizmann , who was co-responsible for the Jewish Legion,
ran

openly counter to the directives of his Russian Zionists and other

Zionist confederate s on the continent and elsewtiere who full y beli eved
and hoped for victory of the Central Powers in World War

9
I.5

Weizmann ' s

chief external Zionist support �erived from some significant American

Zionist

leaders .

As, for exampl e , Stephen S . Wise and Supreme Court

Justice Loui s Brandeis, whose critical antagonisms towards Germany by

1917 did lead American Zionism allied with Weizmann ' s faction to proclaim
"Better no Jewish Palestine, than as a gift from the Turki sh assassinocracy
and its German ally .

Zionism

"60

·It i s important to observe that,

though political

publi cly has debunked and protested that i t desired no Judenstaat

in Arab Palestine, it privately and assuredly understood the real meaning

of

I :.

the "Jewish national home" scheme in Palestine .

For i t was American

40
61
who affirmed in a private interview with
Supreme Court Justi ce Brandei s

� Balfour, Bri ti.sh Foreign Secretary (1916-1919 ) , at the Pari s Peace Conference

··

• • • that Palestine
should be the Jewish homeland and not merely that
there be a Jewish homeland in Palestine .
'Ihat , he assumed, i s the
commitment of the Balfour Decl�ati on and will, of course, be con
firmed by the Peace Conference . 62

6
To which Balfour "expressed entire agreement . .. 3
While Wei zmann was actively cultivating British political support
for a Jewish State in Palestine, in Egypt ( a British acquired protectorat e )
during the winter o f 1915, Josef Trumpeldor organized the first Jewish
mill tary contingent in the British army--the "Zion Mule Corps" which saw
service in the unsuccessful British attack on the Dardanelles mid-way through
the First World War . 64
Zionists negotiations with the German embassy in Istanbul,
which included Ottoman authorities,

Turkey,

6
emphasi zed "Jewish friendliness" 5

with Turkey during the war ; Zionism suggested that a legion of Polish
Jews 10, 000 in number should be formed to fight with the Turkish army in
the defense of Palestine against the British invasion.

66

However , the

development of this legion was to be dependent on a definite assurance
from Turkey to support Jewish colonization (Zionist organized) of Palestine
after the war.

67

Interestingly� in view of the more favorable political

attitude towards Zionism in Britain,

Zionism decided that such a military

project risked losing more than it would ultimately gain, and i t was aba.n
doned . 68

Zionist authorities felt that Turkey would lose the war and be

terri torially partitioned among the Allies after her defeat.

On the other

hand , Zionist official Vladimir Jabotinsky believed that the Allied Powers
would be victorious and that the Turkish Empire would be parti tioned among
the winners.

69

He thought i t politically essential that Zionism give as

sistance to the Allied Powers, particularly the Briti sh, in order to have

41

a ·aubstantial claim upon the Allies

Jd:tish, at the end o f the

mntial

war . 70

and the British, specifically the
It was, as Jabotinsky said, very ,es

to awaken in the British "an appetite for Palestine . " 71

He pro-

]IOaed to organi ze "the Jews" in F.gypt into a mili tary unit that would

fight as a unit with the British army.
'lhe ignorance of Zionist history shown by the publi c is grotesque .
SI.nee the poli ti.cal interests of world Zionist Jewry ( their Jud�nstaat

scheme ) constrained the offi cial leaders of the International Zionist
Organization to a supposed policy of complete neutrality during World

War I, Zionists adopted an expedient and amicable international scission
which would appear externally as internal di sagreement and strife, but
which developed a mutual activity within the apparent division of the two
groups on their respective side s of the Entente-Central Powers ' war .
'lheir mutuality was "the Jewish State" under any conditions.

For example ,

while we have mentioned Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor, i n Palestine itself,
certain other leaders of the Zionist movement had, at the outbreak of the
war,

reached
• • • an understanding with
the Turkish Government to set up a Jewish
Legion in order to protect the country .
Two representatives of these
circles--Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (who later became President of Israel ) and
David Ben-Gurion (who later became Prime Minister among other posts)
proposed in November , 1914, to the Turki sh Commander-in-Chief the
setting up of a Jewish volunteer legion with the stipulation that
this legion would remain in the country for the duration of the war ,
and would only defend its population in case of attack.
The Zionist
proposal was accepted by the military counci1 . 72

'lhe power of German y ' s intervention into the sovereign affairs
of the Ottoman Empire i s ·revealed by the fact that when Jamal Pasha , the
Turki sh Commander-in-Chief in Syria and Palestine, in reply to the for-

mation of the Jewish Legion in England , issued an evacuati on order to the
Zionist settlers in. Palestine, Gennan Zionists sought help from Kai ser
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Wilhelm to protect the Zionist colonies in Palestine.
important Zionist official ,

wrote as a member of the

74
A:ffairs
in the German Foreign Office:

" • • •

Nahum Goldmann ,

Di vision

of Jewish

finally Kaiser Wilhelm him

self was p e rsuaded to seek the cancellation of the orde r .
'lhus,

73

,75
'Ihat helped • .

upon the outbreak of the war a Zionist liaison office was established

in Copenhagen in order to maintain political connections between the
Zionists on ooth sides of the front.
facade of political neutrality,

However,

despite the fiction or

Zionists were not committed to the notion

England,

of poll tical neutrality.

In

Zionists were more successful than

the pro-German Zionists.

On Novembe r 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration

was issued and the orientation of the Zionist movement was henceforth
internationally decided.

'Ihe man responsible was Chaim Weizmann who,

being in the Manchester political constituency of Lord Arthur Balfo u r ,
had endowed his officious pro-British Zionist allegiances with arguments
similar to the proposals Herzl and the German Zionists had made to Germany's
Wilhelm II :
We can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within the British
sphere of influence,

and should .Britain encourage a Jewish settle

ment there, as a Bri tish dependency,

we could have in twenty to thi rty

years a million Jews out there, perhap s more; they would develop the
country,

bring back civilization to it and form a very effective guard
6
for the Suez Cana1 . 7
·

As a result of the defeat of Germany the pro-German faction in
the Zionist movement lost its former influence and was superceded by the
pro-British Zionist faction.

But before Germany's defeat,

in an effort

to still cultivate the . favors of International Zionism--the issuance of
the Balfou r Declaration embarrassed ooth the pro-German Zionists and the
German Government

77--the German Foreign Minister on January 5, 191 8 ,

sulr

mitted to members of the Zionist international Executive still present
in Berlin a memorandum whi ch read :

1�
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With regard to the endeavours of the Jewish community and of the

Zionists in pa.rticular, we welcome
particularly the intention of
the Imperial Ottoman government to promote a flourishing of Jewish
settlement in Palestine through the safeguarding of free emigration
•

•

•

and settlement, within the country' s absorptive capaci ty.
'!he
Imperial Ottoman government, whi ch has constantly proved its friendly
attitude towards the Jews, allows them regional self-rule and the
free development of their own culture in accordance with the country' s
(Turki sh) laws. 78
Otto Warburg,
Organi zation,

a German Zionist and president of the World Zionist

stationed i n Berlin received the German memorandum .

in 1920 at a poll tical rally following the

annual

When

Zionist international

conference held in London (Balfour gave the major address) Warburg was
not allowed to addre ss the meeting.

'Ihe pro-British Zionist faction now

controlled and directed Zionist activities.

7
Significantly, Max Nomau 9

stre ssed in his speech the poll tical and military significance of the
"Jewish State" in regard to the security of the Suez Canal .

Zionism

had

attached itself now to British imperialism; i t would use this poll tical
attachment to construct the Jewish State over the proceeding decades.

80

Zionist vi sionarie s under the aegis of British imperialism and
Palestine Mandate did not come to share their knowledge and culture with
the native Palestinians.

The Zionist settlers, led by the Zionist elite

and guided by such Zionist doct�nes as Hebrew Labor,

or Conquest of Soil ,

.. !
which in Zionist jargon meant the "redemption of the 'Land of Israel ' 8
and the "regeneration of the ' Jewish character ' " to be achieved onlythrough exclusive "Jewish Labor, " actively organized separatist Jewish
insti tutions di sallowing any relationships in any way with the local
Palestinian population. 82

Zionist pioneers, under the aegis of settler

colonialism, were in essence conducting what nineteenth century Europe
carri ed out as pockets of settler colonialists in Algeria, Rhodesia, Angola,
South Africa,

Nami bia--all of which have been or still are international
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trouble spots.

'Ihough Zionist literature and practice i s replete with

racist segregation, even as late as 1957 Israeli official Abba Eban, who
comes from South Africa, claimed that the goal of Israel i s not one of
integrati on.

"Qui te the contrary, " he declared , "integration i s rather

something to be avoided • ., 8 3

It was this racially exclusivi st vision of

the purely Jewish State that led David Wolffsohn, the president of the
Zionist movement in 1905, to instruct the Zionist director of the Anglo
Pa.lestine Company in Jaffa84 not to cooperate w1 th Arab Palestinian of
ficials in the Levontin Plan (an Arab-Zionist cooperative scheme put
forth by Levontin in order to strengthen politically the Zionist APC ' s
position in Palestine) to develop the ciftliks ( crown lands) in the region
of Jericho and the Dead Sea.8 5

Despite the fact that Herzl ' s original

Judenstaat was publicly repudiated by the British Government as well as
ostensively "denied" by the Zionists, Zionism served only Jewish interests
under the cloak of serving the interests of all in Palestine.

Rather than

coming to Pale stine in order to help by their far-flung resources and
efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its indigenous
and settler inhabitants,

Zionism quietly pursued thei r goal of a Judenstaat

and cared not the least for the · original indigenous Palestinian Arabs.

While Sir Herbert Samuel , prominent British Zionist official and
first British High Commi ssioner over the Palestine Mandate, would define
the Balfour Declaration as meaning that
'Ihe Jews • • • should be enabled to found (in Palestine) their home, and
that some among them within the limits that are fixed by the numbers
and interests of the present (Palestinian) population, should come to
Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop
the country, to the advantage of all its inhabi tants.8 6
Yet, conversel y, he would also espouse in March of 1915 the founding
of a Judenstaat with the direct help of Britain and the United States;

1,
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Sumel recommended a Bri tish protectorate in which it was
hoped that under Bri tish rule facilities would be given to Jewish

organizations to purchase land , to found colonies, to establish
.educational and religious institutions, and to cooperate in the
economic development of the country, and that Jewish immigration,
carefully regulated , would be given preference , so that in the course

of time the Jewish inhabitants grown into a majority and settled
in the land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as the
8
conditions of that day might justify. • • 7
.

'lhus, under the cloak of a twisted sense of inteznational law
and morality, and despite Brl tain ' s official protestations

and repudiations,

Br1tain would in practice come to endorse the Zionist enterpri se in Palestine in violation of principles of international law

and in violation of

its self-accepted mandate obligati ons to the Palestinian Arab people.
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Chapter Two
1F.a.ch of the Western Powers, during the twenty years between
1894-1914, coveted and forcefully acquired Ottoman dominions.
'!be
Sultan had to surrender several provinces in Asia Minor to Russia,
Cyprus and Egypt to Great Britain, Tuni sia to France , Libya to Italy,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. to Austria. Under external military duress,,
Ottoman territorial sovereignty was violated by the Western nations,
although thi s subject of another aspect of violating international law
principles will not be discussed in this paper. But, may it suffice,
to understand that further, during the First World War , Russia wanted
Constantinople and the Strai ts; France wanted Syria; Britain desired
the areas of Palestine , Syria, Transjordan and Iraq ; Italy desired
territory in Asia Mi.nor and the Government of India (under British
control) had a hunger for the area of Iraq. The Western Powers,
during the war, conspired to further partition the Ottoman land s.
For an excellent explication of th e Powers' territorial schemes see
George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, chapter XIII.
2
American Journal of International Law, VIII , ( October, 1914),
8
•
P
73.
3rsrael Zangwill, "Zionism To-Day, " '!be Yale Revi ew, January, 1921,
p. 251. Zangwill also asserted that the Palestinians simply were not
to be accorded the rights designated by the provisions of the Class A
mandates system which recognized the right of territories formerly
under Germany and Turkey to eventual independence--the establishment
of self-governing institutions and the rise of an independent state.
4After 1882, numbers of Jews still came from Europe to join the old,
pious Palestine communities, but over half of the 50, 000 newcomers who
remained in Palestine by 1908 were Jewish nati onalists (Zionists)
fonning the "New Yishuv" and dedicated to rebuilding "their people ' s
'patrimony'" in Palestine ; while many of the 190 3 Second "Aliyya , 11
in ad.di tion to being political Zionists (i . e . , not cultural Zioni sts),
had been affected by the Russian revolutionary movement and were imbued
with a mixture of ideologies.
A few of these Jewish nationalists became
Ottoman subjects, but by far the majority did not, so that they could
continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities granted to Europeans
under the Capi tulations. Benefiting doubly from the Millet system on
the one hand and the Capi tulations on the other, they quite consciously
set about laying the basis for an independent Jewi sh exi stence in
Palestine which became the prelude to the Jewish State. Even in the
absence of legal permission from the Ottoman authori ties, the Zioni sts,
drawing upon assistance from the World Zionist Organization, opened the
Anglo-Pal estine Bank i n 190J and the Jewish National Fund began acquiring
land in 1905. I n further proscription of legal pennission the Palestine
Land Development Fund was founded in 1908 to make land ready for exclusive
Jewish settlement. With these and other sources of financial assistance
provided by the extraterritorialized Jewish Colonization Association,
the number of Zionist settlers violating Ottoman sovereignty in Palestine
reached 12, 000 by 1914 out of an estimated Jewish population of about 85,000.
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.S"Pa.lestine" i s herein used as defining the area refe�d in

ottoman documents as "Arz-i Fili stin" , whi ch at the end of the

nineteenth century was not a single ad..mi nistrative uni t ; i t was com

posed of the Mutasarri flik o f Jerusalem to the south and the Sancaks
of Nablus and Acre in the north ; the�e Sancaks were part o f the Vilayet

of Sa.m ( "Syria") until 1888, whereafter these Sancaks were admini strative
ly incorporated in to the new Vilayet of Beirut .
6
The modern period i s considered to have begun with the increased

immigration of Jews out o f Imperial Russi a and Ea.stern Europe generally
in the earl y 1880s.

The pre-Zionist period is considered as 1881-1897;

w1th the latter date being the implementation of politi cal Zionism
established.

by

the Ba.sle Zionist congress.

?Previous to 1881,

different,

the High

for,

Ottoman immigration and settlement policies were

on March 9 , 1857,

the Ottoman Government i ssued through

Council of the Ta.nzimat a decree on immigration and settlement

that was sanctioned by the Sultan .

The decree stated that immigration

into the Ottoman state was open to anyone who would agree to give their
allegiance to the Sultan,

to become a subjec� of the Ottoman state and

to respect the country ' s laws.

policies see Kemal H . Karpat,

For an excellent overview of Ottoman

"Ottoman Immigration Policies and Settle

ment in Palestine , " Ibraham Abu-Lughod and Ba.ha Abu-Laban, eds . ,
Settler Re · mes in Africa and the Arab World:
Wilmette,

pp. 57-72.

Palesti ne,

The Illusion .of Endurance

Illinois : . The Medina Uni versity Pre ss International ,

1974 ,

As regards Zionism and its Jewish State political goal s in

it i s interesting to note that the Ottoman decree of 1857

did not incite immediate interest among the Zionists and non-Zionists
in Europe (includes Russia ) .

'Ibi s is especially si gnificant in view o f

the fact that beginning in 1839, with the establi shment o f the Bri tish
consulate in Jerusalem ( the first European representation in the Holy
City),

the British made strenous efforts to stimulate the settlement of

Jews in Palestine.

'!he British had planned to establish and protect the

Jews in Palestine in the hopes of creating in the Ottoman domain a group
friendly to England ,

a group that would check and balance the Russian

influence among the Orthodox Christians, and the French influence among
the Maroni tes.

For those who are interested in breaking through the

enduring Zionist myths--:that Palestine "belongs to the Jews"--the Karpat
article i s enlightening.

political Zionism,

minoriti es,

including Jews,

Ottoman Archives,

Idare ,

It i s interesting to note,

before the rise of

the protection and tolerance accorded indigenous
by the Ottoman Government in Istanbul .

Foreign Mini stry,

or Administrative,

Idare I ,

555, November 1 6 ,

1840;

See

refers to the departmental internal communi 

cation and "555" to the file number with the date of issuance of the
Ottoman Imperial pronouncement referred to as a " fi:rman . "

will be used whenever Idare i s used as a footnote.

Thi s format
·
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8see Neville J. Mandel , "Ottoman Practice as Regards Jewi sh Settlement
in Palestine: 1881-1908 , " Middle Eastern Stu:li.es, II, (January , 1975),
pp. JJ-46. Also see his arti cle in the Middle Eastern Studi e s , X
no J, 1974) regarding official Ottoman policy (not practices) to Jewish
settlement in Palestine from 1881 to 1908.
Mandel refers to the pre
David Ben Gurion was one such "pilg:ram . "
Zionist period as 1881-1897.
Ben Gurion states, "Herzl initially believed that he would be able to
obtain a charter for settlement in (Palestine)
from the Turks, and
al.ways opposed ( Jewish) infil tra.tion--that i s , settlement in violation
of ottoman laws, which prohi bi. ted Jewish immigration and penni tted visits
for only three months (which could easily be abused and circumvented under
the capitulations).
The se laws also forDa.de the purchase of land by non
Turki sh Jews ( i . e . , those who would not declare their sincere intent to
live as Turki sh citizens ) .
The members of Hovevei Zion ignored these
edicts. Emigration to (Palestine) • • • continued ; land was purchased and
settled . " See David Ben Guri on, Israel A Personal History (New York :
I have added the words in parentheses to clarify what
1971), p. 42 .
Ben Gurion chose to leave vague .

( .

•

•

•

9
Ibid . , p . 35.
As the Jews became familiar with local conditions,
they found other ways of circumventing the Ottoman restrictions and laws.
As for example, they could enter Pal estine by land by landing in Egypt,
they could buy land in the names of old-establi shed Ottoman Jews and
in the names of local Arabs , consuls or consular agents.
See Mandel
for an excellent review of circumvention methods.
During the pre-Zionist
period (1881-1897) the Mutasarri flik of Jerusal em was the main focus
of Jewish settlement in Palestine.
In 1882 the total Jewi sh population
of Palestine was 24, 000.
By 1897 there were 50 , 000 Jews in Palestine
despite Ottoman legal constraints
•

. 10ibid . , p . JB .
The Sixth Zioni st Congress was convened in Basle
in August of 1903.
At the Fifth Zionist Congress in Basle in December
of 1901, the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayeme t Leisrael ) was voted
into existence with funds to be used "exclusively for the purchase of
land in Pale stine and Syri a . " See Abraham Gra.nott ( earlier Granovsky) ,
Boden und Siedlung in Palaestina ( Berlin , 1929 ) , p . 183.
The original
German quote read s : "ausschliesslich nur zum Landkaufe in Palaestina
und Syrien . "
1 1The extra.terri torial violations of Turki sh sovereignty continued
even after the Paris Treaty of 1856 which in theory only--i . e . , not in
practice--" accepted" the Ottoman state in the comi t� of European nations,
this comity including (but in practice not r
endered) reciproci ty in
Only in theory
international law principl es over foreign national s .
did it recognize the Ottoman state as an equal to European states .
For , one year later, the Ottoman state i ssued the decree on immigration
and settlement in thei r sovereignty whi ch, being an "equal" in the
comi ty of the 1856 treaty agreement, would or should have in international
law allowed Turkey juri sdi ction over foreigners residing in the Empire ,
foreigners previ�usly covered by the Capi tulations encroachments.

120ttoman Archives, Forei gn Ministry, Idare , 177, 47646/18).
second number (47646/183) indicates the office number.

'lhe

13rbtd.
14
Ibtd. One reason for disallowing massive Jewish immigrati on as
early as 1884 was that large groups of Muslims from southern Russia,
deprived of their home s , needed to be resettled in the Islamic state.
150ttoman Archives, Foreign Ministry, Idare ,
18, 1900.

)46,

14)8/1624, July

6n

1

r. Alfred Nossig of the Jewish Committee of Berlin proposed his
settlement scheme in 1909.
17'lh
e JCA managed to acquire enough land from 1898 to 1901 for six
Jewish colonies to be e stablished in the north of Pale stine between
1899 and 1904.
18'lhe JCA has acquired about 8 , 000 acres (or J 1 , 500 dunams of land)
near Ti berias in early 1901, much of this land from the Sursuqs family.
'!he Arab tenant fanners rose up in protests through both legal and
violent reacti ons against the JCA purchases. As a result , the Porte
abrogated the Leven purchase s a.t the end of 1901.
19 'lh
e consolidated regulati ons went into force in 1901.
20Foreign Office 195/2097, enc. to no. JJ, April 26, 1901, Sir R .
Drummond-Hay ( Beirut) t o Sir N . O ' Conor ( Constantinople ) .
21'lh
e APC was the first Zionist institution, properly speaking in
Palestine .
The Ottoman authorities had known of the Zionist bank ' s
connection with the European Zionist movement from the moment its parent
company, the Jewish Colonial Trust, was set up in London in 1898 . '!be
APC opened up its first offi ce in Palestine in the summer of 1903 in Jaffa .
22

central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem, W/124/I August 24, 190J, D . z .
Levontin (Jaffa ) , "Report II , " p . 171.
2Jisrael State Archive, Jerusalem, Turkish material , no. 100, December
28, 1905, Secretariat of Admin. Council ( Jerusalem) to Grand Vezir
(no. 29 ) , and to Minister of Internal Affairs (no . 87) .
24rsrael State Archives, Jerusalem, Turkish material , no. 2J,
Nobembe:zr 28, 1906, Resid Bey to Grand Vezir.
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25
consul t, for Zionist land practices in Palestine, John Ruedy,
"Dynamics of Land Alienation in Palestine , " Association of Arab
American University Graduates, Inc . , Information Papers No. 5, May, 197'
(North Dartmouth, Mass . : AAUG, 1973), pp. 124-3 1 , 130; for Zionist
political aspirations as early as 1909, see Moshe Menuhin, '!he Deca
dence of Judaism i n Our Time (Beirut : The Institute For Palestine
Studies, 1969), pp. 502-5.
26
Alliance Israelite Universelle in Paris, IX F22 : April 25, 1907,
Ekrem Bey (Jerusalem) to I . Fernandez ( Constantinopl e ) . Word in paren
theses added by the writer.
27
rsrael State Archive , Jerusalem, Turkish documents, no . 42,
June 23, 1907, Ekrem Bey to Grand Vezir.
28
Israel State Archive, Jerusalem, Turkish documents, no. 34,
September 8 , 1904, Ottoman Minister of Internal Affairs to Resid Bey.

�ba.ssies were located in Constantinople .

29
N . M. Gelber, Hatsharat Balfur Vatoldoteha ('!he Balfour Declara
tion and its Coming into Being) (Jerusalem, 1939), p . 190. Bahaaddin
Bey wa.s appointed before the war Kaimakam of Jaffa in Palestine, Also
see Menuhin , op. cit . , pp. 502-5.

p.

JOA.
293.

Bohm,
Bohm

Die Zionistische Bewegung , I (Tel Aviv, Palestine, 1935),
is a Jewish author of a history of the Zionist movement.

3

1Interestingly, a number of Russian Zionist Jews were given refuge
in Egypt.
32

'Ihere were two groups of Jews in Palestine : Sephardi Jews and
Ashkenzi Jews. '!he Sephardi ( Oriental) Jews were generally Ottoman sub
jects and Arabic speaking and enjoyed internal autonomy in the religious ·
affairs of their own group under the Ottoman Millet system.
33
see E. Yellin, Le-ze' eze' ai ( Jerusalem, 1938 ) , pp. 171-2, 31- J ;
see also D . z . Le�ontin, Le-erez avotenu, I (Tel Aviv, Palestine, 1924),
p . 56.
34G. Young, Corps du Droit Ottoman , II ( Oxford, England , 1905-06) ,
p . 267.
35
'Iheodor Herzl , Der Jud.enstaat ('!he State of Jews) ( Cologne, 1914),
p. 30.

51
Chapter IV of this paper discusses Zionist-Erl ti sh terri tori.al as
pirations in Palestine during World War I in greater detail. Inter
national law did not accept a territorial title forcefully imposed
by conquest or enforced cession of territory. See Cattan, Palestine
and International Law, chapter IV, section I, "Legal and Political
Sovereignty." Lowenthal , op. cit . , a Zionist editor of Herzl ' s diaries,
wrote, "In 1898 Palestine
contained eighteen Jewish rural settle
ments, called ' colonies� ' none of them over twenty years old, and
only three or four large enough to warrant the name of village . Per
haps 4500 Jews, all told, lived on the land . None of the settlements,
moreover, had a legal - l:asi s for its ex:i stence; penni ssion to rside
in Palestine , buy land, or build, was obtainable only through bribery
or outwitting the ( Ottoman) laws. Al:x::>ut 45,000 Jews lived in the
cities, chiefly Jerusalem and Jaffa;
" (pp. 276-77) .
• • • •

• • • •

36Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, (New York : Harper and Bros. ,
1949 ), p. 188, 205; Stein, The Balfour Declaration, p . 514; Herzl ,
L'Etat Juif, French translation (Pari s : Lipschutz, 1926) , p . 23, in
which Herzl states, "The Society of Jews will negotiate with the
sovereign authorities of the territories in question, and it will do
so under the protectorate of the European powers, if they find the
arrangement to their liking. "
Also see Herzl , ibid.

38see, for example , Marvi n Lowenthal , 'lhe Diaries of 'lbeodor
Herzl ( New York : Grosset and Dunlap, 1962), pp. 150, 152, 179 , 215,
�249 , 252, 267, 272, 365, 366, 374-77.
39Herzl , Der Judenstaat, p . 30.
40Speech, delivered at the Second Zionist Congress in Basel
(Vienna, 1898) , p . 5.
�

Dr. M.I. Bodenheimer, So Wu:rde Israel ( 'lhus Israel was Created ) ,
( Frankfort on the Ma.i n , 19.58), p. 71. Wolffsohn became president of
the Zionist movement after Herzl ' s death . Zionism has always put for
ward the political deception of co-habiting with Palestinian Arabs,
rather than exposing their intentions of dispossessing them from their
homeland . It is interesting to note that, if we might follow this
Zionist deception, when David Levontin, who opened the Zionist Anglo
Palestine Company in Palestine (Jaffa), explored with the Sublime
Porte , only as a poli tical means of strengthening the APC' s position
in Palestine, the idea of an Arab-Jewish cooperative scheme to develop
the crown lands ( ciftliks) in the region of Jericho and the Dead Sea,
David Wolffsohn, the President of the Zionist Movement finnly in
structed Levontin in March of 1905 to desist from it. In 1905 the
Seventh Zionist Congress fonnally decided that all efforts would be
expended to create the Jewish State in Arab Palestine . 'Ibis infonna-
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tion is irrefutable evidence that Zionism never did desire to co
hab1. tate with Arabs in Palestine and that Zionism sought an exclu
sive Ju:lenstaat made Arabrein as early as 1905.
2
4 ib1.d. , p . 95.
the quote.

Words in parentheses are added by me to clarify

3
4 Ib1.d . , p . 100. Words in parentheses are added by me to give
clarification to the quote.
4
4 Ib1.d . � See also Lowenthal , op. cit. , pp. 276-298, chapter entitled
"In Palestine . "
4�odenheimer, op. cit , p . 100. In 1889/1890 the British South
Africa Company founded by Cecil Rhodes gained concessions from which
the British colony i n present-day Rhodesia later developed. This
area is currently suffering severe racial strife between a minority
white government and a preponderant black population.
Words in paren
theses are added by me to clarify the quote.
•.

.
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The German Government refused because it was not interested in pro
voking its Turkish ally by supporting the establi shment of an alien
Jewish State in Palestine which was under Turki sh sovereignty.
7
4 Bodenheimer, op. cit. , p . 107. Rather than the British orienta
tion formed during World War I . I have added the words in parentheses
to clarify the quote.
8
4 Quoted in Josef Cohn, Eng1and und Palastina (Engl.and and Palestine)
(Berlin, 193 1 ) , p. 69; see Marvin Lowenthal , ed . , The Diari es of
'Iheodor Herzl (New York: Grasset and Dunlap, 1962) , Chapter 25, en
titled "The ' Uganda' Congress."
49
Lowenthal , op. cit. , p. 407. "Herzl gratefully accepted the
Uganda scheme and sul:mitted i t for ratification by the (Zionist) Cong:i-ess
in 1903
The Seventh ( Zionist) Congress 1904
decided not to embark upon the Uganda adventure
Herzl died of a broken heart in 1904 . "
Lord Melchett, a British Zionist Jewish citizen, i n 'lhy Neighbour
( 1936) ; cited in 'lhe Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York : Arno Press,
1972) , P 362.
•

•

•

•

.

•

•
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Lowenthal , ibid . , p. 407.

•

•

•

•
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51Ilaus J. Hermann, "Political Response to the Balfour Declaration
in Imperial Gennany: Gennan Judaism," 'Ihe Middle F.ast Journal , XIX
(Summer, 1965 ) , p . 309, 311. October of 1897 saw the formal establish
ment of the "Zionist Association for Germany" ( Zionistiscl1e Vereinigung
fUr Deutschland); its leadership had been recruited from the Zionist
students' associations. But in 1914, the "moderate" Zionist leaders·
lost control of the movement to the radicals, largely anti-Germany
Zionist elements headed by Kurt Blumenfeld during the June Zionist con
vention at Leipzig. Blumenfeld had stated that Zionists in Gennany
must cease considering themselves as Germans , and begin thinking in
terms of being members of a "Jewish peoplehood" espousing exclusive
Jewish nationality. In essence, that Gennan Jews should not think of
themselves as rooted in Germany. As a result of the radical Zionist
faction controlling the German Zionist organization, moderate Zionists
organized the "Association of National German Jews" (Verband National
deutscher Juden) in May 1921, led by Dr. Max Naumann. Germany prior to
World War I was a leading power in Europe and had greater political sway
over the Sublime Porte. Already in 1888 , the powerful Deutsche Bank
received railway concessions in Turkey, and in 1890 the first trade and
friendship treaty between the German Empire and the weak Ottoman Empire
was consummated, inaugurating a political closeness between strong and
weak political partners that culminated in December of 1899, when the
agreement on the construction of the Baghdad Railway was completed
.
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..52r.owenthal , op. cit. , pp. 406-41.5.
Congress" .

'!his section i s entitled the

"Uganda

53As, for example , see ibid. , pp. 276-77; Vincent Sheean , Personal
History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969 ) , pp. 333-98, 344 .
pp.

54see, for example , Bodenheimer, op. cit. ; Klaus J . Hermann, op. cit . ,
303-320 .

55tternnann, ibid . , p . 316; Max Cohen (Reuss) , Die politi sche Bedeutung
des Zionismus (Berlin, 1918 ) , p . 26; Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration,
pp. 21 5-16; Paul Goodman , 'Ihe Jewi sh National Home (London : J . M. Dent
and Sons Ltd . , 1943 ) , p . 98 ; Kurt Blumenfeld, Erlebte Judenfrage, ein
Viertel Jabrbundert deutscher Zionismus (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags
Anstalt, 1962), p . 121 . Similar efforts were meanwhile underway in
Britain, where the pro-Bri tish Zionists were attempting to persuade
British wartime officials that a Bri tish declaration on the establishment
of a Jewish national home (an exclusive Judenstaat) in Palestine would
yield international political rewa,rds for the Allies, most notably that
such a declaration would stimulate American Jewry to work for a United
States ent'ry into the war. 'Ihe programs and schemes of international
Zionist Jewry on both sides of the war ' s combatants i s extremely inter
esting and illustrative of Zionism 7 s design to address i tself to any
wartime alliance system that would be beneficial solely to Zionism ' s
Judenstaat goals in Arab Palestine.
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.56R1chard Lichtheim,

(Jerusalem: Rubin Mass,
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1954),
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57Nevill Barbour,
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(Beirut : 'Ihe Institute For Palestine Studie s ,
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Geman Zionism was always considerably

dependent on and actively supported by the large numbers of Jews in

Gennany who were of Eastern European citizenship or political outlook.

According to German census figures of
European Jews in Germany,
cent thereof.
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(Tuebi.ngen : Mohr,

1940

1925,

the percentage of Eastern
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"'Ihe Balfour Declaration, its Significance in the
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Louis Brandeis was Chairman of the

Provisional Commi ssion for General Zionist Affairs in United States from
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and Associate Justice of the U. S .

Even as a Supreme Court Justice in

at the Versailles Peace Conference.
62walid Khalidi ,

Palestine Studie s ,
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69Barbour, op. cit. , p. 55.

71Gelber, op. cit. , p 1 79
72Da.vid Ben Gurion, Chaluzischer Zionismus oder Revi sionismus (Halutz
Zionism or Revisionism) (Berlin, 1934), p. 18 . Words in parentheses are
added by me to clarify the quote .
•

•

73For his Zionist credentials see chapter eight, footnote 23.
74The Division was really a wartime propaganda department for Jewish/
Zionist affairs in the Gennan Government.
7�ahum Goldmann, Staatsmann ohne Staat (Statesman Without a State)
(Cologne/Berlin, 19 7 0), p. 80.

76tetter of Weizmann in November of 1914, quoted in Weizmann, A
Biography by Several Hands (New York, 1963), p . 148 .

??Chaim Wei zmann, Reden und Aufsatze (Speeches and Essays) (Berlin,
1937 ), p . 285.
78Quote i s taken from Josef Cohn, op. cit. , p . 21 7

•

. 79Max Nord.au (1849-1923) was for many years, next to Herzl , the dominant
figure in the Zionist movement; he had the greater hand in drafting the
Ba.sle Program, and delivered the major addresses at the first nine Congresses.
In later life, especially after the Balfour Declaration, he differed with
the policies of Weizmann and Sokolow on the ground of their imputed timidity.
80The method and design is depicted in the c]assic Chaim Arlosoroff
memorandum "'Ihe Stages of Zionism and Mi.nori ty National Rule" of June JO,
1932, and Abraham Granott' s "'Ihe Strategy of Land Acqui sition . " Consult,
for these Zionist documents, Khalidi , op. cit. , pp. 245-.54 and 389-98.
Arlosoroff was a Zionist Labour Party leader, assassinated by a rival
Zionist group in Tel Aviv, 19JJ. At the time of this memorandum to Weizmann
he was Director of the Political Department in the Jewish Agency Executive.
'!he Political Department is also, today, the international propaganda
section of the Jewish Agency organization. Granott was closely associated
wi th the Jewish National Fund from 1919 until his death in 1962 and
directed the Jewish National Fund 1945-1956.
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see, for example , Walter Lehn, "'Ihe Jewish National Fund, " Ibrahim
Abu-Lughod and Ba.ha Abu-Lal:an, eds . , Settler Re mes in Africa and the
Arab World : The Illusion of Endurance Wilmette, Illinois : 'Ihe Medina
University Press International , 1974), pp. 43-53; Moshe Menuhin, op. cit . ,
p. 42; Israel Shahak, "'Ihe Racist Nature of Zionism and of the Zionistic
Sta.te of Israel, " American Jewish Al ternative s to Zionism Inc. : Re ort
fil..(December/Janurary, 1975 197 , pp. 12-22. 'Ihe Zionist term " ' redeem'
or 'redemption' of the land of Israel , " as has been perpetually utilized
by the Zionist movement, has a specific ideological definition. 'Ihe
land after its acqui sition by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was not to
be sold to the Jewish settlers; titles or title to it was to be held
by the JNF in perpetuity as the property of "the Jewish peopl e . " In
short, the land was never to be sold but only leased to Jewi sh settlers
for periods not exceeding 49 years. 'Ihe JNF was controlled, previous
to 1948 when i t came under the control of th� Israeli Government, by the
World Zionist Organi zation. For Zionist ideological perceptions relative
to land purchases in Arab Palestine see Israel M. Biderman, Hermann
Schapira: Father of the JNF (New York, 1962) , Vol . II . Hermann Schapira
proposed in 1897 the establishment of an organization ( the JNF) to
"redeem the land of Palestine . "
Israeli Professor Shahak allows us to look at the current activities of
the Jewish National Fund in Israel and the Arab occupied lands. He reports
the following: "Most of the land in Israel belongs or is administered by
the Jewish National Fund
whi ch i s an institution of the Zionistic
organization, and operates an admitted racist policy: It forbids to non
Jews on its lands to dwell or to open a business and sometimes even to
work, only because they are not Jews ! Such policy not only enjoys (in
Israel ) perfect legality (in contrast to a similar discrimination against
the Jews which is illegal in most countries of the world) but is supported
by all the instruments of the Israeli rul e . In such a manner many whole
' clean of Arabs' and this legally,
towns were created in Israel , which are
or as we should say rather, ' clean of Gentiles ( goyim) ' . In other towns,
like Upper-Nazareth, only one special quarter i s ' devoted' to the dwelling
of Arabs. Any attempt of an Arab to buy or to rent a flat from a Jew is
opposed openly and legally by all the branches of the (Israeli ) government
(The Ministry of Housing, municipality, etc . ) and also by the illegal op
-position of the Jewish inhabitants which i s nevertheless supported by the
Israeli police . I can only remind you that nobody opposes an operation
of the sale or the rental of a flat in Nazareth, if the buyer or the
leasee is a Jew; which means according to the admitted racist defintion
of this world employed legally in Israel , a human being who can prove
that his mother, his grandmother, his great-grandmother and his grand
mother of his grandmother were Jewesses
Anther example in the same area
can be g1. ven i f we remember the case of Mr . Muhammad Ma' aruf, an Israeli
citizen from the village of Dir-El-Assad, who wanted to open a factory
in the town of Carmiel . This was officially prohibited to him because
of the official reason that Carmiel i s ' out of bounds' to non-Jews, and
at the end he had to build his factory out of the ' pure ' boundarie s of
Carmi el .
I want again to emphasize, that there i s no limitation what
soever on any Jew to open a business or to dwell in any place in Israel
and therefore those limitations which operate on the great majority
of the Israeli lands constitute a grave racial discrimination. I can
•

•

•

.

.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

,
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dwell or open a business in any place of my choice (of course i f I cQme
to

an agreement with the previous owner) but only because · my mother :was
Jewess. An Israeli citizen whose only mother was not a Jewess can not
enjoy thi s right . He encounters racist discrimination from which he
suffers any day of his life.
a

"I want to continue with thi s subject in order to show that: A)'lhere i s
no connection between thi s and what i s called among us by the name of
'securl ty' : Thi s limitation is enforced in a raci st way against all
non-Jews
B) This raci st discrimination i s not connected with anything
described by as 'left' and ' right' or hawks and doves, inside the Zionist
On the contrary, the two most racist blocks in Israel are the
movement.
Zionistic ' socialists' and the ' National Religious � , and the holy alliance
between them i s l::ased on their common support of raci sm
"
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

'Ihe Lehn article adds the following perspective : "Since title to the land
purchased by the JNF was to be held in perpetuity 'as the inalienable
property of the Jewish peopl e , ' use of the land required the development
of a system of long-term leasing, the lessor being the JNF.
'Ille land
could be leased for specified purposes for periods up to forty-nine
years, at the end of which the lessee could renew the lease for a similar
period, a total of ninety-eight years.
Under these circumstances, the
lease itself had considerabl e value and could, subj ect to the lesso r ' s
approval , be sublet, sold, mortgaged, bequeathed, or given a s a gift.
Rent, paid annually, was assessed at 2 per cent (agricultural ) or 4
per cent (urban ) of the value of the larid ; the lessor had the right to
make periodic reassessments of the land and to raise the rent accordingly.
'!he lessor had the further· rights, which could be. exercised at its dis
cretion, to inspect the property, to decrease the amount of land held,
and to take l:ack the land if the lessee was held to have violated the
tenns of the lease .
"All of these terms, including the lesse e ' s rights, were subject to one
overriding condition, made explicit in the lease : the lessee must be
Jewish. Accordi�gly, the land could not be leased to a non-Jew, nor could
the lease be sublet, sold, mortgaged, given, or bequeathed to anyone
but a Jew. Non-Jews could not be employed on the land or even in any
work connected with cul tivati on of the 1 and.
Violati on of this term of
the lease rendered the lessor the right to abrogate the lease without
compensation to the lessee (upon the third violation) and rendered the
lessee liable for damages to the lessor.
"Since the JNF eventually became the largest private land-owner in
Palestine, holding title by 1948 to 53.8 per cent of the Jewish-owned
land, its practices were adopted by, or, at times, imposed on, other
Jewish land-owners . " It should be noted that in 1960 the JNF and the
Israeli government concluded a paper agreement clarifying the relationship
of the JNF to the state. In essence, now the racial JNF policies regard
ing the leasing of land, followed since the JNF inception in 1901, were
applied to all state lands (Arab land expropriated by the Israeli govern
ment after May of 1948 ), which, together with JNF lands, now constitute
over 90 per cent of the land in Israel , on which non-Jews (Arabs) are not
allowed .
'lhe implication of thi s fact for Arabs in Israel , and for any
eventual settlement of the conf1.ict, should be obvious to even the dullest
of minds.

Among the numerous violations of the mandate by the British, in favo r
of the Zioni st scheme i n Palestine, were JNF racialist practi ces in land
transactions and the method of its acquisition to the detriment of the
Palestinian Arab peopl e .
The John Hope Simpson report for the British
government in 1930 reported that the land "has been extraterri torialised"
and that thi s was not "only contrary to the provi sions • • • of the Mandate,
but • • • in ad.di tion a constant and increasing source of danger to the
country" ( pp. 54, 55)
•

'lhis writer strove to acqilire the most recent information available
on JNF landholdings from the Zionist Organi zation of Ameri ca which i s
controlled by and acts on behalf o f the World Zionist Organization/
Jewi sh Agency of Israel .
But the ZOA office in New York chose to ignore
my requests for thi s information which was requested variously on
February 5-; 8 and March 8 , 1976.
Apartially reproduced copy of my
February 8 letter to Mr . Paul Flacks of ZOA i s included in the Appendix.

82See,

for example , as early as the end of the First World War, for
Zionist settlers' violent reaction toward Palestine Jews who rebuffed
Zioni sm ' s "Jewish labor" insistence, in Walter Francis Stirling, Safety
Last ( London : Hollis and Carter, 1953 ) , pp. 112-23.
Stirling was the
British mili tary administrator of the Jaffa district in Pale stine 19201923, who recalled the "Ge stapo methods ( so severe ) " applied by the
Jewish Agency whi ch insisted that Jewish non-Zionist employers dismiss
all Arab

employees and

employ only

Jews.

83
Quote i s taken from a letter by A . M. El-Messiri to The New York Times,
November 13, 1975 . El-Messiri is the author of '!he Encyclopedia of
Zionist Concepts and Technology: A Cri.tical View.
84 '!he Anglo-Palestine Company opened
at Jaffa in 1903. Herzl died in 1904.

its

first office in Palestine

85 The Ottoman Government never accepted any commercial tender placed
by the APC for any concession in Turkish Palestine because it understood
the nationalist aspirations of Zioni sm ' s plans for a Jewish State in
Palestine. See D. z . Levontin, "Report II , " August 24 , 1903, p . 106, 171.
86Storrs , op. cit. , p . 378.
87
John Bowie, Viscount Samuel (London, 1957),
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CHAPTER III
BASIS OF ZIONISM' S POLITICAL THEORY

AND

CLAIM

TO

PALESTINE

Zioni sm , known also as "Jewish" nationalism or Zionist nationalisa, advocates the political doctrine of "the Jewish people" nationality
clai.11 . 1

The Zionist political movement in 1897 fomally expounded the

theme of the existence of a "Jewish people , " or a "Jewish race , • or a
"Jewish nation," advocating that "the Jews" are racial descendants of
ancient Hebrew tribes in Palestine. 2

This central doctrine of "the

Jewish people" nationality concept has not varied from the First Zionist
Congress in 1897; political. Zionism desert bes

1t

as simplys

Jews, wherever they are and no matter what their legal citizenship
and nationality, are members of a transnational entity of "the
Jewish people" and have legal "rights" in and legal obligations
to
Israel. simply by Virtue of their identification as Jews. J
• • •

• •

Actually, political Zionism had sought to create a "Jewish"
state in Arab Palestine and enVirons since 1882 . 4

Th�odor Herzl , the

�ounder of political Zionism,5 was thin.Idng racially when he spoke of

Jews not i n terms of religious faith but as "Ein Volk" (that is, one race
or

national! ty or peoplehood) f_or whom he sought distinctive geographical

rights in Palestine as the "historical fatherland of ' the Jews .

. ..

6

Morris Cohen succinctly commented on the racial philosophy of early
Zionisms
This constant tendency to emphasi ze the consciousness of race
bas led
Jews to adopt the very popular racial philosophy of
history, represented on the teutonic side by Chamberlain ' s
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, or, on the Russian side,
by Slavophils like Katkoff. Zioni sts fundamentally accept the
racial ideology of these anti-Semites, but draw different con
clusions. Instead of the Teuton, it is the Jew that is (to the
Zionist) the pure and superior race.

• • •

• • •

• • •
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'!be scientific adequacy of the ethnologic, historic and philolog1c
evidence by which all this is supported would be beneath contempt
were we not dealing with widespread beliefs of a pathetic intens1. ty
Nevertheless, these beliefs are radically false and pro
foundly inimical to liberal and humanistic civilization. History,
and Jewish history especially, shows that the claim to purl ty of
7
race on the part of any civilized people i s entirely mythical
• • • •

• • • •

'lbe doctrinaire assumptions of Herzl and his successors are
fourfold and are the practices of present--day Israel . 8
ideological assumptions

'lbese Zionist

a.re a

1 . Jews and Gentiles are inherently incapable of living harmoniously
in the same society. Anti-Jewi shness is an incurable Gentile
affliction.

2. For self-preservation, all Jews must settle together in the same
country. Herzl was willing to accept 6, 000 "uninhabited" square
ailes of Africa's Uganda offered by the Br1 tish. However, the much
llOre powerful emotional appeal--and for reasons of attractive poll t
ical support by using the appeal of "Palestine" the land of the
"Israelites"--of Palestine made that land the ultimate choice for
�oloniza.tion and the eventual Jewish State .
3. Non-Jews must either be displaced from the Jewish State or kept
apart from the Jewish settlers by legal and social walls of group
separation.
4. Gentile cooperation is needed from two sources a Anti-Semites who
will stimulate Aliyah ( that is, Jewish migration to Palestine ), and
at least one Great Power whose backing can make up for the scattered
smallness of world Jewry. Herzl sought the sponsorship of the
Russian Czar, the Gennan Kai ser, the King of Italy, and the Turkish
Sul tan. His political efforts were more successful in enlisting the
support of Great Britain. Hi s successors were more successful in
acquiring the poll tical support of Brita.in and then the United States.
Moreover, the Zionist-Israel ideological doctrine of "the Jewish
people, " while portraying the Jews as one nati on, one people, one race,
contains three major political characteristicsa
1 . "'!he Jewish people" doctrine, to Zioni sm, is a poll tical-legal

entity which entails "rights" in and owes obligations to a
sovereignty ( I srael ) which is foreign to any other country except
Israel . Said another way, the legal "rights" and obligations of
"the Jewish people" entity are "rights" of the Jewish collectivity
itself and not of the individuals which comprise the collectivity.
Consequently, to the extent that "rights" and obligations are in
volved, they are group "rights" and obligations rather than in
dividual ones.
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2. "'lbe Jewish people" Zionist doctrine i s a transnational entity
which i s not limited to Jews who live, or wish to live, in the
State of Israel .
The Zionist aims or claims are addressed to Jews
outside the sovereignty of the State of Israel, to Jews who have
a legal
nationality status other than Israel.
·

and

). "'!he Jewi sh people" doctrine is an involuntary entity which
aeans that i t includes all Jews simply because they are Jews
thout regard to the personal preferences of any Jew.
For example,
the involuntary factor of the claimed legal connection of all Jews
th the State of Israel--actually in strict Zioni st ideology ,
"E:retz Yisrael"--makes no room for any exception for United Stat.es
and other non-Israeli nationals who are Jewish by rellgion. 9

and

w1
w1

Consequently,
a.re

the essence of political Zionism i s the doctrine that Jews

"one people"

and

a state for the Jews.

the corollary that Jews must have a Judenstaa.t or
The base of the Zionist demand for a sovereign

exclusively "Jewish" state was--as i t still is--the contention that all
Jews belong to a single ethnic-national (racial ) entity called "the
Jewish peopl e , • distinct and apart from the national entities of the
countries in which they· live and claim legal citi zenship;

secondly,

Zionism employs the poll tical doctrine to promote activities throughout
the world to entice Jews to emigrate to Palestine-Israel and bring about
the declared Zionist territorial obj ective of making the area the "national
homeland" of world Jewry.
Additionally, i t should be understood that Zionist diplomacy with
the British governmental Zioni sts such as Balfour in 1917 postulated a
definitive objective : that "the Jewish people0 be accepted as a transnational nationality entity and that arbitrary membership in it be con
ferred upon world Jewry• 1 0

As we will soon see,

the British governmental

Zionists under criticism from anti-Zionist British Jews rejected the
Zionists' claim when i t clari fi ed 1 ts stance i n the safeguard clauses
of the Balfour Declaration.

Both safeguard clauses were placed in the

declaration contrary to the explicit negotiating objectives of the
Zionist leaders, as we shall shortly reveal.

'lbeir inconsistency with

the official Zionist draft proposal of July 18, 1917, and the three
central political objectives embodied in that proposal will become
obvious in chapter five .
Zionist claim to a "historic title" to Palestine was first advanced by the World Zionist Organi zation to the Peace Conference in
P&r:1.s in i919. 11

The Zionist memorandum, under the heading "The

Historic Tl tle", explained the basis of the Zionist claim as follows:
( 1 ) The land i s the historic home of the Jews• • • •

(2) In some parts of the world, and particularly in Eastern Europe,
the condition of life of millions of Jews are deplorable • • • •
The need for fresh outlets i s urgent • • • • Palestine would offer
one such outlet • • • •

( J ) But Palestine i s not large enough to contain more than a pro

portion of the Jews of the world • • • • A Jewish National Home in
Palestine will , however, be of high value to them • • • •

(4) Such a Palestine would be of value to the world at large , whose ,
real weal th consists in the healthy diversities of its civilizations.
( 5) Lastly the land needs redemption.

Much of 1 t i s left desolate • • • • 1

Consequently, the Zionist claim to Palestine was primarily based
on ancient "Biblical Prom1ses" 1 J of four-thousand years ago that God
promised Abraham that "unto thy
to

seed have I given this land, nl4 and ,

Zionism, that the words "seed of Abraham" mean only those who today are,

by religion, Jews, whether or not they are the physical descendants of
Abraham .

( This ideological concept i s referred to by the Zionists as

"the Jewish people" racial doctrine . )
Author! tative literature of the Zionist movement shows that the
removal of the indigenous Palestinian Arab people was, from the beginning,
a doctrinal program of Zionism. 1 5

The drastic reduction, if not total

removal , of non-Jews i s still, thirty years after the minorl ty Zioni st

2

cCllJIUni ty unilaterall y proclaimed 1tself a "Jewi sh State" in Palestine,
an

ideological corollary of the doctrine of rellgio-raclal Jewish ex-

clusivi sm, which ls the central essenc� of Zionism.

For, when Zionism

arose as a penchant or call for Jewish self-segregation in a terrl tory
in which a "Jewish State" would be founded, 1 ts poll tical adherents
knew that the "Jewishness" of the proposed state would be incompatible
with the continued exi stence of a non-Jewish majori ty, or even a sub-

stantial minor! ty, unde� 1 ts national poll ti cal control .

In essence,

Zionist trad1 tional policy has been to make the Jewish State Arabrein

( free

of Arab people ) . 16

Consequentially, the Zionist policy has historically been that
the Palestinians, or most of them, had to be removed by one means or
another if the aim of Zionism was to be attained.

17

'Ibis is the reason,

as the American King-Crane Commi ssion reported to President Wilson in
1919 , "the Zioni sts looked forward_ to a practically complete dispossession
of the present

( Arab )

inhabi. tants of Palestine . ..

l8

'!he program of the Jewish national home , clearly expressed by
even the moderate Z1oni sts, was to increase Pales tine' s Jewi sh numbers
by immigration until such time as "the Jews" should outnumber the indigenous

Arab

people and usurp the exclusive prerogatives of governing.

'!he Zionist

policy had as 1 ts final aim the submergence of the natl ve Arabs under
a new Jewish State controlled by Zionism.

'!he principles of inter-nation

al law were to be simply ignored and repudiated i n the Zioni sts' gradual-

1st national ter:ri torial goal to construct their "Jewish" state .
Zionists argue that their poll ticalconcept of a continuing
"Jewish people" throughout the history of mankind, as predicated on the
notion of the "chosen peopl e , " was implicitly recognized in the Balfour

..
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Declarat1.on. 19

First, the concept of a subjective "Jewish nation"

internationally distributed, existing through more than twenty centuries
without terrl tory, government, or poli ti.cal cont1.nu1 ty, and imposing
obligations and limitations upon all adherents of the Jewish religious
fa! th, rega.rdless of ethnic origin, choic� of nationali ty, or time of
conversion to Judaism (or for that matter continued adherence to Judaism),
bas no foundation or precedent in any internationally recognized legal
doctrine.
rejected

'lhe international commun1 ty has explicitly and specifically

1 t . 20

When in 1959 Clarence

L.

Coleman Jr., President of the American

Council for Judaism, 21 requested that the Department of State clarify
the relationship between the State of Israel and American citizens of
Jewi sh fai th,

Parker T .

Hart;

Acting

Assistant Secretary for

Near

Eastern and South Asian Affairs, responded a
I have for reply your letter of October 15, 1959, to the Secretary
of State rega.rding American-Israel relations especially as they per
tain to the status of American citizens of the Jewish faith
•

(T)hat the United States Government does not condone the involun
tary identification of its c1 tizens with a foreign state. 22
• • •

Moreover, the United States Government has legally declared the
rejection of Israel ' s "the Jewi·sh people" claim as a concept of international lawa
Accordingly, 1 t should be clear that the Department of State does
not regard the "Jewish people" concept as a concept of international
law. 23
'lhe universally recogni zed national! ty entity in international
law is the national state ; an individual. has the single nationality status
of a particular state .

'!hough a state has wide discretion in conferring

its national! ty status , there are certain international juridical limi tations upon the recogni zed procedures legally used to confer nationality
me�bership1

6.5

l . National.1 ty at birth may be acquired either through the terrl toria.l
principle of jus soli , 24 or by the principle of jus sanguinis. 25
2. National.1 ty membership may be acquired through naturalization
but the provisions of the municipal nationality law must not conflict
w1 th the applicable limitations of international law.
That is, an
individual who is an alien by birth may acquire nationa.li ty member
ship in a state through his voluntary choice and under the prescrip
tive municipal law of the country.
3. National! ty membership may a.lso be conferred by recognizing dua.l
nationality. "'!he classic example of dual national! ty i s that of a
person born in one country of nationals of another country, who
acquires the nationality of the former by reason of the place of
birth, jure soli , and that of the latter by virtue of the nat1onal1 ty
of the parents, jure sanguinis . 1126

"The Jewish people" Zionist national! ty claims are used by
Zionism-Israel to change the juridical status of Jews in states other
than

Israel, that is, to add to the existing Zionist "Jewish" nationality

of Jews a further membership in "the Jewish people" national! ty entity
expounded by Zionist ideology. 27

An

elementary duty of protection on

the part of a political society or state is the legal protection of 1 ts
nationals' citizenship status against foreign attack or subversion of
that national! ty and citizenship status .28

Only a national state has

the unique juridical competence and recognition to constitute a national1 ty entity.

Even where a particular international organization or public

body is controlled by the same political constituency that controls a
state, i t is only a national state that constitutes a nationality entity.
One of the staggering and strange features of "the Jewish people"
national! ty ent1 ty claim which requires 1 ts instant rejection in international law is that i t does not comprise the nationality of a national
state .

Even though "the Jewish people" is claimed by Zionism to have a
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juridical relationship to the State of Israel, 29 1 t is clearly obvious
that the claimed nationall ty of "the Jewish people" is not the same as
the nationality of the State of Israel .

Unheard of before and totally

rejected by international la.w, the national! ty of "the Jewish people"
is

an

additional "national! ty" entity in the sense that it is composed

of individuals identified by religion who are the nationals of the
countries of their respective legal residence.
to

press this absurd

ad.di tional

But Zionism continues

nationality until such time, in the

political jargon of Zionistic terms, as when all the "exiles"

are

•1ngathered" to the Zionist State of Israel .JO
'lbe Zioni st political-ideological philosophy clearly stipulates
that a Jew could not be a member of any other national! ty except "the
Jewish people"nationali ty, that a Jew is "in exile" outside of "Eretz
nsrael , " and that a Jew is a Jew by "nationality." All three concepts,
besides being very dangerous to the international commun1 ty in that these
Zionist ideas and practices have created and are still provoking Middle
East conflict, are unacceptable as juridical claims in international. law.31
Concluding, since we are concerned only with international law
considerations, no attempt will be made here to controvert the queer and
extra-legal proposals made in the Zionist memorandum. JZ 'lbe Zionist claim
of a historic title to Arab Palestine has no basis in international law
or in historical fact.

'lbe modes of acquiring terrl. tory are well defined
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under international law and the claim of a historic title is not one of
them.

The term "historic title" has no relationship in international

law whatsoever with a claim to recover a territory from the hands o f
another people on the ground o f its former occupation by the claimants
some time in distant history . '.33

International law would not countenance

a claimant concept which, instead of ensuring peace, order and stability,
would create the most dangerous and violent conflicts in modern inter
national relations. 34

Ancient historical connection gives no

no rights, no claim to territory.

title,

And much less does i t displace the

t1 tle or justify the dispossession--in Palestine

1 t was forceful dis

possession--of the indigenous inhabitants of a country.
Moreover, studious historical examination reveals that the
"historical rights" of "the Jews" over Arab Palestine, even analyzed.
in common sense, are pathetically absurd.

Such claims are all the more

absurd and inconsistent in view of the fact that the Jews who came :from
Europe to Palestine are not racially ancestral "heirs" to the ancient
Hebrew tribes; the Zionist claim becomes ever more specious when one
understands that, historically, before the invasion of Palestine by Hebrews,
Palestine had always been Semi tic-Canaanite, that is to say, ancestrally
Arab in view of the fact that the Semite i s geographically speaking of
Arab world orig:1. n . 35

In reality, any attempt to consider the "Jews" a

race or an international "nationality" designated "Jewish" when they are
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no

more than another religious community--and a non-homogeneous one at

that, for it too i s divided. into sects (Judaism i s a schismatic religious
body}--constitutes hideous illiteracy.*

*Another aspect of massive public ignorance as pertains to Zionist racial
theories i s the intended lack of public infomation on Zionism's close
and covert dealings with Geman National Socialism (the 'Nazi ' party)
between 1933 and 1941 . For example , see IG.aus Polkehn, "'!he Secret
Contacts a Zionism and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 , " Journal of Palestine
Studies, V (Spring/Summer, 1976 ) . This article is an excellent docu
mented account of Zionist-Nazi Germany cooperation in which the Zionist
official El.iezer Livneh (who had been editor of the Haganah publication
during the Second World War) declared during a sympoSium organized by the
Israeli newspaper Ma.ariv in 1966, "that for the Zionist leadership the
rescue of Jews was not an aim in itself, but only a means" (i . e . , to
establishing a Jewish state in Arab Palestine ) . Readers should especially
see pages 69 through 76. One reason why the Israeli government was so
nervous and anxious about secreting Adolf Eichmann out of Argentina
(rather than informing the Argentine government for his legal extradi ti.on
to West Germany for trial ) and holding the ttrial of Eichmann in Israel
and in no other place becomes clear; onl y in Israel could Zionist contacts
with the Nazi s be kept out of public view. Observe in Polkehn' s article
footnote sixty-five and pages 71 through 75 regarding the Zionist emissary
Feivel Folkes who , today, lives in Haifa, Israel .
Zionist leaders during the holocaust did not stop at manipulating lives.
'Ibey also controlled. the sources of finance and communications, repre
senting themselves before the world as the spokesmen of the "Jewish
nation. " They played a significant and prominent role in the unfulfilled.
potential in rescuing Jewish people during and before World War II. In
three vital areas they failed and impeded others' efforts : 1 ) in communi
cations, 2 ) in material aid and J ) in preventing annihilation. Had these
failures stemmed from ignorance or mistakes, one might excuse their lack
of ab1li ty, rut the b1 tter truth i s that their actions were determined by
explicit policy and a fundamental Zionist principle . 'lhe first and fore
most aim was to establish· the "Jewish State"--the masses of Jews merely
served as convenient means. And wherever there existed a contradiction
between the two , the needs of the masses, and even their extrication, were
subordinated to the needs of the Jewish state-in-formation. The Zionist
leaders saw the spilt Jewish blood of the Nazi period as grease for the
wheels of the Jewish national state . To exemplify this fact see the quotes
of Zioni st officials excerpted. in Reb Moshe Shonfeld, The Holocaust Victims
Accuse s Documents and Testimon on Jewish War Criminals (Brooklyn, New York :
Netu:rei Karta of U.S.A . , 1977 , pp. 24-28 .

Chapter

'lbre e

1 'lbeodore Herzl , L 'Etat Juif, French translation (Paris :
Lipschutz, 1926). Herzl recognized: "'Ibey will hold i t against
ae, with all the reason in the world, that I am serving the
a.nti-Semites' :p urpose by declaring that we are a people , one peopl e . "
(ibid . , p . 199 ) . Marvin Lowenthal , ed. , The Diaries of 'lbeodore
Herzl (London : Victor Gollancz , Ltd . , 19.58); Chaim Weizmann, Trial
and Error (New York : Harpers and Brothers, 1949 ) ; Theodore Herzl ,
'!be Jewish State (London: H. Pordes , 1967) . It requires a great
deal of indulgence to read Zionists' astounding conjectures on the
concepts of nation, race , people . For example , Asher Ginsberg,
known as Achad Ha 'am, one of the so-called " spiritual" philosophers
of Zionism, stated in an article in the magazine Am Scheidewege,
published in Berlin in 1923, vol . 2 , p. 103, the following: "The
steps on the ladder of creation are : minerals, plants, animals,
human beings, and, at the very top, Jews. "

2'lbe ancient Hebrew connection with Palestine was short-lived,

unstable , intermittent, long extinct, and based on nothing better
than the fact of conquest and subject to the condition that there
is a national or racial affinity between the Hebrews of 4, 000 years
ago and the Russian, Polish, American and European Jews of today.
The wri ter will quickly dismiss the absurdity of this Zionist claim
in both historical fact and modern international law: because if
this transl tory occupation by invasion can give the Zionists a
"historic right" to the country, then it may be argued that the Arabs,
who occupied Spain continuously for 800 years , could claim the
country today, while the Italians could claim the British Isles and
the American Indians and Aboriginees demand the withdrawal of the
contemporary ruling inhabitants of the Americas and Australia from
these countries. In essence, historically and legally, if all
nations were to adopt or accept this absurd Zionist logic, the world
today would be in utter chaos.

3w.

'lhomas Ma.llison, Jr. , "Zionist-Israel Claims on 'the
Jewish people ' Are Unconsti tutional11 , Issues, Winter 1962-63, p. 5.
Should one desire to contest the "political" nature of the Zionist
movement, I refer the person to the words of the President of the
World Zionist Organi zation, Dr. Nahum Goldmann , who stated in 1959
that "the Zionist movement i s no longer ' political • , " that the inter
national Zionist movement "is a Zionist nationalist movement, " and to
"Zionism ' s fundamental and unchanged conception of all Jews as pos
sesors of a universal 'Jewish ' national! ty." 'Ibis Zionist ideological
concept and Zionism0 s attempt to impose i t upon all Jewry precipi
tates the intense debate among Zionist, non-Zionists, and anti-Zion
ists. See Fonnal Policy Statements of the American Council for
Judaism : From September, 1959 to May, 1961 , the letter of Clarence
Coleman, Jr. , President of the American Council for Judai sm , dated
December 7, 1959 , P• 1 .
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4The

environs,

or area,

to which the writer refers i s histori-

cally documented by the Zionists.

At the Parts Peace Conference

the Zionists had hoped that Transjordan up to "close to and west of
the Hadjaz railway" would be included i n the area of the Palestine

mandate to be opened to Jewish settlement.

'Ibis hope was officially

expressed in the Zioni sts' memorandum to the Versailles Peace Confer

ence and was not officially renounced until
in his Trial and Error, p .

361,

1922. Chaim Wei zmann ,
1922 all the leaders

records how in

of the Yishuv , including Vladimir Jabotinsky, agreed to the renunci
ation--but one not adhered to in practice--"not without some qualms , "
but as the price of inducing Britain to confirm the mandate and
accept the Balfour Declaration in the mandate.
of Hovevei Zion,

Russian Jews begtnning in the
outlook,

1880' s

without any clear political

sought to regenerate "the Jewish people" by establishing

Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine.

1890

Earlier the doctrine

"the lovers of Zion , " a Palestinophile movement of

'Ihe legal name taken in

by the groups inspired by Hovevei Zion thinking is significant :

Soci ety for the encouragement of Jewish agri cultural and manual
workers in Syria and Palestine.

See also Leon Pinsker,

Emancipation, which advocated in

1914-1945,

Vol .

5tterzl ' s

( New

1882

the "re-e stabli shment" of a

Robert John and Sarni Hadawi ,

Hebrew state ;

I

Auto

'Ihe Palestine Diary

York: New World Press,

1970),

pp.

1-21.

Zionism had limi ted appeal in the earl y decades.

an excellent interpretation of Zionism,
Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger,

For

or "Jewish" nationalism,

see

( New York: Bookman Associates, 1957); Berger,
Dilemma ( New York : '!he Devin-Adair Co. , 1946 ) .
For an

Judaism or Jewish Nationalism: 'Ihe Alterna

tive to Zionism

The Jewish

excellent legal explication of the idea of Zionism,
of W . T . Ma.llison, Jr. ,

see the wrttings

Jewish-American Professor of international

law at George Washington University.

Jewish nationalism or Zionist

nationalism i s also defined as the ineradicabl e desire by the
Zi oni st movement to build a national home for "the Jewish people . "
Israel , i n defiance of international law,
and the Geneva Conventi ons, has built
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the United Nations Charter
exclusively Jewish settle

ments and colonies on occupied Arab lands captured from Syria,
and Egypt since the June,

1967

war .

along with addi tional information see Arab Report, I I ,
ber

Jordan

For this number of settlements

1 , 1975.

no.

6
The political Zionism launched by Theodore Herzl in
the creation of a "Jewi sh Commonweal th"

(his

1,

Decem

1896

Judenstaat scheme

)

for
did

not advance the claim to Arab Palestine as their "historical inheri
tance . "

'!he Zionist Organization Jewish State scheme considered

several areas: Palestine,
Cyprus, Argentina,

Uganda,

( El

Mozambiqu e ,

the Sinai Peninsula

)

the Congo,

Arish

Tripoli ,

and even the

western United States were considered as a prospective Zionist exclu
sive colony.

UNESCO' s offi cial definition of racism i s "anti-social

beliefs and acts which are based on the fallacy that discriminatory
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intergroup relations are justifiable on biological grounds."
Defenders of the United Nations' "Zionism equals racism" equation
regard Israel ' s basic 1950 Law of Return and 1952 Nationality Law
as discriminatory since both grant to the world' s Jews rights ·which
they deny and withhold from Palestinians and other Gentiles. Among
other I sraeli practices so cited i s the fact that "more than 90 per
cent of the land in the State of Israel falls under the regulations
of the Jewish National Fund under which non-Jews cannot rent or buy
a house or flat, or open a business ...
7Morrls Cohen, "Zionism : Tri ba.lism or Liberalism , " 'Ihe New
Republic, March 8 , 1919, p. 182; Dr. Israel Shahak, "'Ihe Raci st
Nature of Zionism and of the Zionistic State of Israel, " American
Jewish Alternatives to Zioni sm, Inc . , December/January 1975/1976,
p. 12.
Dr . Shahak, an Israeli Jewish citizen since the establish
ment of the State of Israel in 1948 , says 0that the State of Israel
is a racist state in the full meaning of this term : In this state
people are discriminated against, in the most permanent and legal
way and in the most important areas of life, only because of their
origin. 'Ibis racist discrimination began in Zionism and i s carried
out today mainly in cooperation with the insti tutions of the
Zionistic movement. Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger, prominent American of
the Jewi sh faith, reports in the same i ssue that "Zionism , by
(Israeli ) law and historic ideological commitment is, indeed,
racist. " (p.4).
11

8Golda Meir, an ardent translator of Herzl ' s thoughts into
Israeli Zionist action, used the ethnic term "Arabs" rather than the
religious term "Christians0 when on July 23, 1972, she, as Prime
��nister, persuaded all but four of her Cabinet to refuse the
Catholic Palestinian Arab villagers of Berem and Iqri t near the
Lebanese border the right to return to their homes, which they had
been previously promised by the Israeli Government when they were
evacuated for: security reasons . The Israeli Army forcefully evacu
ated them in favor of Jewish immigrant settlers, who settled their
homes. 'Ihe villagers' appeal to Meir brought her reported response
that 1 t would be "an erosion of Zionist values to allow Arabs to
return where Jews had been settled . " Quote i s from Wright, A Tale
of Two Hamlets ( 1973), p . 6 .
9w . 'Ihomas Mallison, Jr. , "Zionist-Israel Claims on the ' the
Jewish people ' Are Unconstitutional, 11 Issues, Winter 1962-63, p . 8 .
In short, Israel and Zionism arrogate to themselves the legal claim
of jurisdictional authorl ty in international law over Jews the world
over. Said another way, the State of Israel and Zionism seeks to
achieve the juridical objective that "the Jewish people" be legally
constituted a transnational "nationality, 11 membership in which i s to
be conferred upon all Jews wherever they reside as citizens.
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original principal purpose of the Zionist claim to " the Jewish
while privately negotiating the format of the Balfour

, :. Dlclara.tion for nearly three years was to obtain the assent of the
Government to "the Jewish people" concept through the implied
eases of agreement of customary international law.
One of the
,
cipal purposes of the reiterated Zionist "the Jewish people" claim
international law contexts i s to obtain the assent of governments
than the Government of Israel .
Even though to Zionism "the
people" i s a novel ad.di tional "nationality," i t does not meet
juridical criteria for even dual or multiple nati onality in inter
"The Jewish people" membership claim, though advanced
national law.
an a race theme by Zionists in 1917 and in the 1948 Declaration of the
lstablishment of the State of Israel ( 0'Ihis right
'of the Jewish people
was recognized in the Balfour
to national rebirth in its own country '
Declarati on • • • • " , i s invalid under the criteria of public internati onal

Jfl
� tish

.Other
.,Jewish
the

)

law.
Ironically, the Balfour Declaration and later agreements concerning
the same subject ( 0 the Jewish people0 nationality claims) denied the
Zionists juridical authorl ty for "the Jewish people" nati onality claims.
'lbe safeguard clauses of these agreements are so unequivocal that they
prohibit and deny the Zionist claims, such as the Uni ted States Government
explicitly did i n 1964.
The "Jewish people" Zionist concept has never
Moreover, all
been accepted as a juridical claim in international law.
the official Briti sh policy declarations and the history of the negotiations
behind the Balfour Declaration, reveal that "a national home for the
Jewish people" was not equivalent to assenting to or making Palestine
into a Jewish state , nor couli the erection of such a Zionist Jewish
state be accompli shed without the gravest trespass and violation 0£
international law precepts .
Moreover, the Mandate for Palestine was,
under the international law authori ty of the League of Nations Covenant, '
the basi c international law instution ( the Mandates System) for the
interim government of Arab Palestine agreed to by the League of Nations.
Its provi sions, therefore , are of particular importance and" priority
in implementing the juridical limitations to the Zionist scheme imposed
by the Balfour Declaration as an international law aspect of the Mandate.
11
J . C . Hurewi tz, Dipl omacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol. II
(Van Nostrand, 19.56 ) , p . 45.
Arguments over aboriginality in Pale stine
are inconclusive and lead nowhere .
The crucial factor i s that the
political Zionist movement developed at a time--Herzl conceived the
Zionist idea during the nineteenth century, an era characteri zed by
extreme nationalisms often with all its raci st ove·rtones--when in order
to ful fill its professed goals Zionism had to displace the existing
majori ty people of the land called Palestine.
It was not a movement
of the majori ty peopl e of the land tying to overthrow an imperial i st
In actuality, the Zionist program i s a colonial
settler population.
or settler movement.
Herzl ' s appeal s to Bismarck, Cecil Rhodes, Joseph
Chamberlain, the T6rld.sh Sul tan , were founded on the principle tha.t a
colonial venture would be profi table to the power that sponsored i t .
'!his information i s all explicitly recorded i n Herzl ' s diari e s .
The
"altruistic" intentions of his political efforts were explicitly negated
by the fact that Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine demanded

7)

Palestinian Arab displacement--both Muslim and Christian--to make room
for the Jewi sh immigrant population.

'l I

Herzl maintained that, once the Jewish State was founded, any of
the then fourteen million Jews who refused to migrate to the Jewish State
should be classed as "anti-Semi tic . "
See Herzl , The Jewish State, trans
lated by Louis Lipsky, 1947, p . 8 1 . The definition of anti-Semitism
being most vigorously promulgated by Zionism and its adherents i s "any
talk of substance that i s critical of Israel or Zionism . " This handy
use of such an irrational epi thet--al so used as a subterfuge--has been
unthinkingly imposed by Forster and Epstein who are both Zionists ( see
their book The New Anti-Semitism, 1973) on the Quakers, Episcopalian
Dean Francis B. Sayre , Senator Fulbright, columni sts Evans and Nov!tk
and the Christian Science Monitor paper.
An acceptabl e , non-politicized,
non-Zionist and intelligent definition of anti -Semiti sm is given by the
Universal Jewish Encyclopedia: "The tenn . , . to denote the movement to
degrade Jews to an inferior position in all branches of life in the
countries in which · they live. Generally, it i s applied to individual
and group inci tati on and action aiming to circumscribe the civi l , religious
and political rights of the Jews; also to hinder nonnal relations between
Jews and non-Jews. "
12Ibid . , p . 46. The Zionist redemption doctrine, in essence, i s the
political objective of ingathering and settlement of the land of Palestine
and its environs with the "people of Israel , " that is, the "Jewish people"
of the world , in the "land of Israel . " Their program i s to acquire the
land for "the Jewish people . " The Zionist memorandum stated that "by
violence they were driven from Palestine"--totally ignoring the historical
fact that it was by violent invasion that the Hebrews themselves con
quered part of the country in the first place. It should also be noted
that the Palestinians of today are the earliest and the original inhabitants
of Palestine. Their settlement in Palestine can be traced back at least
forty centuries al though, naturally, there were infusions of other racial
elements into the Palestinians' ancestors.
13
'Ibere will be no attempt in this paper to examine and debate the
explicit meaning of Biblical texts either to support or to oppose the
contention that the present Zionist State of I srael i s the "fulfillment"
of Old Testament prophecies. It i s sufficient to say only two things
in this regard . First, none of the national o·r international tribunals
which have, in the past, wrestled with the poli tical issues of the
Palestine problem has ever admitted that ancient Biblical prophecies
established any legal validi ty to the Zionist political claims to all ,
or part of, the area of Palestine. Second, even those Zionists who .
claim, ex post facto, that the State of Israel does fulfill the
Biblical injunctions, the mili tary/political methods used to establish
the state. 'Ibe best these people can say i s that the Zionist
nationalist movement became the Divine instrument. The closest these
people can come to "logic" i s to plead the expediency and the necessity
for human intervention and political efficiency to speed up the process
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lld,ch was to require God ' s own time . 1he most chart table construc
tt.on which can be put upon the Zionist State of Israel therefore , in

the context of considering i t s Biblical legi timacy, i s that through
JQ11.t1cal and mili tary methods having no sancti on in the Bible at all ,
a political sovereignty (distinct from legal ) has been forcefully es
No more heinous distortion of the Bi bl e could be imagined
tablished. .
than using i t to justify the brutal expul sion from thei r homes and
lands of modern Palestinians or to give succor to a political Israel
that occupies territory and homes belonging naturally to another peo
ple and reduces minority Arab inhab:l. tants to undesirable s i n prefer
ence to an exclusive "Jewish" character.
Jews are pawns in an elite
political and totalitarian movement.
1hey are being concentrated in
Palestine, not because they are in need of a so-called refuge or a
haven, but in order to fulfill the purely secularist political aspira
Palestine has
tions of a major ideological movement called Zionism.
seen many invasions throughout its complex history, but not since
t.he first Hebrew invasion of some 3, 500 years ago has a similar situa
tion of massacres , mass expul sions and near total di spossessions
arisen in the Holy Land .
To suggest that this i s being done under
Biblical prophecies i s the height of grotesque ignorance.

14

When Abraham made a covenant with God through circumci sion
(Genesi s XVI I ,
and all the land of Canaan (Palestin e ) was promised
to him for an everlastin g possession, it was I shmael , ancestor of the

8)

Arab tribes, who was circumcised,

for Isaac had not then been born.

If, therefore , one i s to follow Zionist Biblical reasoning, Palestine
1he idea of the es
was "promi sed" by God exclusively to the Arabs .
tablishment of a state on the basis of arguments derived from the
Bible i s utterly unacceptable in international law and especi ally to
twentieth century thinki ng.
Considerati ons of a religious nature
'!here i s no relation
have no place in contemporary international law.
in international law between the establishment of a State and re
ligious affiliation.
But scriptural exegesis by Zionist anagogical
interpreters has been utilized, but even then incorrectly, to claim
"the Jewish people" right to "recover their sovereignty" over Palestine.
Accordi ng to the rules of international law established since the
eighteenth century , a terri tory can only be subj ected to the sover
eignty of the occupier through actual indigenous occupation.
In
laying down condi tions for the transfer of sovereignty in a State,
international law has never admitted sovereignty claims based on re
ligion.
'!here exists no juridi cal precedents in international law to
create a State for adherents of either a regional nor universal fai th.
See Edward Rizk, ·trans . , The Palestine Question (Beirut: The Institute
For Palestine Studies, 1968); Sarni Hadawi , The Jews and the Bible
{unpubli shed extract from the author to thi s wri ter); Elmer Berger,
Judai sm or Jewish Nationali sm (New York : i3ookman Associates, 1957 ) ;
Israel According to -Holy Scriptures ( Cedar Rapids, Iowa: !gram Press,
Inc . , no date).
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15-ibe goal of pol1 t1cal Zionism as early as August 2 1 , 192 1 , was

illustrated by one of Israel ' s contemporary political leaders and

longtime Jewish Agency official , Golda Meir, who declared on thi s date :
•1t is not the Arabs the English will choose to colonise Palestine, 1 t
is us (the Jews ) . "
See Mary Syrkin, Golda Mei r (Pari s : Gallimard, 1966 ) ,
P•

63.

1
6Americans for Middle East Understanding, A Secret Document: The
Ioenig Document (New York : Americans for Middle East Understanding,
19??). This document i s reproduced fully in the Appendix. The
so-called "Koenig Program" i s the product of es tablishment Israeli
Jews . Israel Koenig i s , at this wri ting, the "District Commi sioner for
the North . " He is the Israeli official held responsible for putti ng
into effect the policies of the Israeli Government ' s Interior Ministry
in the Galilee District, where most of the remaining Arabs of Palestine
live. Koeni g handled the official processing o f the document, including
its delivery to "Rabin and other ministers . " But the racially advo
cated program reflects the views of other important Israeli poll tical
figures. A full review from an authori tative, respected source of thi s
document is found in Al-HaMishmar, one of Israel ' s major daily news
papers , dated September 7, 1976.
Dr. Israel Shahak, of the Israeli
League for Human Rights, wr1 tes in a personal l etter to American Jewish
Alternatives to Zionism and Americans for Middle East Understanding:
"The one really shocking thing which I think you should mention is the
overwhelming support that Koenig got among the religious, that i s
Actually
the orthodox Jews, here, including especially their rabbi s .
the assembled rabbi s of Galilee asked all the Jews to bless Koenig
on the first sabbath after the publication of his report , during
their ' call ' to the Torah reading . " Koeni g ' s program , therefore , i s
not the eccentricity o f a maverick; h e i s in h i s post at the dispo
sition of the National Religious Party; this party is--as i t has been
for thirty years--an indispensible factor in the successive coalitions
which have maintained the dominant governing position of Ma.pal .
That
is the political party of Ben-Gurion, Eshkol , Meir and Rabin, all of
whom have been the toast of pro-Zionist Ameri can governmental officials
professing passionate commi tment to "democrati c principles and human
rights." Koenig was actually called "Nazi" by parties located on the
The Koenig document itself
left of the Israeli politi cal spectrum .
is merely an addendum to all of the earlier racist policies imposed or
enacted against Palestine ' s Arabs (later Israel ' s remaining Arabs ) .
l7
Felicia Langer, With M Own E es (London: I thaca Press, 1975 ) ;
Sabri Jiryi s , 1he Arabs i n Israel New York : Monthly Revi ew Press, 1976 ) ;
Sabri Jiryi s , The Arabs in Israel Beirut: The Institute For Palestine
Studi es, 1969 ) .
After 1948 , puni shment of remaining Arabs in Israel takes
the form of indi scriminate impri sonment without actual legal protections
and safeguards .
Jiryi s , an Israel Arab attorney from Haifa was first
imprisoned and then exiled because of his secretive transfer of the
earlier Hebrew manuscript, by chapters, out of I srael .
After more than
a year of impri sonment and "house arrest" he was released but ordered
out of Israel to Beirut.
Additional confirmation of Israeli treatment
of Arabs both within Israel and the Arab occupied lands i s explicitly de
tailed in reports of the Israeli League of Human and Civil Rights, headed
by Dr. Israel Shahak .
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18
Palestine Government, The Political Histor
of Palestine Under
British Administration (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1947 , p . J ,
paragraph l J .
l9

r

Walid Khalidi , ed. , From Haven to Conquest (Beirut: The Institute

ror Palestine Studi es, 1971), p. 235.
I t should be noted that the
Zionists as early as 1922 did not believe that the Balfour Declaration
(which incorporates the phrase "Jewish people" ) was a valid claim to
nationhood and soverei gnty in Arab Palestine.
For , i n 1922, Lieutenant
Colonel W . F . Stirling, nri ti.sh mili tary administrator i n Jaffa (Palestine ) ,
declared that the British Government should have allayed the fears of
the Arabs and "counter the false interpretation being placed on the
declaration by the Jewish Agency in Palestine and certain responsible
Jews in Amert ca. "
20
nie United States Government has expressly rejected i t , as i s
evidenced by a letter dated April 20, 1964, and addressed to Rabbi
Elmer Berger ( then execut.i ve vice president of the American Council
for Judai sm) wherei n Assi stant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot
legally asserted by American municipal law criteria "that the Department
of State does not regard the ' Jewish peopl e ' concept as a concept of
international law . "
A copy of thi s letter i s included in the Appendix .
21 '!he

American Council for Judai sm, formed t o counter American Zionism
in 1942 , was through the mid- 1960 ' s anti-Zionist; American Zionists now
control the Council and exhort Israeli state interests.
See Moshe
Menuhin, Quo Vadi s Zionist Israel? ( Beirut : The Insti tute for Palestine
Studies, 1969), pp. 52-76.
22

Fonnal Policy Statements of the American Council for Judai sm : From
The full letter i s reproduced in this
September, 1959 to
19
61 .
report as i s the American Council for Judai sm l etter of October 15, 1959
to Secretary of State Chri stian A . Herter.
Despite these legal safe
guards, Israel still involves itself in imposing "Jewish people"
'!hi s i s
nationality law obligations upon Americans of Jewish fai th.
done in diverse ways but basically through Zionist ideology of a claimed

May,

legal connection between "the Jewish people" concept and the State of
Israel.
Zionist organizations, such as the American Zionist Organization
(ZOA ) , bypassing American juridical safeguards and acting as an instru
mentality of the Israeli Government and the World Zionist Organi zation
(WZO), have been able to intrude themselves into i nternal American
poli tics largely because the United States Government has not enforced
the provisions of the Friendship , Commerce and Navigation Treaty with
Israel and the Foreign Agents Regi stration Act. nor the very important First Amendment of the Constitution.
Said another way, the poli
tical and propaganda activities within the United States of foreign
agents and their principals (in thi s case, the State of Israel and its
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)

agent, the Jewish Agency/World Zionist Organization (JA/WZO , and
the agent of the JA/WZO the Zionist Organization of America are dis
allowed. by American law, by treaty provisions between two states, and
by a Consti tutional First Amendment provision against religious dis
crill1nation.
For a full purvi ew of violations of American juridical
standards by domestic Zionist groups and organi zations serving the
Israeli Government see U . S . , Congress, Senate, Commi ttee on Forei gn
Belati ons, Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign
Principals in the Uni ted States, Hearings , before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, Senate, 88th Cong . , 1st sess . , May 23, August 1 , 1963.
'lbe purpose of the investigation was to study the activities of
•nondiplomatic repre sentatives of foreign principal s including, without limitation, foreign governments, forei gn poll tical parties, and
individual s, partnerships, associations, corporations, organi zations
or other combinati ons of individual s , whether forei gn or domesti c ,
acting i n the place of, or in the interests of, or on behalf o f a
foreign government or foreign political party, tending or intended
to influence the foreign or domestic policies or interests of the
United State s . "
2

3r.etter

from Assistant Secretary of State Talbot of the United
States Government to Rabbi Dr. Elmer Berger, Executive Vice President
of the American Council for Judaism, April 20, 1964 i n 8 Whiteman
Digest of International Law 35, 1967.
24
An example of the jus soli principle is inherent in the Four
teenth Amendment of the Uni ted States Constituti on: "All persons
born or naturalized in the Uni ted States, and subj ect to the juris
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside . "
2

5wbere the child a t birth acquires the nationality of one or
both of his parents.
26
Hackworth , Digest of International Law (Washington , D . C . : Uni ted
States Department of State, 1942), p . 352.

'
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'1bis category includes the Zionist Organization.
In ad.di tion to
national states there are other significant group parti cipants in the
contemporary world communi ty, including international public organizations or bodies, politi cal parties, pressure groups, and private assoc
But none of them has the unique juridical competence of the
iations.
national state to constitute a national entity. Among the many Zionist
reiterations of the basic legal claim to " the Jewish people" doctrine,
in varying political and legal contexts , the following are set forth as
representative illustrations: Theodor Herzl declared "Let the soverei gnty
be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the
rightful requi rements of a nation; the rest we shall mange for ourselves • .
The creation of a new State i s neither ridiculous nor impossible . . • • The
Governments of all countrie s scourged by anti-Semitism will be keenly
interested in assisting us to obtain the sovereignty we wan t . " Quote

• .

taken from Theodor Herzl , The Jewish State (New York : American Zionist
Ellergency Council, 1946) , p. 92. The Basle Program of the First Zionist
Congress in 1897 stated, "The aim of Zionism i s to create for the Jewish
people a home in Palestine secured by public law . " Quote taken from
Alan R . Taylor, Prelude to Israel : An Anal sis of Zionist Di lomatic
189?-1947 (New York : Philosophical Library, 1959 , p. 5. Chaim Wei zmann
declared , "The Zionist Organization has taken the poll tical steps necessary
to obtain the recognition by the other nations of the Jewish right to
1 a home in Palestine. But we have never wanted Palestine for the Jews.
The Balfour
'!he development of Palestine Jewry i s not a party affair.
Declaration is addressed to all Jewry. I t i s only logical that we have
1
approached the Jewish communities of the world in order to put the
work, whose maximum can never be achieved by a limited circle of Jews,
on a broader basis, and in order to mobilize for it systematically
all the forces of Jewry. " Quote ta!cen from Paul Goodman, ed . , Chaim
Weizmann (London t Victor Gollancz, Ltd . , 1945 ) , p . 203.
Fonner longtime
President of the World Zionist Organization Nahum Goldmann stated, t•The
object of the Jewish State has been the preservation of the Jewish
people, whi ch was imperilled by emanicipation and assimilation • • • • "
Quote taken from Taylor, op.cit. , p. 2 . A · textbook on Zionism sponsored
by the Zionist Organization of America declares, "The homeland itself
must be not only the home of Palestinian Jewry , but also the home of
the whole people, i .e . , potentially the home of all Jews. In striving
to accomplish its task the Zionist organi zation has regarded itself
as the representative and trustee of the whole of the nation , " Quote
taken from Joseph Heller, 'lbe Zionist Idea (New York : Schocken Books,
Inc . , 1949 ) , p. 73 .
The Declaration of the Establishment of ttt� State
of Israel states, "We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora
to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and
upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization
of the age-old dream--the redemption of Israel . " Quote taken from
Badi , ed . , Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel (New York : Twayne
Publishers, 1961), p. 10. David Ben-Gurion, fonner longtime Zionist
official and Prime l"d.ni ster of Israel declared, "On the world scene and
in the Middle East;·. Israel ' s endeavours must be the same--mili tary and
moral , but its destiny depends wholly upon the third domain, the Jewish
people in all its dispersion. '!he State of Israel i s a part of the
�addle East only in geography, which is, in the main, a static element.
From the more decisive standpoints of dynami sm, creation and growth,
Israel is a part of world Jewry. From that Jewry i t · will draw all the
resources and the means necessary for the upbuilding of the nation of
Israel and the development of the Land ; through the might of world Jewry
it will be bull t and built again . A commu.'1i ty of destiny and destination
joins together indissolubly the State of Israel and the Jewish people.
'lbere is an indestructible bond, a bond of life and death, between them. "
Quote taken from State of I srael Governmental Year-Book, 19 2 (Jerusalem:
'!be Government Printing Press, 1952 , p. 29. The District Court of
Jerusalem in the Eichmann Tri al Judgment declares, "In the light of the
recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to
establish their State, and in the light of the recognition of the established
Jewish State by the family of nations, the connection between the Jewish
people and the State of Israel constitutes an integral part of the law
of nations." Quote taken from Criminal Case No. 40/61 , p . 32, section

)4.
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Dae last quotation i s particularly significant in explaining the Zionist
Israel purpose of continued reiteration of the basic legal claim in
nrylng poli tical and l egal contexts.
The purpose i s to take any
Yoluntary relati onships between Jews across national boundaries, such
u relationships of philanthropy and reli gion, and change them into
relations recogni zed in and established by public law.

28

An interesting feature of the Zionist State violations of customary
internati onal law precepts i s Israeli intrusions into the municipal
legal system of the United States, although by no means confined solely
to the United States.
While i t should be obvious that the United States
Covenunent has the constitutional obligation to protect the Ameican
citizen ' s undivided nationality status, the Israeli State Zionist
establishment has refused to abide by this customary international law

provision.
In the American constitutional system, an individual (an
American does not receive his constitutional rights by virtue of his
11e111bership in groups or collect!vi ties) is legally entitled to his full
and equal measure of constitutional rights without regard to extraneous
factors such as his religious affili ation, national ori gin, or other
incidental s whi ch in our constitutional system are legally irrelevant.
Such is not the case in the Zionist State of Israel .
29Adolph Eicha.mann was charged with crimes against humani ty,

but the

principal Zionist charge s were "crimes against the Jewish people . "
See the Israeli Nazis and Nazi Collaborators Punishment Law ( 19 .50 ) ,
4 Israel Laws 154, Fundamental Laws 162, defining "crimes against the
Jewish peopl e . "
Thi s I sraeli statute was applied in the Attorney
General of the Government of Israel v . Adol f, the son of Karl Adol f
Eichmann, Criminal Case No. 40/6 1 , District Court of Jerusalem, Israel ,
December 11-12, 1961, affirmed Criminal Appeal No. 336/61 Supreme Court
of Israel, May 29, 1962, cited hereafter when used as Eichmann Trial
Judgment.
JO"Since I called, at the beginning of my remarks, for absolute
allegiance to the Jewish revoluti on, I shall now make a few concluding

remarks about the goal , of our revolution : It i s the complete ingathering
of the exiles into a aocialist Jewish state . "
Thi s quotation is taken
from Ben Gurion, "The Imperatives of the Jewish Revolution (1944 ) , " in
Hertzberg, ed . , The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysi s and Reader (1959 ) ,
pp. 606-619.
31rnconsi stency of this Zionist concept of a "Jewish nati on" 1 s very
peculiar: On the one hand Zionist doctri ne rejects and condemns integration
of Jews in the various countri e s ; on the other hand , Zionism considers
it normal that Jews should enjoy the advantages of "dual national! ty"
Obviously, Zionism ' s strange inconsistency
defined by Zionist jargon.
is wrapped up in political expediency.
The official attitude of , Israel ' s
Zioni st establishment i s that i t condemns the integration of Jews into
the various nations in which they live.
The 1950 Zionist Law of Return
is based on the narrowest racial and confessional principl es.
The absurdity
of this Zionist law--which legally opens up the State of Israel to Jews

only--is well illustrated i n the case of the American Negro entertai ner
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Sammy Davi s ,

Jr. , who converted

to Judaism.

According to Zionist

thinking, as legally formulated in the Israeli Status Law and the Law

of Return , Davi s i s now considered to be living i n "exile" in the United

States, his homeland , pining for the day to return "home" to Palestine �

Ludicrously,
can

by

while a total stranger i n language ,

color,

culture and rac e ,

acquire the "right" to live in the Jewish State o f Israel merely

adopting Judai sm,

the evicted indigenous Moslem and Chri stian

Palestinian Arab inhabi tants of their ancestral homeland are denied
the right to live i n the country of their birth and ancestors!

J2An

excellent historical and legal purview can be found i n Henry

Cattan , Palestine and International Law:

Israeli Conflict

London : Longman , 1973 .

33'Ihe King-Crane Commi ssion,

President Woodrow Wilson,

Arab

ects of the Arab-

The Le al

appointed in 1919 at the suggestion of

summed up the specious Zionist legal claim to

Palestine by declari ng that " the initial claim,

by Zioni st repre sentatives,

that they have a 'right'

on an occupation of two thousand years ago,
considered . "

often subni tted

to Palestine based

can hardly be seriously

Quotati on taken from J C . Hurewi tz,

op.

•

34In the context of both history and sociology,

cit. , p .

70.

the even more

aberrational conceptual elements in "the Jewish people" transnational

nationality claims must,

a forti ori , make them permanentl y invalid under

public international law precepts.

In fulfilling its constituti onal

and international juridical obligations by rejecting the absurd dis
criminatory "Jewish people" racial-regigious Zionistic concept,

the

United States and the international community i s also justified by the
most fundamental considerati ons of morali ty.

For,

not the least of

these fundamental s is separati on of religious and political values
sufficient to permit the exercise and development of religions of

universal moral value s free from political interference, coercion and

discriminati on .

The writer presumes that religious behavior i s based

on positive moral values ,

although some inculcate negative values such

as the ultra-nationali stic religious officialdom in Israel that i s part
of the Zionist ruling establishment.

The fundamental role of theocracy in Israeli governing processes

is not a subject of this paper.

But the Israeli state system politically,

reli giously and juridically depicts the involuntary and coercive aspects
of the "membership and identity" religi ous-racial conception of Zionist

nationalism.

actions,

Such a conception i s readily seen,

by official Israeli

as totally inconsistent with democrati c values and individual

equality including religious freedom and secular integration/assimilati on.
Concerning the Zioni st conception of "democracy" see the infonnation

collected by Norman F. Dacey,

'Ibe Golden Calf,

and other public information sources from Dr.

League for Human and Civil Right s .

especially chapter

25,

Israel Shahak of the Israeld..
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35
semite i s a depiction for, including in ancient times, people such
as Babylonians,

Assyrians, Phoeni cians,

Hebrews and Arabs , and others

of the eastern Mediterranean area . Before the invasion of migrant
Hebrews Palestine had always been Semitic-Canaani te,
Arab, in view of the fact that the Semite i s ,
of Arab origin.

Consequently,

that i s to say.

geographically speaking,

the .basic historical fact that must be

emphasized in any discussion of the Middle East problem,

i s that the

land of Canaan or Palestine, which was inhabited by Canaani te peopl e ,

who

were Semites and therefore Arab,

by alien Hebrew tri bes.

was later parti ally conquered

Contrary to Zionist mythmaking, Hebrews were

not originally indigenous to the Palestine area .
invaders in the land .

'Ibey were early

CHAP'IER

ZIONIST-BRITISH

IV

ASPIRATIONS IN 'ffiE
MIDDLE EAST

'IERRITORIAL

The creation of the State of Israel was an extension of European
imperiali sm . 1

'lhat the Palestinians simply did not "exist" as a national

people in the European consciousness is explicable only in terms of the
imperialistic "white-man' s burden" mentality that during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries led to a wave of European expansion.
European supremacy had planted in the minds of even the most deprived
of those who shared in 1 t the idea that any territory outside Europe was
open to European occupation.

A terrl. tory could be declared "unpopulated"

simply because 1 t was not inhabited by Europeans under a European administration; that it was inhabited by a non-European people posed an
"administrative problem , " or a challenge to missionaries, whether religious
or technological, but was of lt ttle significance otherwise. 2
It was this attitude that made 1 t possible for the Zionist
leaders and theoreticians to all but completely ignore the Arabs and
deal exclusively with the European powers within the framework of their
colonialist policies.

As one of many examples, a note wr1 tten to the

British War Cabinet in 1917 by Chaim Weizmann reads in part as follows:
In subni tting our resolution we entrusted our national and Zionist
destiny to the Foreign Office and the Imperial War Cabinet in the
hope that the problem would be considered in the light of imperial
interests and the principles for which the Entente stands.J
A book review

from

the Jerusalem Times stated the followings

That the Zionists shared the imperiali stic mentality of nineteenth
and early twentieth-century Europe "explains" their indifference
to the Palestinian Arabs, but it does not, of course , excuse i t .
Neither can it be excused as an indifference resulting from la.ck of
information, or mi sinformati on, that led immigrants and ardent,
• • •
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idealistic apologists alike to imagine Palestine as an uninhabited
terr! tory:

"there can be no doubt that i f [Palestin�

had been oc

cupied by one of the well-established industrial nations that ruled

the world at the time, one that had thoroughly settled down in a
territory it had infused with a powerful national consciousness,

then the problem of displacing German ,

French or English inhabi tants

and introducing a new nationally coherent element into the middle

of their homeland would have been in the forefront of the conscious

ness of even the most ignorant and destitute Zioni sts.4

With the building of the Suez Cana1 5 in the 1850s-1870s Palestine
received the close attention of Britain and France, both rival colonial
powers.

Moreover,

the European Powers at the conclusion of the nine-

teenth century were fiercely competitive and had no regard for inter
national law precepts . 6

Zionism used that colonial competitiveness to

their poll tical advantage;

Zionism tried to induce the relevant power--

although i t failed until 1917--to extend the necessary political support.?
'Ihe competi tiveness of the powers was related to their imperial ambition
for the domination and ultimate occupation of the Middle East,

then still

part of the sovereign political entity known as the Ottoman Empire.

a

'!he

aspiration of the European Zionists to induce the Ottoman Sultanate to
concede the political right of exclusive Jewish colonization of Palestine
ultimately was denied; 9 hence the similar political activity of Zionists
in major capi tal s of the European world in the hope that the powers--those
competing for the control , di smembennent and eventual colonial occupation
of what was euphemistically called " the sick man of Europe"--would perceive the "benefits" to be derived from the support they could extend i n
realizing the Zionist Judenstaat scheme .

10

'lhe independent colonial am-

bi.tions of the European powers for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire
was long contained by their mutual fears and suspi cions of one another.
But their respective interests in the Ottoman Empire were maintained by
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the exercise of extraterr!toriali ty through the Ca.pi tulations encroach
aents of Turkish sovereignty, a direct violation of international law
precepts even at this time . 11

As for example, British imperial interests

in the Ottoman Sultanate is recorded as early as the immediate turn of
the

twentieth century by Julian Amery . 1 2

Amery confirms the accuracy

of Chamberlain ' s statement in 1902 to Herzl (if Herzl could show him
•a spot in the English possessions where there were no white people as

yet, they could talk" about Jewi sh colonial settlementl '.3) but also re
veals the motives of Chamberlain : "Chamberlain
Br1 ti sh

statesmen to see in Zionism

• • •

• • •

was the first among

a means of advancing the interests

of the British Empire, nl 4 and that "a Jewish colony in Sinai might prove
a useful instrument for extending British influence into Palestine proper,
when the time came for the inevitable d.ismembennent of the Ottoman
Empire. nl.5

When Chamberlain saw that a public political storm might be

aroused by Herzl ' s colonial "Cyprus,

El

Ari.sh and the Sinai Peninsul_a"

scheme, 1 6 Herzl confided "that not everything in politics is really dis
closed to the public--only results, or whatever may happen to be needed
in a discussion. nl 7
'!he fundamental Zionist differentiation between Jew and non-Jew
in itself does imply the superiority of one over the other.18

Zionists

do believe in the superiority of the European Jew· (Ashkenazim) over the
Gentile Arab in Palestine, and this is a function of Zionism ' s close
association to European colonialism. 19

To obtain the necessary political

support and commitment f'rom the European colonial powers, Zionism pre
sented itself as a European colonial movement that sought not only the
involuntary removal of the Jew from European society long before the rise
of German National Socialism, but, more importantly, their relocation in

8.5
an

area of economic and strategic value to European colonialism . 20

It

was no accident that Herzl and subsequent European Zionists actively pre
sented

themselves as collaborative agents of Eu.rope in the Middle F.ast

thoroughly subservient and ready to protect European imperial interests.

21

As Europeans of the Jewish faith (al though many Zionists were
irreligious), Zionists were imwed w1 th European ideas of racial super
ior! ty vi s-a-vis African

and

Asian people and shared in the general

European contempt of and whim to exploit the Asian-African worlds.

Ac

cordingly, Zionist Jewish nationalism justified its act of colonial set
tlement in Palestine on several cond1 tions: ( 1 ) that such settlement
would entail an occupation of an Asian land by a European people ; (2)
that they would confer the benefits of European material civilization
on the "backward, " "nomadi c , " "uncivilized" inhabi. tants of the land; and

(3) that a settlement, entirely composed of European people, protected
by European colonial.ism, would provide an important strategic base for a
secure imperial presence.
From the very beginning of Zionist settlement in Palestine Zionism
pursued three policies simultaneously.

'Ihe first policy, still in evidence

today, was the absolute denial o� the Palestinian Arab presence in Palestine .
When that policy was exposed by Zionist Europeans of different humane
interests and political persuasions, 22 Zionists admitted that the Arab
Palestinian people existed but ignored and demeaned their tradi tional
culture as devoid of the rudiments of civilization, or described the
people as a nomadic population lacking the normal human attachment. to
their homeland .
Br1 tish

'!he third Zionist policy, in close collaboration with

imperlal interests, was predaciously designated in the words of

.
the Balfour Declaration (a "Jewish national homeland" in Palestine ) and
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later in the League of Nations Mandates '!he denial of the national and
cultural affiliation of the Palestinian people who, in 1917, constituted
93 per cent of the population, ·by referring to them as "the non-Jewish
communities" of Palestine.

It was under the protective umbrella of

Britain, which lasted for thirty years, that the Zionist infrastructure
was laid in Palestine and Zionism created the conditions for a Jewish
State in the Arab world. 23
Zionists arrived in Palestine as arrogant , separatist colonists
certain of their superior culture . 24 '!heir "Jewish" State, Herzl • s
Judenstaat, to use the tenn founded by the founder of political Zionism,25
would be as pure as "England is English" or as "France is French . "26
Zionist consciousness led to racially based political, economic and social
institutions in Palestine. 27

'lhe Palestinian presence was ignored;

when that presence was felt, as through 1936-19 39 , i t was confronted by
military force.

From the time of the Mandate on the Palestinian became

the "invisi bl.e person" : present everywhere as a person and as a culture
but absent from the Zionist reality.

One is amazed to read Zionist

literature for nowhere does the Palestinian in any shape infonn the Zionist
delusion. 28

'Ihis invisi bill ty was not accidental.

It is rooted in the

racial consciousness of the European Zionists Asians and Africans, to
this mentality, were an undifferentiated whole ; if they existed at all ,
they existed to be exploited, expelled or suppressed lest they dilute
the purl ty of the superior cul tu:re.

When they resist, they must be

hunted, destroyed or exiled as "terrorists."

( Terrori st is only the most

recent national and cultural identity the Zionists have bestowed on the
Palestinians who have sought to confront the Zionist alien state . }
At no point were the Zionists willing to acknowledge the humanity,
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equallty or cultural affinities of the Palestinian peopl e .
aovement is,

For the Zionist

still today, a creature of nineteenth century European racial-

ism, and Europe

justi fied its occupation,

colonialism and exploitation

of Africa and Asia on racial and cultural grounds. 29

In actual fact

the Zionists purposefully excogl tated an exclusi onist system from which
the national Palestinian population was first excluded and later became,
as Herzl ' s

Diary reveal s, "spirl ted but penniless . .. 30

a labor federation,

but i t was a "Jewish" federation ( the Histadrut ) from

which non-Jews were excluded .
are

Zionists established

Membership with all attendant benefits

still exclusively Jewish despite the presence of an Arab Department

in the Histadrut, which in itself, reveal s the racial discrimination
practiced by Zioni sm .

Arab labor was excluded from all industrial enter-

prises and urban occupations.
Zionist dictum,
Histadruti sts. 31

When some Jewi sh workshops violated this

they were physically sacked and assaulted by Zionists and
'!he Zionists established a Jewish system of '"Zionist

education" predating the Balfour Declaration and , as one eyewitness Russian
Jewish immigrant to Palestine recalled as earl y as 1909, became a "hot bed
for wild insane political national!�" and " started an almost unbridgeable
wave of hatred . .. 32

Non-Jews were automati cally excluded .

Zionist edu-

ca.tors emphasize4 the collective race entity of "the Jewish people" irrespective of place,

citizenship or culture , instilled Zionist Jewish

values, proselytized intense Jewish poll tical nationalism and postulated
the idea of "Moladtaynooh . ,.33
filled their Zionist goal .

These political-educational practices ful

'lhey produced a recogni zable system of em

bittered apartheid in Palestine very early in the twentieth century . 34
It was at the Basle Conference in 1897 35 that the tenn "national
home" was first used instead of Jewish State (Judenstaat). 36
an associate of 'lheodor Herzl explained:

Max Nord.au ,
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I did my best to persuade the claimants of the Jewish State in
Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express
all we meant, but would say i t in a way so as to avoid provoking
the 'l\lrkish rulers of the coveted land . I suggested 'Heimstatte '
as a synonym for ' State'
This i s the history of the much commented
expression. It was equivocal , but we all understood what i t meant.
To us i t signified 'Judenstaat' then and i t signifies the same now . 37
•

•

•

Incidentally, the central theme of this historic Zionist Congress testifled, as well, to the great influence of the Gennan Zionists: "Zionism
seeks to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recogni zed, legally
secured 'home-location' (Heimstatte) in Palestine for the Jewish peopl e . "
'lhe weak term "Heimstatte" rather than " state" or "Judenstaat" represented
a

political victory of the moderate Gennan Zionist leadershipJ8 over

Herzl • s personal wishes in that matter. 39
Consequently, the declared aim of the First Zionist Congress in
1897 was the creation of a Jewish State .

Toward this political goal the

intentionally ambiguous sixty-seven word Balfour Declaration, presented
deceptively as the work of the Briti sh Government, had been drafted with
elaborate care by the Zionists. 40
Interestingly, i t was a prominent Jewish American, Mayer Sulzberger,
fonner president of the Court of Common Pleas of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, who most vehemently addressed himself to the imperialistic
philosophy inherent in Zionist thought.

Sulzberger opposed Zionism, con

tending that it denied democracy to those who lived in Palestine,
Democracy means that those who live in a country shall select their
rulers and shall preserve their powers. Given these principles a
Convention of Zionists looking to the government of people who are
in Palestine would be in contravention of the plainest principle of
democracy. It can have no practical meaning unless its intent i s to
overslaugh the people who are in Palestine and to deprive them of
the right of self-government by substituting th� will of persons
outside, who may or may not ever see Palestine. 4 1
By 1917, persistent Zionist efforts began to show signs of success.
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In no small part, victory with the Brl ti sh Cabinet was due to the role
played by Herbert {Viscount) Samuel , 42 who espoused the founding of a
Jewish State with the help of Brl ta.in and the United States.

He pro-

posed the annexati on of Palestine and argued that a protectorate over
Palestine4J would "enable Engl.and to fulfill in yet another sphere her
historic part of the civilizer of the backward countrles."44
a Zioni st,

sul:mi tted

a revised memorandum in March of

1915,

Samuel ,

whi ch, ac-

cording to one authorl ty, "marked a turning point in the history of the
Middle East and of the world, "45 for i t enuciated what would eventually
be translated into Brl ti sh policy.

Samuel ' s argument for a Br1. ti sh

protectorate was that ,
Its establishment would be a safeguard. to Egypt.
It i s true that
Palestine in Br1. ti sh hands would i tself be open to attack, and the
acquisition would bring with it extended mili tary responsibilities.
But the mountainous character of the country would make its occupa
tion by an enemy difficult, and , while thi s outpost was being con
tested time would be given to allow the garri son of Egypt to be in
creased and the defense to be strengthened • • • •

A British protectorate , according to the Egyptian Intelligence
Department report already quoted, would be welcomed by a large
proportion of the present population. 'Ihere have been many previous
indications of the same feeling. I am assured , both by Zionists and
non-Zioni sts, that i t is the solution of the question of Palestine
whi ch would be by far the most welcome to the Jews throughout the
world.
It i s hoped that under British rule facilities would be given to
Jewish organi zations to purchase land, to found colonies, to estab
lish educational and religious institutions, and to cooperate in the
economi c development of the country, and that Jewish immigration,
carefully regulated, would be given preference, so that in the course
of time the Jewish inhabitants grown into a majorl ty and settled
in the land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as the
conditions of that day might justify • • • •
'Ihe course whi ch i s advocated would win for England the gratitude
of the Jews throughout the world. In the United States, where they
number about 2, 000,000, and in all the other lands where they are
scattered, they would form a body of opinion whose bias, where the
interest of the country of which they were citizens was not involved ,
would be favorable to the British Empire .46
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Chaim Wei zmann , president of the English Zionist Federation,

confirms

(then

of

that in December of 1914 while breakfasting with Lloyd George

Chancellor of the Exchequer ) , Herbert Samuel, M.P. ( then president

the Local Government Board) , related that he was preparing a memoran-

dum for Prime Minister Asquith on the subject of a Jewi sh State in
Palestine. 47

In fact, Samuel wrote three memoranda on the subject of

Palestine becoming a Jewish State ; the first he subni tted January , 1915:
The course of events (the wa�) opens a prospect of change, at the
end of the war, in the status of Palestine • • • •

I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which
would be much the most welcome to the leaders, and supporters of
the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation
of the country to the British Empire • • • It i s hoped that under
Brl tish rule facilities would be given to Jewish organizations to
purchase land, to found colonies, to establish educational and
religious institutions • • • • It i s hoped also that Jewish immigration,
carefully regulated, would be given preference so that in course of
time the Jewish people, grown into a majority and settled on the
land, may be conceded such
gree of self-govenunent as the conditions
of that day may justify • • • •

ag

'Ihat the Zionists pressed the theme for a Brl tish protectorai!e
is w1 thout question.

For Weizmann wrote,

If Great Br1 tain does not wish anybody else to have Palestine, this
means that i t will have to watch it and stop any penetration of
another Power. Such a course involves as much responsibility as
would be involved by a British Protectorate over Palestine, with
the sole difference that watching is a much less efficient pre
ventive than an actual Protectorate. I therefore thought that
the middle course could be adopted : viz. the Jews take over the
country; the whole burden of organization falls on them, but for
the next ten or fifteen years they work under a temporary British
Protectorate . 49
Weizmann' s tentative ideas belonged to a period. before the Mandate system had been thought of and before the issuance of the Balfour
Declaration.

Palestine was to be admini stered in the style of a British

protectorate rather than in the juridical style of an internationally
mandated territory.
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Many ind.1vidual schemes were being mooted for the partition of
the Turkish Empire.

Asquith outlined the views of three of his Cabinet

colleagues when he wrote to Venetia Stanley50 March 1 3 , 191 5 :
H. Samuel has wr1 tten an almost d1 thyrambic memorandum urging that
in the carving up of the 'I\trks' Asiatic dominions, we should take
Palestine, into which the scattered Jews cd in time swarm back from
all the quarters of the globe, and i n due course obtain Home Rul e .
(What an attractive community ! ) Curiously enough, the only other
partisan of thi s proposal i s Ll9yd George , who, I need not say, does
not care a damn for the Jews or their past or their future , but who
thinks i t would be an outrage to let the Christian Holy Places-
Bethlehem, Mount of Olives, Jerusalem & c--pass into the possession
or under the protectorate of 'Agnostic Atheistic France ' ! Isn ' t it
singular that the same conclusions shd be capable of being come to
by such different roads?
So he (Kitchener) i s all for Alexandretta,
and leaving the Jews and the Holy Places to look after themselves . 51
•

•

•

•

On March 12, 1915 , Lord Crewe52 informed Lord Hardi nge53 of the
various terrl torial acquisitions and schemes under di scussion i n London :
1he fighting departments consider i t important to hold a strong
position on the flank of our direct road to the East, and they regard
Alexandretta as the most favourable place. I can quite believe in
its merits; but if its possession means holding the whole of the
Euphrates valle , above Aleppo to Urfah, on to Baghdad, and thence
¥
to the (Persian) Gulf, i t i s a large proposition i n itself; which if
Russia takes Armenia, Italy Adana, France Syria, and Greece wants
Smyrna, the 'I\trks remain w1 th Anatolia and little else. This may be
54
inevitable
•

•

•

•

'lbe third volume in the extensive biography of Winston s . Churchill
completed by Martin Gilbert, himself a British Zionist, included private
papers of the Royal Archives that detail the complex evolution of British
war

and imperial policy.

His narrative relates the Brl tish War Council

proceedings of March 1 0 , 191 5 :
'lbe war Council then discussed the future of Constantinople . I t was
agreed that Russia' s claim both to the city and to the Straits should
be accepted, provided , as Asquith wrote to Venetia Stanley, ' that
both we and France should get a substantial share of the carcase of
the 'IUrk ' . Lloyd George pointed out to his colleagues that ' the
Russians were so keen to obtain Constantinople that they would be
generous i n regard to concessions elsewhere. Both Asquith and
Kitchener jumped at the chance of pressing Britain ' s claim for the
annexation of Alexandretta, which had, said Kitchener, a mill tary as
well as a naval importance .

/
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Because of the significance of these terr! torial questions Asquith
had invited Bonar Law and Lansdowne to be present during thi s stage
of the discussion, wanting any terrl. tori.al decisions to be given
an aura of all-Party acceptance
Churchill. argued that ' after
the war there might be mutual jealousies and heartburnings' and
that i t was therefore ' very desirable to block in the general lines
of the terms we required' . He feared that if this were not done ,
Brita.in would be at loggerheads with France when the war was over,
as some of their respective claims particularly over Alexandretta
(in Syria), overlapped..
• • • •

• •

Lloyd George suggested. that rather than quarrel with France over
Ale:xandretta., they should give i t to France . A good alternative,
he suggested., ' owing to the prestige it would give us', would be
Palestine
Kitchener declared dogmatically ' that Palestine would
be of no value to us whatsoever� and pressed the claim for Alexan
dretta.. Fi sher strongly supported Kitchener, and argued that
Alexandretta. had ' a special importance as an outlet for the oil
supplies of Mesopotamia and Persia' . McKenna wanted to turn the
discussion to questions of ' compensation outside the Mediterranean '
•

.

• • • •

A t thi s meeting the Council concluded. with the following:
It was finally agreed that Russia would be infonned that Brl ta.in
accepted her demand for Constantinople and the Straits, subject
to Br1 ta.in herself obtaining her own terrl. torial desiderata., which
would be
t forward 'as soon as there has been time to consider
them '
• • • •

�

Consequently, Herbert Samuel ' s proposal fell on receptive ears
when, in December, 1916 , Lloyd George became Prime Minister and Arthur
Balfour, Foreign Secretary.

Balfour's asociation with Zionism went "tack

at least a decade, roughly to that period when his opinion was also
vital in another area of European settlement, namely South Africa.

Although that prospect was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm as a
testament to the "liberal" English tradition, i t would also set the
stage for the subjugation of the South African majori ty.

Balfour' s

defense of the proposed. Union and Palestine schemes were rooted in the
same creed which later dictated his approach to an analogous situation
in Palestine .

He thus believed,

If the races of Europe have really conquered, by centuries of
difficulty and travai l , great rights and privileges for themselves
they have given some of those rights and some of those privileges
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9J

to men quite incapable, by themselves, of fighting for them at all,
or obtaining them at all. '!bat is the plain , historic truth of the
s1 tuation, which i t i s perfect folly for us to attempt to forget.
It is this very fact of the inequality of the races which makes the
difficul ty.57

During the war Allied promises to liberate Arab people of the
ottoman Empire were war maneuvers and not intended seriously.

Not

Wilson' s fourteen points and subsequent discourses, as had been promised
at the time of the anni stice, but the Anglo-French-Russian-Italian
treaty of April ·26, 191 5 : the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916; the Anglo-French promises to Italy at St. Jean-de-Ma.urlenne in
1916; the Anglo-Hedjaz treaty of 1917; and the Franco-Russian convention
of February, 1917, were the actual bases of the Ottoman settlement in
the minds of the Entente delegates and members of Versailles commissions.
In discussing "just settlements , " Entente representatives disposed of

arguments that independence or self-determination measures were in the
interests of the people concerned or even in their own interests.
'Ihe American "experts" on near Eastern affairs were met constantly by the statements, "our treaty obligations come first, of course , "
and "our traditional policy demands this solution . .. .58

In brief, history

now reveals the actions of the Entente delegates at the Versailles Peace
Conference to self-aggrandizement policies.

With regard to British

policy, in lieu of maintaining the composi tion of the Ottoman Empire
which was no longer possible at the war ' s tennination, Great Bri tain
would control the approaches to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf ,
prevent any other European power from approaching Persia on the land
side, acquire the Mesopotamian and Syrian portion of the Baghdad Railway,
and substitute herself for Russia in Central Asia, Northern Persia and
the Caucasus.
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'lbe open declarations for Arab consumption were always correct

and equitable, while the agreement with Zionist leaders was that Pal estine
should be transformed. into a Jewi sh State under Zionist control.
Hubert Young, a senior official in the Colonial Office,

Sir

summari zed the

Brltish position in a memorandum on negotiating with the Arab Delegation
which came to London in the summer of

1921 1

'!he problem which we have to work out now is one of . tacti cs, not
strategy,

the general strategic idea as I conceive it,

being the

gradual immigration of Jews into Pale stine until that country
becomes a predominantly Jewish State •

• • •

But it i s questionable

whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy

really mean s . 59

'lbe imperialist and colonialist nature of the collaborative
British-Zionist scheme in Palestine and environs was clearly revealed
in

1920 by Winston Churchill, who was to become the British Colonial.

Secretary in

192 1 :

If, as may well happen,

there should be created in our own lifetime

by the tanks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of
the Briti sh Crown }'lhich might compri se three or four millions of

Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which

would from every point of view be beneficial, and would be especia
lly
in harmony with the truest interests of the Bri tish Empire . 60

Remembering that even before the war possession of Palestine was
considered necessary for the Bri tish Empi re,

a Bri tish Palestine and a

Zionist Palestine became complementary schemesto the pro-Zioni sts in the
British Government,

the reali zation of which would put a tremendous

weapon in the Allie s ' hands and,
bi tion.

precisely in so,

satisfy a Bri tish am

With the pro-Zioni sts such as Lloyd George and Balfour,

prospects of a Zionist scheme for Palestine,

the

which would be used as a

lever to bring about British control of the country,

became much brighter.
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'!he Arab World, March-April, 1972, pp. 18-25;
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Studies, 1974 ) ; Maxi.me Rod.insonm, Israel A Colonial-Settler State (New
York : Monad Press, 1973); Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Pa ers 1 1 -1 22 :
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'lheod.or Herzl Arti st and Poli tician: A Bio a h
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Israel
New York : Doubleday and Company, Inc . , 1974 ; Vincent Sheean ,
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Weizmann (New York : Harpers, 1949).
2

Marvin Lowenthal , ed. ,

'!he Diaries of 'Iheodor Herzl ( New York :

'!he

Universal Library, 1962 ) , p . 375.
Both domestic and international
considerations, i t was perceived by Herzl, could be used to gain Bri ti sh
endorsement of the Zionist colonial scheme .
Support of Zioni sm , argued
Herzl , in 1902 before a Royal Commi ssion, would not only spare the
British government the distasteful necessity of imposing immigration
restrictions against growing numbers of East European Jews, but would
also serve British imperial interests.
Joseph Chamberlain , the Colonial
Secretary, informed Herzl that "he liked the Zionist idea" and that i f
Herzl "could show him a spot among the British possessions which was not
yet inhabited by white settlers, then they could tal k . "
See Dr Uri Davi s ,
"1he Land Where Palestinians Are ' Non-Persons' , " Pal estine Digest, July,
1976 , pp. 1-J.
See Israel Zangwi l l , "Zionism To-Day, " 'Ihe Yale Revi ew,
January, 1921, PP•
3
stein,

246-57.

'!he Balfour Declaration,

4
'!he Palestine Digest,

September,
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514.
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5.rbe Suez Canal was to the British their imperial lifelin e , and
Consequently, the
the Suez base was the hub of her regional defense .

British grip over the Suez and environs remained virtually unshaken
until 19.56 .
'lhe British favor of an autonomous Jewish national state
in Arab Palestine was characteri zed publicly as a humanitarian gesture
but was merely a camouflage for their imperialistic, strategic desire
to fashion the Indian Ocean into a closed English sea; further, the
establishment of a Bri tish controlled land bridge reaching from Egypt

to Bri tish India via the areas of Palesti ne, Mesopotamia , Persia (Iraq )
and Afghanistan.
Henc e , Palestine as a so-called "Jewish" State was
to become a British protectorate whi ch i n the process of time would

become dissipated as Jewish strength in Palestine increased to a point
where Br1 tish imperialism would have its regional political interests
protected by close collaboration with the Jewish State.
In essence,
the transformation of a modus vivendi into regional mili tary dependence

mutuall y collaborative in order to protect each other' s interests.

6
see, for example , how Britain violated the territorial sovereignty
of the Ottoman government in Desmond Stewart, 'lheodor Herzl Arti st and
Politician, op. ci t . , p . 305; Neville J. Mandel, "Ottoman Practice as
Regards Jewish Settlement in Palesti n e : 1881-1908 , " Middle Eastern
Studi e s , January, 1975, pp. 33-46.
Turkey shortly upon the outbreak
of World War I denounced the Capi tulations as violations of " the general
principles of international law . "

See the American Journal of Inter

national Law , VIII (October, 1914 ) , p . 873.

See the Wei zmann-Rothschild memorandum
?stein, op. ci t . , p . 514.
sul::mi tted to Balfour in October 3 , 1917, for transmi ssion to the full
British War Cabinet.
8
Historically, Syria, an integral part of the Arab World, stretched
from the Taurus mountai ns on the north to Egypt on the south , with no
intervening lingui sti c , natural , or racial boundari es of importance,
The
and unbroken, in the nineteenth century, by anynational frontier.
sea on the west, the mountain s on the north , the desert south and east
gave i t unity.
But by 1922 this area had been arbitrarily carved up i n
the acquisitive interests of Western world politics.
Pal estine was
one of the fragments of the entity known as Syria.
Pale stinians con
sidered themselves "Syrians" and their country as " Southern Syria" for

at the turn of the pre sent century the economi c , lingual , cultural
and ethnogenic background of the Syrians and Palestinians was identical .
Sir Ronald Storrs wrote at the end of the First World War that, "For
four centuries the Arabs, Moslem as well as Chri stian, of Syria and
Pale stine" were "one country though administratively divided into two"
and that "Owing to the number and delicacy of international problems in
Jerusalem, the Mutasarref, or Governor of Judea, corresponded directly
with Constanti nople , and not through the Vali of Syria, though Palestine
See Storrs, The Memoirs of Sir
and Syria were one mili tary command . "
Ronald Storrs (New York: Arno Press, 1972 ) , p .

370.
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When 1 t became evident that England would carry out the Balfour policy
to make Arab Palestine a "national home" of the Jews, the Palestinian
people turned politically to Syria and King Fai sal for political as
sistance . I t was only on thi s desire of protection from the Zionist
national home threat that the Palestinians joined the Syrian indepen
dence movement w1 th Faisal as its nationalist leader. The Palestinians
were not slow to collectively express their official disapproval of
the "Zionist peril , " as the people of Palestine and Syria called
Zionism, and the policy of the Balfour Declaration, for soon after the
meeting of the Peace Conference , Palestinian Arabs fonned a national
Congress and on December 27, 1919, forwarded to Pari s a strong protest
against Zionism. Part of their protest was published in the Arabic
newspaper Mirat-ul-Gharb: " • • • how can i t be possible to obliterate
our sovereignty over this land, which has lasted for 1 , 200 years, and
while its sons are still masters of it? How can the Zionists go back
in history two thousand years to prove that by their short sojourn in
Palestine they have now a right to claim i t and return to i t as to a
Jewish home , thus crushing the nationalism of a million (Palestinian)
Arabs?"
9

Marvin Lowenthal , ed . , The Diaries of Theodor Herzl (New Xork z
Grosset and Dunlap, 1962 ) , pp. 139-172. Caution should be exercised
by the reader because Lowenthal has taken pains to edit out much
significant information from the diaries of Herzl in order to deflect
a more historically accurate purview of the founder of "poll tical
Zionism." See also Ma.xi.me Rodinson, I srael A Colonial-Settler State?
(New York : Monad Press, 197J), pp. 45-48.
10
see Lowenthal , ibid . , pp. l?J-190, 230-275.
ll 'Ihe Capitulations topic is very complex. But generally speaking,
the Ottoman Empire was an immense structure , governed from Istanbul .
'!he Sultan resided over a tremendously varied population extending from
Belgrade and Bucharest to Algeria and the Yemen. His power was sanctified,
by Islamic religious doctrine. The minority religions, Chri stianity
and Judaism in particular, were allowed considerable autonomy. The
various Ottoman provinces were ruled by governors for the Sultan.
Towards the end of the eighteenth century the preponderance of European
power began to make i tself felt . European merchants who had a foothold
in the Muslim countries enjoyed an increasingly privileged position.
European ambassadors were now ad.mi tted to the Sul tan ' s councils and
even began to dictate Ottoman policies. Over time the French took
Algeria in 18)0, the British Aden i n 1839, thus beginning the movement
of direct European intervention and colonization. After a pause during
which the European powers consolidated their indirect but effective hold
over the whole of the Ottoman Empire, Anglo-French colonial expansion
moved inexorably forwards: Tunisia in 188 1 , Egypt in 1882, the Sudan in
1899, Libya and Morocco in 1912. At the same time the cultural inf1.uence
of Europeans grew everywhere stronger. European powers introduced new
political structures and interventi ons, one of which was the Capitulations.
'!he European powers imposed restrictions on the Ottoman Empire in that
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European subjects or national s living in Ottoman administered provinces
came under the forceful protective jurisdiction of the local European
powers. '!he Sublime Porte had no administrative or sovereign jurisdiction
over national s of the European nations in the remaining Ottoman Empire
nor in the Ottoman areas forcefully acquired from the Ottoman Finpire,
such as in Egypt.
·

In

an

article written on the "Turkish Rule" period for the Encyclopedia

Br1 tannica, 1973 editi on, about Palesti ne, Professor Wal.id Ahmed Khalidi ,

a Palestinian Arab history scholar, wrote about the Ca.pi tulations: "In
18J1 his (Vi ceroy Mohammed Ali ) armies occupied Palestine, and for nine
years he and his son Ibrahim gave the Holy Land a fairly enlightened
administration.
'!heir tolerant rule opened the country to Western
influences and enabled Chri stian missionari es to establish many schools
which proved of "ine stimable value in accelerating the process of modern
ization. Whem in 1840 the British, the Austrians, and the Russians came
to the aid of the sultan, the Egyptians were forced to withdraw and
Palestine reverted to the Ottomans.
Increased European interest, how
ever, led to the establishment of consulates and vice-consulate s by the
powers in Jerusalem and in the ports.
In the meantime, the "reforms"
which the powers had induced the sultan to promulgate did not fail to
improve the lot of minorities. Later the country witnessed a marked
increase i n the inflow of foreign settlements and colonies, French ,
Russian, and German.
By far the most important, in spite of their
1n1 tial numerical insignificance, were the Zionist agricultural settle
ments which foreshadowed later Zionist endeavours for the the establi sh
ment of a Jewish national home and still later a Jewish state in �alestine.
'!he earliest of these settlements was established by Russian Jews i n
1882. In 1896 Theodor Herzl issued his Der Judenstaat and advocated an
" ( p . 168 ) .
au tonomous Jewish state
• • • •

"'Ihe number of Zionist colonies, mostly subsidized by Baron F.clmond de
Rothschild, rose from 22 to 47 from 1900 to 1918, but the majori ty of
the Jews were town-dwelling, Orthodox ( Challukkah ) Jews
"
( p . 168 ) .
• • • •

12Life of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1951 ) . Amery was the biographer
of Chamberlain who was Colonial Secretary from 1895 to 1906 in the British
Conservative Party government headed by Arthur James Balfour, Prime
Minister from 1902-1905.
13Raphael Patai , ed. , '!he Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl ( New York :
Herzl Press and 'Ihomas Yoseloff), p . 1361.
14Amery, op. ci t . , p . 256. '!he Rand gold mines i n South Africa were
largely controlled by Jews; on the economic prosperity of the Rand mines
Chamberlain largely counted for the reconstruction of South Afri ca.
Like
his Prime Minister, Balfour, Chamberlain was concerned by the numbers
of immigrant Jews i n Britai n .
A concentration of Jews and Jewish money
in Sinai or el sewhere , indebted to Britain, would serve Bri tish foreign
policy interests ( "a Jewish colony in Sinai might prove a useful instru
ment for extending British i nfluence into Palestine proper, when the time
came for the inevitable di smembennent of the Ottoman Empire" ( p . 261) and
siphon off immigrants from England .

99

1 .5r b1.d. • p . 261.
16
In 1878, in return for a political promise of British support
against the Russians, the Ottoman Sul tan had allowed Brita.in, as a
11111 tary-poli tical lase for this purpose, to administer Cyprus, which
remained in actuality under the legal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire .
El Ari.sh and the Sinai Peninsula were part of Egypt, whose Khedive,
Ab'cas II, ruled a vassal state also under the legal terri tori.al
suzerainty of the Ottoman Government. Hence, i n the context of inter
national law and the colonial willingness to violate it by the British
Government even at this earlier time ( Britain had , since 1882, been in
illegal mili tary occupation of Egypt), neither Cyprus, Sinai nor Egypt
was juridically a British possession at this time. By the time the
Zionists were pressing the major powers for recogni tion of their scheme
for the colonization of Palestine and environs (1897-191 7 ) , the Ottoman
Empire had experienced a continual violation of its territorial
sovereignty by the Western nations.
17Patai , op. ci t. , p . 1361. Herzl ' s remark to Chamberlain reveals
his acceptance of political deception and effort to violate internation
al law to achieve the Zionist result .
18Amerlcan Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, Report #25, December
January, 1975-1976, pp. 11-22. Dr Israel Shahak, chairman of the
Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights and former inmate of the
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in Nazi Germany, described the State
of Israel racialist Zionist insti tutions as follows: "'!he State of Israel
is a raci st state in the full meaning of this term : In this state people
are di scriminated against, in the most permanent and legal way and in the
most important areas of life, only because of their origin. This racist
discrimination began i n Zionism and i s carried out today mainly i n
cooperation with the insti tutions of the Zionistic movement. I will
prove this
by quoting facts, laws and regulations which have force
in Israel (and which are known reall y to anybody) and are enforced by
the government
In the State of Israel , one who i s not a Jew i s
discriminated against, only because he i s not a Jew
" 'Ihis citation
originally appeared in an article wri tten for PI-Ha'aton, a weekly paper
for the students at the Hebrew University at Jerusalem.
See also Moshe Menuhin, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time ( Beirut:
'!he Institute For Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 502- 3; Israel Zangwil l ,
" Mr . Chamberlain and Zionism: Mr . Zangwill ' s Work ('!he F.ast African
Scheme ) , " The Times, London , July 9 , 11 , 18, 19141 B . Shefi , "'!he Jewish
Religion Abused , " '!he Middle East International , December, 1971, pp. 31)4; Israel Shahak, "Letter to the &ii tor: Israeli Law, " The Middle East
International , April , 1976, p . )4. Early Zioni sm had never been reluc
tant to employ murder to achieve its national political goals i n Palestine.
'!he anti-Zionist Jew from Palestine Dr de Haan was murdered in 1924 on
the direct orders of the Zionist Organi zation ( Jewish Agency for Palestine ) .
Dr de Haan was murdered when on the point of visiting London i n order to
start there a Jewish-Arab anti-Zionist movement to counter the Zionist
movement.
• • •

• • • •

• • • •
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'lhe Zionist entity in Palestine is racialist because it i s built on the
extreme Talmudic principle which considers Jews as a super-race above
all races and peoples. It i s raci st and exclusionist because Zionist
doctrine itself maintains that "Israel" is a state for Jews and in accor
dance with the defintion of Halacha, that is, strict Jewish religious
laws. A Jew i s defined as a person born of a Jewish mother or who was
converted to Judai sm in accordance with the strict ID.alacha rules.
Strict Jewish religious law, while also secularly poll ticized by atheist
Zionist Jewry to achieve Zionist program goals, underscores Israel ' s
Law of Return: its legal racial provi sions enact the assumption that
the establi shment of "Israel" signifies the fulfillment of a "messianic
promise" and that the "right of 'return ' " i s inherent in a divine law
that transcends all other realities; historical processes or even the
passage of time. According to this view, Jews the workd over possess
a superior claim to the possession of the land of Palestine, and any
injustice, suffering or violation that i s ca.used by Jewish settlement
in the Arab country i s of lesser importance than the act of "reclaiming
the Jewish People ' s 'historical inheritance . ' " The Talmud i s the
collection of ancient Rabbinic wr1 tings consisting of the Ml. shnah and
the Gemara, constituting the basis of religious authority for traditional
Orthodox Judaism. Mishnah refers to the first section of the Talmud,
comprising a collection of early oral interpretations of the ancient
scriptures as compiled about A.D. 200. Gemara refers to the second
part of the Talmud , consisting primarily of commentary on the Mishnah .
For an excellent review of Israel ' s Law of Return· and Nationality Law
see the Middle East International , July, 1973, in which a Jewish critic
and wr1 ter from Tel Aviv, using the pseudonym David Cohen, wr1 tes about
this law. For racialist Zionist writings see Torah Judaism and the
State of Israel by Uriel Zimmer, published in London in 1961 , in which
at page 12 it i s stated , "The Jewish people, Rabbi Judah Halevy ( the
famous medieval poet and philosopher) explains in his ' Kuzari , ' constitutes
a separate entity, a species unique in Creation, differing from nations
in the same manner as man differs from the beast or the beast from the
plant." Asher Ginsberg, known as Achad Ha'am, one of the philosophers
of Zionism, stated in an article in the Gennan magazine Am Scheidewege ,
published in Berlin in 1923, volume two, page 10), the following:
"'!he steps on the ladder of creation are : minerals, plants, animals ,
human beings, and , at the very top, Jews. " '!he Zionist racial philosophy
goes further than these sample quotes but the writer suggests that those
interested should consult Zionist writings for themselves.
19consult 'Iheodor Herzl , L' Etat Juif, French translation (Paris :
Lipschutz, 1926) .
201eon Pinsker, Auto-Emancipation, French translation by J. Schul.singer
(Cairo-Alexandria, 1944), p. 69f, 79f, 92, 94-96, 96. Wei zmann insists
that it was he and his staff who first asked the English to accept a
protectorate role over the future Jewish State . See Trial and Error
(New York : Harper and Brothers, 1949 ) , p . 192.
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1Blanche

E . C . Dugdale , Arthur James Balfour ( New York : G. P . Putnam ' s
Sons, 1937 ) , p. 1 64 ; Theodor Herzl, op. ci t. , p . 23; J . de v. Loder, '!he
Truth About Meso otamia Palestine and S
a (Londont George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd . , 1923 , p . 149 ; Stein, op. cit. , p . ,514; Leon Pinsker,
op. cit . , p . 96; Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 205.
22see the general works of Yehuda Lai b Mnuchin ( Moshe Menuhin ) ,
Martin Buber, Judah L . Ma.gnes, Albert Einstein, Morri s B . Cohen,
William Zukerman , Henry Hurwi tz, Hans Kohn, Elmer Berger, Alfred
Lilienthal , Israel Shahak and Felicia Langer.
23
Chaim Weizmann, op. ci t . , p . 205; "An Interview i n Mr. Balfour ' s
Apart.ment, 23 Rue Nitot, Pari s , on June 24th , 1919, at 4 : 45 P . M . , "
Walid Khalidi , ed. , From Haven to Conquest (Beirut: '!he Institute For
Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 195-199.
24
Moshe Menuhin , The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time, pp. 502-505.
25'rhe growth of the Jewish settlement i n Arab Palestine was due to
the "practi cal" Zionists, who were opposed by the "political" Zionists
who insisted on the granting of a charter as an essential prerequi s1 te
for Jewish colonizati on.
'Ihe pre-World War I Zionist movement was
led by Austrian and Geman Jews, but its mass Zionist strength came
But, only a very few or small minority of Jews were
from Russia.
'!he center of the Zionist
organized in the Zionist poll tical movement.
movement was established in Vienna, Austria , where 'Iheodor Herzl became
Zionism' s indefatigibl e organizer, propagandist and diplomat. After
convening the First Zionist Congress at Ba.sle, Switzerland i n August
1897, the congresses met annually until 1901 and then every two years.
26wei zmann used the phrase "Palestine should become as Jewish as
England i s English" in 1919.
See Chaim Weizmann: Exce ts From Hi s
Statements Writin s and Addre sses New York : The Jewish Agency for
Palestine, 1952 , p . 48 ; Chaim Wei zmann, Trial and Error: 1he Auto
biography of Chaim Weizmann (New York : Schocken Books, 1966), p . 244;
and Palestine Government, 'Ihe Political History of Palestine Under
Bri. tish Admini stration (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1947), p . 3,
paragraph 12 .
27For the conditions of Arabs i n the State of Israel , see Sabri
Jiryis , The Arabs in Israel (Beirut: 'Ihe Insti tute For Palestine Studies,
1969 . For Jewish National Fund racial covenants, see "on the Employment
of Arab Labor , " by John Hope Simpson, in Walid Khalidi , ed . , From Haven
to Conquest, op. ci t . , pp. 303-307. Also i n the same anthology by
Khalidi, refer to A . Granott, "'Ihe Strategy of Land Acquisition , "
pp. 389-398 .
For conditions of Arabs in I srael see Sabri Jiryi s ,
Democrati c Freedoms i n Israel (Beirut: 'Ihe Institute For Palestine
'!here i s an increasing and persistent flow of information
Studies, 1972).
by and about the "di ssidents" in Israel. 'Ihree sources are rather
randomly selected from many: Report, American Jewish Alternatives to
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Zionism, 133 East 73rd Street, New York City; Inter Change , Breira,
Riverside Drive, Sui te JD, New York City; Swasia, 3631 39th Street
N.W. , Washington, D . C . For a specifically insightful report of condi t1.ons of Arabs in the State of I srael and in the occupied Arab lands
, since 1967 see American Jewi sh Alternatives to Zionism, Report #25,
December-January, 1975-1976, pp. 11-23. For di scriminatory racial
land policy covenants of the Jewish National Fund which was organized
in 1903 and re-incorporated in Israel i n 1954, see Walter Lehn, "The
Jewi sh National Fund , " I brahim Abu-Lughod. and Baha Abu-Laban, eds,
Settler Re mes i n Africa and the Arab World (Wilmette : '!he Medina
University Press International , 1974 , pp. 43-53. For a collection
of articles, memoires, letters and documents, which appeared between
July 1967 and March 1968 pertaining to the conduct of Israel ' s
occupation forces since the June war in which some of these documents
come from Israeli sources, see Israel and the Geneva Conventions
(Beirut: The Institute For Palestine Studies, 1968); A . C. Forrest,
The Unholy Land (Conn. : The Devin-Adair Co. , 1974 ) ; A Special Kind of'
State: Israel and the London Times ( Beirut: Hennon Books, 1970).
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28Asked whether the Palestinians were not also entitled to their
homeland, Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol answered , "What are the Palestinians?"
Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p . 18. A statement by longtime Zionist
official Golda Meir reads, "There was no such thing as Palestinians
It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine con
sidering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out
and took their country away from them . They did not exist . " The Times,
London, June 15, 1969, p. 1, column 3. Yet i t was also Jewish Agency
official Meir in Palestine who declared on August 21, 1921, "It i s not
the Arabs the Arabs the Engli sh will choose to colonize Palestine, i t
is us. " Mary Syrkin, Golda Meir (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p . 63.
One should note the word "colonize" in the Meir statement and observe
how Zionism i n 1968 chose to call i tself a "national li beration
movement . "
Arthur Ruppin who settled i n Palestine i n 1907 and ran the first Zionist
office in Jaffa and headed the Zionist department of colonization after
World War I stated that, "Herzl ' s concept of a Jewish state was possible
because he ignored the presence of the Arabs. He believed he could make
Weltgeschichte through the diplomatic methods of the Quai d' Orsay.
Zionism has not yet discarded this diplomatic and imperialist approach . "
See Amos Elon, The Israelis Founders and Sons ( New York : Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971), p . 178.
Herbert Adams Gibbons observed : "At the time of the Dardanelles Expedition,
Syrian physicians, educated in the American and French colleges of Beirut,
when they learned the terrible need of medical care for British soldiers,
volunteered their services. They received no answer, An Entente
diplomat took up the case with the British authorities, and urged that
Syrians be used. �we do not want niggers looking after our men ' , was
the answer. I should not tell this story, for the truth of which I
can vouch, were i t not that here may lie the reef which will wreck the
ship of a durable peace . Greeks, Armenians, Persians, Arabs, Syrians,
and Egyptians are not ' niggers ' , and the sooner we wake up to this truth
the better for the Anglo-Saxon race
We can no longer get away with the
'my man' and 'here there ' and ' boy' fashion of addressing them . In the
• • •

• • •
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near East,

as in the far East, arrogance, insolence , indi fference to

the political and social rights of ' natives' i n their own countri es
will have to go the way of ante-bellum diplomacy.
radically our attitude toward all Asiatic races,
nothing to what i s coming,
Gibbons,

Magazine,

If we do not change
the present war i s

and i n the twentieth century,

See

too . "

"Zionism and the World Peace , " The Century Illustrated Monthly
January,

1919,

p.

376.

Lieutenant Colonel Wal ter Franci s Sterling, Bri tish Governor in the
British administrative area including Jaffa during the pre-Mandate

" • • • Lord Northcliffe* visi ted Palestine • • • • At Richon

years reports,

le-Zion • • • Northcliffe made a speech which left most of us gasping.

He

told the Jews of Palestine some home truths which no one hitherto had

dared voice.

He said that they should realise that they could not always

be guarded by British bayonets,

and that their future status in the

country depended on how well they co-operated with the Arabs ,
guests, after all ,

they were . "

See Khalidi ,

op.

ci t . ,

234.

p.

whose
While

Israel Zangwill reported that "Palestine i s to be ruled like a Brl ti sh
crown colony,

and its

( Arab )

inhabitants have lost the democratic

rights which they enjoyed even under Turkey"

( p . 251)

he referred to

the indigenous Arab people as "a degenerate Arab type . "
"Zionism To-Day, " The Yale Review,

1921,

January ,

Herzl ,

the founder of the Zionist Organization,

Diary

on June

12, 1895

p.

247.

See Zangwil l ,
'Iheodor

had written in his

that "when we occupy the land • • • we must expro

priate gentl y the private property on the estates assigned to us" and
"try to spirit the penniless population across the border . "
Raphael Patai ,

See

ed . , The Com lete Diaries of Theodore Herzl ,

translated by Harry Zohn

New York:

'Ihe Herzl Press,

19

Vol .

0 , p.

I,

88.

Moshe Dayan candidly stated that while "economically we can" absorb
the Palestinian dispossessed he ruled out the return of the displaced

Palestinians as being "not i n accord with our aims • • • • we want to have
a Jewish state . "

See CBS News,

"Transcript:

cast over the CBS Television Network and the CBS Radio
June

1 1 , 1967,

p.

12.

( as broad
Network ) , "

Face the Nation

Even before his espousal of Zionism,

in keeping

with his raci alist colonialist outlook V.ia.x Nord.au suggested the settle
ment of unemployed European workers with the European emigrants taking
"the place of the ' l ower races ' who were not sl.irViving in the struggle
of evoluti on . "
Uri Avnery,

See De smond Stewart ,

Theodore Herzl ,

Israeli political figure and writer,

did 'Iheodor Herzl ,

the founder of politi cal Zionism in

the Arabs of Palestine in his wri tings.
Einstein,

op.

1897,

mention

"What Arabs?

'Ibey are hardly

To Israel Zangwill and later to Chaim Wei zmann

"there was a country which happens to be called Palestine,

without a people • • • • "

192.

To a question from Albert

Chaim Weizmann answered angrily:

of any consequence . "

cit. , p .

notes that not once

In

1967,

I . F . Stone noted:

a country

Jewish terrori sm

"encouraged" Arabs to leave areas the Jews wished to take over for
strategic or demographic reasons.

as free of Arabs as possibl e .

In

They tried to make as much of Palestine

1895,

The odor Herzl was considering

menial tasks to assign to the "natives , " i . e . ,

Arabs of Palestine; like

killing wild beasts and drying swamps before he " spirited" the "penniless"
Arabs outside Palestine circumspectly.

In Herzl ' s later draft Charter
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for Zionist colonization of Palestine and Syriawhich he subni tted to

the Ottoman Sultanate , Article III was to give Zionists the right to
deport the native population--in other words, the Arabs .
See Leonhard
Van der Hoeven, 'Ihe Truth About the Palestine Problem ('Ihe Hague, 1960 ) .
29Paul F. Boller,

Jr. , American 'Ihou ht in Transl ti on: 'Ihe Im act ·

of Evolutionar Naturali sm
186 - 1 00 Chicago : Rand McNally and Company,
1970 : Jacques Barzun , Race : A Study in Superstition ( New York :
Harper and Row, 1965 ) , Alan R. Taylor, The Zionist Mind : 'Ihe Origins
and Develo ment of Zionist 'Ihou
t ( Beirut: 'Ibe Insti tute For Palestine
Studi es, 1974 : Elmer Berger, • • • Who Knows Better Must Say So ! ( New York :
'lbe Bookmailer, 1955 ) .
.
30
Raphael Patai , ed . , 'Ihe Com lete Diaries of 'Iheodor Herzl , 5 volUllles translated by Harry Zohn New York : The Herzl Press, 19 0 ) , Vol . I ,
p . 88.
31
see Neville Barbour, Nisi Domi nus : A Surve
of the Palestine Controvers
( Beirut : The Insti tute For Palestine Studi es, 1969 , pp. 1 32Land
141, 11� : Sir John Hope Simpson, Palestine
Re ort on Immi
ation
London: His Majesty ' s
Settlement and Development, 19 30, Cmd . J68
Stationery Office, 1930); Sir John Hope Simpson "On the Employment of
Arab Labour, " Wal.id Kha1idi, ed. , From Haven to Conq,uest (Beirut:

'lbe Institute For Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 30J-J07: Wal ter Franci s
Stirling, Safety Last (London: Hollis and Carter, 1953 ) , pp. 112-2).

32
Moshe Menuhin , The Decadence of Judai sm i n Our Time (Beirut: The
Institute For Palestine Studie s , 1969), p . 502-507.
.
JJ"Moladtaynooh" i s Hebrew meaning "a birth place" or "our homeland . "
For an excellent original political description of this Zionist trans
lated term see Moshe Menuhin , Ibid . , p . 503 .
34
'Ihe term "apartheid" i s
tion promulgated with a view
acy or ascendency i n an Arab
discriminating system became
of Israel .

described as a policy of racial segrega
to promoting and maintaining Jewish suprem
nati on.
After May 14, 1948, this Zionist
systemati cally codified in the new State

35'Ihe Zionist Congre ss met August 29- 1 .
J
36
wi th regard to the words "national home , " neither Balfour, his

colleagues, nor Zionists can claim ori ginality of thi s deceptive
tenninology; Zionist history credi ts this terminology to Leon Pinsker
of Odessa thirty-five years before the Balfour Declaration, although

Pinsker did notapply this term to the geographi cal area of Palestine.
In fact, Pinsker declared , "We must not attach ourselves to the place

where our political life was once violently interrupted . "
'!he Balfour Declarati on.

See Stei n ' s

In historical fact Balfour and his pro-Zionist
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colleagues adopted thi s terminology from Zionist programs and drafts ,
and made use of i t s ambiguity.
For, i n 1917, the term "national home"
was a descriptively new poll tical phrase.
Naturally, no one could give
1t a definitive etiologi cal meani ng, for it had no establi shed meaning,
and was put into practice in Palestine without a publicly understood defi
n1tion (except to the Zionist leaders ) , al though i t i s now historically
known that privately i t meant an eventual "Jewish" state .
)?
Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel : Palestine from Balfour
to Bevin (London, 1965 ) , p . 24.
)8
Klaus J. Herrmann , "Political Responses To '!he Balfour Declarati on
In Imperial Gennany: German Judai s m , " '!he Middle East Journal , Summer,
1965, pp. 303-320.
Observers will be careful to detect the pro
Zioni sm of this wri ter.
39
Alex Bein, Theodor Herzl, A Bi ography (Philadelphia: Jewish Publi
cati on Society, 1940), p . 238-39.
This sense of political moderation
manifested i tself in the specific program of the first Zionist organiza
tion i n Gennany, the "National Jewish Association" (Nationaljudische
Vereinigung) , evolving from the discussions among several Zioni st study
and students' groups in 1897.
Their combined politically "moderate"
program read : ° Connected by common descent and history, the Jews of all
countries constitute a national community.
This convi ction in no wise
infringes upon the activation of patriotic sentiment, and ful fillment
of the duties of citi zenship on the part of the Jews, in parti cular of the
Geman Jews, for their Gennan Fatherland . " In effect, al though the words
"national community" and "Gennan Fatherland" apparently depict a question
of confusing allegiance, loyalty and citi zenship responsibilities, the
program was strangely designed to counter the "apprehensions" of the
Geman Jews who were more disturbed over the prospects of any diminution
of their "Ge:rmani sm . " See Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State
( Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961), p . 139.
Between Theodor Herzl ' s death in 1904 and the war of 1914, in relation
ship to the Zionist organi zations of all countries, with the exception
of Czarist Russia, German Zionism was very significant; i t contri buted
more in terns of propagandistic effort, establi shments of Palestine com
panies and finances than any other country ' s Zionists , excepting those
See Richard Lichtheim, Die Geschichte des deutschen Zi onismus
in Russia.
(Jerusalem: Rubi n Mass, 1954 ) , p . 10.
The origins of German Zionism
are easily traceable to Moses Hess who published in 1862 his Rome and
Jerusalem, advocating therein the "re-establi shment" of a national "Jewish
state . "
40
J . M.N. Jeffries, Palestine, the Reali ty (London : Longmans , Green
and Co . , 1939 ) , Chapter XI; Doreen Ingrams , Palestine Pa ers 1917-1 22:
Seeds of Conflict ( New York : George Braziller, Inc . , 1973 ; Walid Khalidi,
ed . , From Haven to Conquest (Beirut: Institute For Palestine Studi�s, 1971 ) .

1 06

41J . M. N . Jeffries, Palestine : '!he Reality (New York, 1939), p. 153·
American Zionist backing was crucial for the survival of the Palestinian
Zionist communi ties now deprived, by the war, of European funds. "It
became clear that America alone must not only save the Yishuv but keep
the Zionist movement alive . . •
See Rufus Learsi , Fulfillment: The
ic Stor of Zionism ( Cleveland, 1951 ) , p. 172. Yishuv (Hebrew; liter
ally, " settlement" refers to the Jewish community residing in Palestine
prior to 1948 . '!he collection of $10, 000, 000 betlween November 1914 and
December 1917 by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee under
scored the potential power and influence of the American Zionists. In
both the United States and Britain, Zionists had begun to direct their
efforts toward obtaining a guarantee from the Allies that, in the
event of Ottoman defeat, Palestine would be recognized as a "Jewish
commonwealth" open to unrestricted immigration.
•

..

42tterbert Samuel was a Liberal Party Member of Parliament from 1902
to 1918 with a seat in the Cabinet from 1915-1916, Home Secretary 1916
and the first Bri tish High Commi ssioner in Palestine from 1920 to 1925.
Israel Zangwill, fanatical Zionist, described Samuel and his family
as having a "gracious Zionist romanc e . " See Zangwill , "Zionism To-Day, "
'!be Yale Review, January, 1921, p. 250.
43According to Brierly the word protectorate in the latter half of
the nineteenth century described a relation between a state and a
''native community not sufficiently civilized" to be regarded as a state .
Protectorates were usually established by imposed agreements, hence,
involuntary, and were meant to exclude other states from making an
occupation, or from maintaining any direct relations with the "protected"
communi ties: it also serves as an obligation to maintain security for
foreign subjects and property within the "protected" terri tory.
Protectorates were, i n essence, at this time colonial possessions largely
acquired through a display or imposition of mili tary power.
44John Bowle, Viscount Samuel (London, 1957 ) , p. 170.
45rbid . ,

P•

172.

46Ibid.
47weizmann, Tri.al and Error, p . 192.
48British Public Records Office, Cabinet Papers, 37/123/43.
49Cited in Blanche E . C . Dugdale , Arthar James Balfour (New York :
G.P. Putnam ' s Sons, 1937), p. 164. Blanche Dugdale was James Balfour' s
niece .
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.50Beatri ce Venetia Stanley, 1887- 1948, was Clementine Churchil l ' s
cousin. On July 26, 191 5 she marri ed F.d.win Montagu.
51 Marti n Gilbert, Winston s. Churchil l : '!he Challen e of War
1914-191 6, Volume III Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971 ,
PP • 343-44.
52Robert Offl ey Ashburton Crewe-Milnes, 18 8-194 .
Secretary of
5
.5
Lord President of the Council , 191 5- 1 6.
State for India 1910-1 5 .
53Charle s Hardinge , 1858-1944. Viceroy of India, 1910-16.
Re
appointed Permanent Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
1916-20. Ambassador to Pari s , 1920-23 •
.54Gil bert, op. cl t . , p . )44 .
'!his publi cation i s replete with dis
cussi ons of territorial acquisitions contemplated after the war ' s ter
mination.
55Martin Gilbert, Winston S . Churchill : '!he Challen e of War, Vol .III
(Boston: Houghton �lifflin Company, 1971 , p . 332-33.
Mark Sykes wrote
Sir Mark
that Lord Kitchener "was ultimately reconciled to Haifa . "
Sykes to Sir George Arthur , September 12, 1916, in Kitchener Papers,
PRO 30/57/9 1 . Such sentiments may now appear extravagant and histori
cally inaccurate , but during the war belief in the power, or rather
the omnipotence , of the Jews was then very widely held.
Sir Mark Sykes
was very impressed with the power of Jewry and Zionism as his le tter of
'!he letter i s reproduced
March 18, 1916, to Sir George Arthur reveals .
in Middle Eastern Studies, October, 1970, pp. 341-42.
Because of its
significance the wri ter has reproduced the letter and included i t in the
appendix. In April 1917, a few months after Lloyd George became Prime
Mi nister, he bluntly told the :Sri tish Ambassador at Paris that the
French would have to accept a British protectorate in Palestine : "We
shall be there by conque st and shall remai n . " Lord Bertie , the Ambassador,
accurately summed up George ' s attitude then and later as being:
"J ' y suis, j ' y reste . " " (idiomati c for "here I am, here I stay" ) . With
Lloyd George as head of the government meant that patronage of Zioni sm
would be used to establish and maintain Bri tish control of Palestine.
See Elie Kedouri e , "Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 191 5-1 6, " Middle
Eastern Studies, October, 1970, p. 343.
56Ibid . , P• 334.
57
L . M. 'Ihompson, The Uni fication of South Africa (1902-191 0 ) (London,
1960) , p . JB ; Desmond Stewart , Theodor Herzl Arti st and Politician,
op. cit . , pp. 301-306.
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.58'lbe wr1 ter does not infer that the American Government was
principled on its own espousals of democracy and independence. It
too, in the case of Palestine, practiced the European art of deception.
:f)Ingrams, op. cit . , p. 140.

60Illustrated Sunday Herald , February 8 , 1920 . Also cited in Middle
Fast International , February, 1976, p . 27. Randolph Churchill described
his father as "indoctrinated in the cause of Zion, long before i t became
fashionable" and made himself "highly acceptable to the powerful. Jewish
community in Manchester." See Randolph S. Churchil l , Young Statesman
1901-1914, Vol . II of Winston s. Churchill (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co. , 1967) , p . 80.

CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF THE

BALFOUR DECLARATION

'Ihe Balfour Declaration 1 has never possessed any juridical value , 2

I

�.

although the Zionist establi shment has employed 1 t as such for the estab-

�l llshment of a "national home" (Jewish State) i'n Palestine, despite the

r
t

I

tact that analysis of the Zionist negotiations reveals their interpretation to be in explicit error.

Secondly, emanating from the British

wartime cabinet, which at no historical time possessed any right of or
. sovereignty over Turki sh Palestine, the declaration, even when we exclude
its actual negotiative emendations, could not, i n the context of modern
international law, juridically recogni ze a title of sovereignty i n favor
of the Zionists. 3

'Ihe secret negotiating hist�ry of the declaration re

veals that Wei zmann and the other Zionist negotiators promised the British
Government the political support of the alleged Zionist "national.i ty"
consti tuency of Jews i n return for the political sympathy clause of the
declaration.

the

Temperly was most succinct and accurate when he wrote that

declaration " i s a pledge that i n return for services to be rendered

by Jewry the British Government would 'use their best endeavours ' to
secure the execution of a certain definite policy i n Palestine" serving
both British and Zionist aims. 4

Jewish

Even though the Zionist phrase "the

people" was used, it was clear that Weizmann and his fellow self-

appointed representatives of "the Jewish people" had no authority to
speak for all the members of Juda.i sm, as the direct political. intercession
of the anti-Zionist Jews reveal s . 5

Weizmann admitted this fact :

Certain it was that Montagu' s cpposi tion, coupled with the sustained
attacks which the tiny anti-Zionist group had been conducting for
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months--their letters to the press, the pamphlets, some of them
written pseudonymously by Lucien Wolf, their feverish interviews
with Government officials--was responsible for the compromi se
formula which the War Cabinet subnitted to us a few days later. 6
Subsequently, Weizmann again admitted this fact tens years later
at Czernowi tz, Roumania when he declared , "'lhe Jews, ( the Br1 tish Govern-

ment ) knew, were against us; we
a tiny group of Jews

• • • •

"

( Zionists )

stood alone on a little island,

Thus, as Mallison declared, "the claimed con

stituency of ' the Jewish peopl e ' was fabrication ... 7

Mallison g1ves an

excellent historical and juridical purview of the Zionist interpretation
of the declaration:
The Declaration is regarded as providing juridical authority for
"the Jewi sh people" nationality ·clai!Jls and for the Zionist national
home enterprise in Palesti ne . The political promise clause has been
extrapolated concerning the Palestine Arabs as if the first safe
guard clause did not exist. In the same way, it has been Pxtrapolated as to Jews in any other country than Palestine as if the second safe
guard clause did not exist. 'lhe foregoing summar i s supported by
an extensive and detailed Zionist interpretation.

s

The reader should keep the perjurious Zionist extrapolations in
perspective as the wrl ter analyzes the various mutational alterations of
the declaration.

An excellent point of departure from an extensive

historical analysi s of the private negotiations i s the Zionist preliminary draft of July 12, 191 7 , recalling importantly that in the original
Foreign Office draft proposal , the key words were "asylum" arrl "refuge" ,
that i s , the non�acceptance of a Jewish State or Jewish sovereignty over
Arab Palestine.

We must keep in mind that the Zionists interpreted the

words "national home" to explicitly mean an exclusive Judenstaat over
the Arab country and ideologically defined "the Jewish people" as pre
viously explicated in this paper. 9

In other word�, though yet i n violation

of international law as pertains to the rights of the Palestinians over
their aged homeland, the Brl ti sh Government was prepared to arbi trarily
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create in Arab Palestine "a sanctuary (haven) for Jews" l O who felt they
could or did not wish to live where they already resided.
Sokolov di sapproved of this British draft because
meet the (Zionist) case . .. 11

1t

Contrarily,

"would by no means

Consequently, the Zionists prepared their

more explicit draft requesting directly that the British Government
(Cabinet) accept the Zionist
principle of recogrii sing Palestine as the Nationa] Home of the
Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up i ts
national life in ?aiestine under a protection to be established at
the conclusion of peace following upon the successful i ssue of the
War. 12
• • •

'Ihi s Zionist preliminary draft i s also explicit in that i t called
for "the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish national! ty in Palestine,
(and) freedom of immigration for Jews . .. 13

'Ihe Zionist draft proposal of

July 18, 1917, requested the following concessi on:
1. His Majesty ' s Government accepts the ·principle that Palestine
should be reconstituted as the National Home of the Jewish peopl e . 14
2. His Majesty' s Government will use its best endeavours to secure the
achievement of thi s object and will discuss the necessary methods and
means w1 th the Zionist Organization.
The wording of this draft i s very explicit: Arab Palestine was to
become a Jewish State under Jewish sovereignty.

In fact, this draft con-

tains three Zionist political objectives :
1 . That Arab Palestine be "reconstituted" as the Zionists' Juden
staat without regard to the existing rights of the Palestinian Arab
people .
2. That all Jews ( the comprehensive Zionist claimed racial entity
of "the Jewish people" ) be recognized by"'the British governmental
Zionists as constituting a distinct transnational racial group.
That a relationship or connection be recognized between " the
National Horne" and "the Jewish people" as a juridical precedent
confinned in a secretly negotiated agreement.

J.

Radical departure from the original Zionist object! ves is quickly
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observable :

contrary to the Zionist drafts of July 12 and July 18,

Weizmann-Sykes memorandum of a1:x>ut September 22,

the

1917 which explicitly

renounced "a Jewish Republic" and any "other form of State in Palestine or
any part of Palestine . "

15
. 'Ibi s was a drasti c change in the earlier demanded

Zionist political endeavour to have

Britain

ac�ept the Zionist thesis of

"Palestine being reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people"
and " secure the achievement of this ( Zionist) object . "

Weizmann wrote i n

his diary the following:
A compari son of the two texts--the one approved by the Foreign Offi ce

and the prime minister, and the one adopted on October

4,

after

Montagu' s attack--shows a painful recession from what the government

itself was prepared to offer .

• • •

We, . on our part,

examined the formula ( o f October

new.

4) ,

exami ned and re

comparing the old text with the

We saw the differences only too clearl y,

but we did not dare

to occasion further delay by pressing for the original fonnula ,

which repre sented. not only our wishes,
of the government . 1 6

but the attitude of the members

Here w e have Weizmann ' s own direct admission of the radical difference
between the earliest Zionist draft proposals and the rescinded government
offer, which expressly denied Palestine as the contemplated Jewish State •
.

'Ihe Balfour draft of August , prepared by James Balfour but adopting
the phraseology from the earlier Zionist draft of July 18,

represented

in summary the governmental Zioni sts' acceptance of Zionist poli tical
objectives,

including the comprehensive terri torial objective of Wei zmann-

Sokolov-Lord Rothschild in Pal estine,
over Palestine.

that i s ,

Zionist Jewry sovereignty

The Balfour draft stated the following:

His Majesty ' s Government accept the principle that Pale stine should
be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people and will

use their best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object
and will be ready to consider any suggestio�s on the subject which
the Zionist Organization may desire to lay before t
hem . l r
'!his Balfour draft,

which was not subnitted to the Cabinet because

it was thought likely to be rejected,

18

represented Balfour ' s accep-

.. � ,
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'rtance
'I

of Zionist objectives requested in their July 18 draft ( that

"Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish

people" ) ; in essence,

that Pal estine would become the Jewish State .

Analysi s reveals that the key words in Balfour ' s draft are taken directly
from the earlier Zionist draft.

Consequently, the Milner governmental

draft was prepared to replace the non-subni ttea Balfour draft .

It read:

His J1ajesty ' s Government accepts the principle that every opportunity
should be afforded for the establi shment of a home for the Jewish
people i n Palestine, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any
sugge stions on the subject which the Zionist Organizati on may desire
to lay before them .19
To Milner i s accredited the remark that, "If the Arabs think that
Palestine will become an Arab country, they are very much mistaken . .. 2o
'lbe War Cabi net, accordi ng to the minute s , met September 3rd to discuss
the Milner draft declarati on.

Lloyd George and · Balfour , both Zionist

sympathizers, were absent from thi s meeting.

Even though the Milner draft

delineated a signif'i cant retreat from the Zionist political objectives, i t
was not the rebuke to them that subsequent developments created for the
Zioni st negotiators.

The Milner draft i s significant for many changes

from the Balfour and Zionist drafts: 1 ) '!he wording was now "a home"
rather than "the national home" ; 2 ) rather than "secure" the achievement
of "reconstituting" Palestine as "the national home of the Jewish people , "
Br1 tain would "facilitate" the achievement of simply affording "every

opportunity" for the "establi shment of a home in Palestine" ; J ) The Zionist
"opportuni ty should" be afforded "in" Palestine rather than "rt.constituting"
Palestine as "the national home" of the Jewish peopl e , thus denying that
Palestine belonged to the Zionists or to the Jews;

4)

the wording "best

endeavours" was repeated but in the usage of a reduced set of Zionist
political objectives.

On the other hand, the Milner draft did not contain
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any direct wording to the "non-Jewish" population of Palesti ne; at this
point no safeguard clauses ,
were added.

either for "the Jews" or Palestinian Arabs,

We must recall that Lord Milner,

and a Gentile governmental. Zioni st,

Minister wi thout Portfolio

considered the words "reconstituted"
The Zionists

and "secure" of the unaccepted Balfour draft much too strong.

were still at this pivotal point not willing ·to accept the Cabine t ' s re
treat from thei r objectives manifested in their own drafts and Balfour ' s
draft .
'!he War Cabine t , meeting on September 3 to consider the Milner
draft,

deferred its deci sion because Lloyd George and Balfour were absent,

because of Montagu 0 s vehement attack of the pro-Zionist draft ,

and because

"It was suggested that a question rai sing such important issues as to the
future of Palestine ought,

in the first instance,

to be discussed with (the)

.

d State s . ,

Allie s , and more particularly with the Uni te

•

•

1121

Montagu

voiced strong objections to any declarati ons in which i t was stated that
Palestine was the "national h?me " of the Jewish peopl e . 22
although now hard-pressed by anti-Zionist oppo sition,

'!he Z.ioni sts,

after the 'Shelv:lng

of the Milner draft were not yet prepared to accept defeat of their
objectives (recall the Zionist drafts of July 12 and
"Balfour draft" of August).
1
his opposition, 1 23 that i s ,

18 and the withdrawn

· Weizmann recognized "the implacability of
Montagu who "astounded the Cabinet.

n24

Ironi cally, the posture of the Zioni sts i s revealed in Weizmann° s "chagrin"
at the Cabinet for "the attention paid •
Jews. " 2.5

• •

to a handful of assimilated

He even castigated the Conjoint Commi ttee of repre sentatives,

the Anglo-Jewish Associati on,

and the Board of Deputi es as consisting of

"old-fashioned, well-to-do assimilationist Jews. 1126

M:mtagu criticall y

attacked the Cabinet members on grounds of their "anti-semi tism" and
vehemently retorted that the Zioni s t ,

Balfour and Milner draft proposal s
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were not acceptable to the Jews. 27

'lhe key to understanding the political

pressure techniques crucial to the Zionists in overriding the powerful opposition of the Montagu group by the pro-Zioni sts i n the War Cabinet
canes from 'Neizmann' s diary:
I added (in cable to Brandeis on September 19 th) that the opposition
of the assimilationists (Jews) was to be ' expected and that i t would
be of great assistance if the text of this declaration ( the Zionist
draft of July 18th) received the support of President Wilson and of
Br
andeis . 11 28
Secondly,
At the same time we were doin� our best to counteract the activities
pamphlets,
of the assimilationists (Jews), who were attacking us in
in the press, and in person-to-person propaganda, as well as in the
cabinet.?9
.
• • •

On September 18, Weizmann received a letter from Lord Rothschild

stating an undesirable ominous to Zionist plans:
Do you remember I said to you i n London, as soon as I saw the announce
ment in the paper of Montagu's appointment, that I was afraid we were
done. 0 30
In planning their poll tical assault against the Montagu group,
Weizmann and Mark Syke s, th: pro-Zionist Secretary of the War Cabinet,
collaborated on a memorandum which was di stributed to the Cabinet members
before the issues involved in a declaration were discussed again .

Before

that memorandum i s reproduced here , we must retain in mind the political
objective of the Zionist negotiators and thei r treacherous guile i n the
face of the active anti-Zionist opposition. 3 1

'lhe first installment of

explicit Zionist duplicity during the declaration ' s negotiations occurred
in the Weizmann-Sykes memorandum of September in which the Zionists
"specified" what they were and were not asking for 1
What the Zionists do not want i s 1
I.
To have any special political hold on the old city o f Jerusalem
itself or any control over the Chri stian or Moslem Holy Places.
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To set up a Jewish Republic or other form of State in Palestine
or any part of Palestine.
II.

To enjoy any special rights not enjoyed by other inhabi tants
of Palestine.

III.

On the other hand, the Zionists do want:
I.
Recogni tion of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine as a national
unit, federated with [? otherj national uni ts in Palestine.

II.

be

'!he recognition of [the] right of bo�a fide Jewish settlers to
included i n the Jewish national unit. in Palestine. 32
'Ihe retreat from the original Zionist draft proposal i s indeed

perceptively striking; the Zionists renounced "a Jewish Republic" or any
"fom of (Jewish) State i n Palestine or any part of Palestine . "

Weizmann ' s

object, because of the effective anti-Zionist Montagu group, 33 was to have
the Cabinet agree to some kind of a declaration.

If Weizmann' s memorandum

was to reassure Montagu and the other anti-Zionist Jews'.34 to a ccept a
'

pro-Zionist declaration, it was a complete failure as the Milner-Amery
draft (which replaced the Milner draft) of October 4th will shortl y reveal .
Another significant aspect of the Weizmann-Sykes memorandum i s that in
denying or retreating from the Zionist scheme for Jewish homeland or
.

nation (Weizmann' s exact expression was "Jewish Republic or other form
of State in Palestine or any part of Palestine" ) i n Palestine, Wei zmann
(Sykes also) was perfidious; for, as Weizmann declared in his diary,
'Ihe first full-dress conference leading to the Balfour Declaration
took place at the home of Dr. Gaster on the morning of February 17,
1917
'Ihe discussions touched on several points which were to con
stitute the heart of the problem i n the ensuing months
Second,
the term "nation," as applied to the emergent Jewish homeland i n
Palestine , referred to the Jewish homeland alone, and i n n o wise
to the relationship of Jews with the lands in which they lived .
So much was made clear by Herbert Samuel . To this I added that the
Jews who went to Palestine would go to constitute a Jewish nation,
not to become Arabs or Druzes or Englishmen.?5
• • • •

• • • •

In essence, regardless of the political and juridical nullities
proscribing the Judenstaat scheme, Weizmann and Zionism would simply

11
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ignore the proscriptions designated in the declaration.

'!he Milner-

Amery draft of October 4 reflects the critical impact of Montagu' s
implacable anti-Zionism and the failure of the Zionists, both Jewish
and Gentile, to cast aside his objections:
His Majesty ' s Government views with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race and will use its
best endeavours to facili tate the achievement of this object, it
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may pre
judice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com
muni ties i n Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed
i n· any other country by such Jews who �r
e fully contented with their
exi sting nationality and citizenship . 36
Amery, 37 an assistant secretary of the War Cabinet, has written
that before the October 4 Cabinet meeting, he was pri va�ely asked by
Lord Milner, a member of the Cabinet, to draft " something which would
go a reasonable distance to meeting the objections, both Jewi sh and pro
Arab, without impairing the substance of the proposed Declaration . .. JB
Since Amery' s draft included the addition of the two safeguard clauses
(these not being in the August Milner draft) , Mi.lner' s private request
to Amery was obviously inco�sistent and unintelligible because the Zionist
demands (of sovereignty in a Jewish State over Palestine) were di chotomous
to the anti-Zionist and pro-Arab objections of the previous drafts.

'!he

Milner-Amery draft reveals, with the ad.di tion of the two safeguard
clauses for anti-Zionist Jews and "non-Jewi sh communities i n Palestine"
( that i s , the majority Palestine ' s Arab Christian and Muslim people
along with other minority Palestine groups), an ad.di tional retreat from
the original. Zionist draft proposal and a failure of the WeizmannRothschild-Sykes memorandum of October 3 that the declaration "would
be considered i n the light of (British) Imperial interests,"

Stein,

the English-Zionist (Jewish) historian of the Balfour Declaration said
of the Milner-Amery draft:
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The progressive watering down of the formula sul:mitted by Rothschild
in July, and in substance accepted at the time by Balfour (in the
Balfour draft), was clearly a response, not only to the pressure of the
Jewish anti-Zionists, but also to reminders that in dealing with the
Palestine question there were other claims and inte:irests to be con
sidered besides those of the Jews . 39
Weizmann' s diary apprai sal of the Milner-Amery draft i s caustically
recorded in his letter of October

7

to Philip Kerr, Lloyd George ' s

secretary, when he wrote , "�xpressing my chagrin and bewilderment at the
attenti9n paid by the British government to a handful of assimilated
Jews. 040 It is preci sely because of the Cabinet' s refusal to accept the
Zionist claimed constituency of "the Jewish people" or Weizmann' s Zionist
attitude that assimilated Jewish national� counted for nothing (when
actually they represented an anti-Zionist majority) that the Cabinet inserted the safeguard phrase "it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be

done which may prejudice the

•

•

•

rights and political status enjoyed in

any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing
nationality and citizenship . "

We must recall that the Zionist negotiators

arbitrarily spoke and acted in.behalf of the Zionist claimed constituency
of "the Jewish people" and that the British governmental pro-Zionists
did not unequivocally curtail his claimed authority as "spokesman" for
"the Jewish people" until anti-Zionist British Jewry entered into the
negotiations and made i t vehemently clear that Weizmann lacked authority
to speak for or represent anti-Zionist Jews.

(Despite the specific

safeguard. clause one of the inane anomalies of Zionism is that i t still
provides "juridical authority" for "the Jewish people" nationality claims,
although thi s was specifically rejected by the Declaration ' s second safe
guard clause . )

Weizmann explicitly ad.mi ts, recalling the original

Zionist draft proposal s (and Balfour ' s draft which iterated the Zionist

drafts),

that "the draft adopted on October 4 •

• •

shows a painful re

cession from what the government i tself was· prepared to offer, 041 that
is, to the Zionists that "Palestine should be reconstituted as the National
Home of the Jewish people" and that Zionists spoke for all world Jewry.
'lbe reader should also recall that in the Declaration of the Establi shment of the State of Israel

(1948)

the Zionists! despite the expli cit

denial of their "the Jewish peopl e" claim in ,the second safeguard clause ,
still arrogated to themselves that,

al

nation

"This right

e o f the Jewish people to

rebirth i n i t s own-· country� was recogni sed in the Balfour

Declarati on •

• • •

"

The Zionist state establi shment Declaration also ,

pite the denial. i n the Balfour Declaration phraseology,
stated that "the Balfour Declaration •

• •

des-

speciously

gave international sanction to •

the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home . "

• •

Zionists'

subversions and distortions of th� Balfour Declarati on are not really so
strange.

While Weizmann would declare that the Zionist negotiators and

Organi zation ( " W e " ) "examined and reexamined the formula ( o f October 4 ) ,
compari ng the old text with the new"42 and that
.

We saw the di fferences only too clearly,

but .

• •

did not dare to occasion

further delay by pressing fo
the original (Zionist) formula,
�
represented • • • our wishes • • • • 3

which

while Weizmann would ask as a change i n the .Milner-Amery draft,
Instead of the establi shment of a Jewi sh National Home,
be more desi rable to use the word "re-establishment"?

would i t not

By thi s small

alterati on the historical connection with the ancient tradition would
be indicat
•
ml

Race" ,

• • •

May I also suggest "Jewish people" instead of "Jewish

• • • •

though the Cabinet would deny the change to "re-establi shment , " and whi l e
Weizmann intensively shifted Zionist tactics :from the private negotiating
forum to the poll tical one of Jewish-Zionist pres.sure group tactics45
on the Cabinet and Foreign Offi ce on October 11 (this political pressure

120
device would also fail ) , Weizmann would later pacify his "chagrin" of
failure and disappointment at the Declaration by subsequently developing
a

personal interpretation which satisfied hims "It would mean exactly what

we would make i t mean--nei ther more nor less . ..46
Relevant to this chapter is the intriguing deception of Leopold
Amery, whose scandalous official conduct in support of Zionism included
treasonable acts because they aggravated the difficult and dangerous
situation of the British army in Palestine which was being subjected to
incessant assaults from Jewish terrorists.

When, on May 11, 1940, the

Chamberlain government was replaced by Winston Churchill ' s election,
the Zionists felt much as they did when. the Asquith government was replaced by that of their exponent Lloyd George , for on December 17, 1939,
before Weizmann left for the Uni ted States from Portugal , Churchill agreed
with Weizmann that after the Second World War

a

Jewish State of three or

four million Jews should be created in Arab Palestine,47 another obvious
violation of the Palestine Mandate· responsibility.

Weizmann' s immediate

.

objective was a Jewish army in Palestine.
A brief review of the pro-Zionist collaboration of important
British officials in violation of the administration of the Mandate reveals the extraordinary behavior normally considered scandalous, improper
and treasonable.48 Amery was directly active in this role and the role
of Amery leads us

to

Orde Wingate , an English Zionist who was assigned

to an intelligence unit at Haifa, Palestine in the autumn of 1937.49

As

previously stated, an immediate objective was a Palestine Jewish amy
which Weizmann had privately discussed with Sir .F.clmund Ironside, Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, Churchill and other select Bri tish officials.
Captain Wingate ' s biographer records that from November of 1939, Wingate ,

11 1

12 1

Blanche Dugdale and another prominent English Jewish Zionist, Victor
Cazalet, Member of Parliament, met frequently at Cazalet' s country home .
It was Cazalet who introduced Wingate to the Zionist Leopold Amery, 50
whose close friendship with Churchill can not be disputed through 1940. 51
Keeping in mind that Amery' s draft proposal of October 4 included the
two safeguard clauses, one of which protect�d the rights of the Pales
tinians to their country, 'his role of quietly assisting the Zionists
becomes, to say the least, intrinsic and furtive.

In July, 1940 , at a

meeting of the Middle Ea.st Commi ttee of the British Cabinet, Amery sug
gested to General Raining, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Sta.ff under
Sir Edmund Ironside, that Wingate be used in the Middle Ea.st.

On

July

1 5 Weizmann, seeking a Palestine Jewish army and Wingate1s assi stance i n
Palestine, had an interview with Haining, the result of which Haining
promised to telegraph General Sir A . P . Waveii , British Commander-in
Chief of Middle Ea.st (19 39-1941 ) , urging him "to get on with the training
of cadres of Jewish ( Zionist) officers and

N . C . Os . 052

Mrs. Dugdale ' s

diary reveals an elated but solemn Weizmann returning from a similarly
successful mission with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and other
private parlor meetings with the backstairs pro-Zionists Lewis Namier
and Wingate�3 Subsequently, the appointment of the new Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill , upset the plans of Weizmann and

Wingate • .54

Dill felt that Wingate would be of more significant help in

the war cause in Allied operations against Italian Ea.st Africa; hi s in

structions also added the stipulation that because of Wingate' s pro
Zionism and willingness to violate direct mill ta.ry orders he "was pro
hibi ted from going to Palestine for any reason whatever, either on duty
or on leave . " 55

An enraged Wingate asked Weizmann to demand a Jewish
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army from Churchil l .

Churchill hesitated · to assent immediately to the

formation of a Jewish army although his consent to recrui tment was given

in September of

1940. 56

Instead,

the Bri tish armed and trained a force

of Jewish " special constables" which numbered nearly

16, 000

by

1941 .

Amery ' s offi cious help in the above synopsized proceedings harkens
back to an earlier period,

that i s ,

Declaration negotiati ons. 57

the Fir�t World War and the Balfour

Amery ' s contri bution of the so-called safe

guard ciauses would a�pear to have been sincerely made to protect the
rights of the Palestinian Arabs in their country.

'Ihis i s not actually

the case because he wrote one year later:
The population of Palestine will consist in the main of two elements:
Palestinian Arabs and the Jews.

The former are closely linked up by

every sort of affili ation with the Arabs across the Jordan who are
to form part of the Arab State.

It i s essential for the pGace and

good government bo th of Pal estine and of the Arab State that Arab

questi ons should be handled in the same spirit and on parallel lines
on both sides of the Jordan .

On the other hand the Jewish settle

ment of Palestine i s not likely in the long run to be confined to
It i s sure to spread not only into
Palestine in the narrower sense.
the trans-Jordan country,
East generally •

• • •

.58

but to Egypt,

Mesopotamia and the Near

Although the Bri tish had set up a mili tary ad.ministrati on i n
Palestine i n

1918,

i t was not known what decision the victorious Allies

would enact as to the future status of the country ;

although the first

safeguard clause of the declarati on, authored by Amery,

explicitly stated

111 t being clearl y understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
the civil and religious rights of the existing

( Palestinian

Arab

)

communi -

ties in Palestine , " Amery furtively backed a Jewish State over Palestine,
that the Arab State would be formed i n the " trans-Jordan country" and
that eventually the Jews would expand into Egypt,: Mesopotamia,
Fast and Trans-Jordan

( Jordan )

to these ad.ditional areas .

the Near

thereby expanding the Jewish State in time

Amery i s obviously incredi bly surreptitious
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because he explicitly understood that the Zionist negotiators, especially
Weizmann , wanted an exclusive Jewish State over Palestine; moreover,

/unery

speaks of an "Arab State" in Transjordan but suggests that in time Jewish
settlement in the "Arab State" area would convert i t into part of the
expansive Jewish State .

Consequently,

what becomes of the national ,

"civil and religious rights" of the Arab people i n the "Arab State" i f ,
N.nery projected,

as

the Zionist goal of an exclusivist and expanded " Jewish"

State . encroaches into t})e "Arab State" area!
Weizmann may have expressly recognized that the Milner-/unery
draft could be interpreted to "cripple" Zionism ' s actual ceniiral political
national objective� in Palestine , 59 · but _ as both he and A!nery furti vely con
strued ,

the Zionists would simply ignore and violate the first safeguard

clause , as the following three decades would vividly reveal .
on October 9 ,

When Weizmann,

telegraphed the Mi.lner-/unery draft to /unerican Zionist lead-

er Brandeis in /uneri ca,
the draft on two points:

Brandeis and his Zionist associates disagreed with

1)

They disliked the phrase " by such Jews who are

fully contented with their e:X:i.sting nationality and citizenship , " prefer
ring "the rights and civil political status enjoyed by Jews i n any other
country" ; 60 2 ) Brandeis suggested the change of " Jewish race" to " Jewish
peopl e " . 6

i

These change s were made in the final draft .

The most signi ficant feature of the final draft was that the
Zionists failed to receive Cabinet assent to any of their three central
political objectives in their July draft proposai . 62

Even more signifi-

cantly, the second safeguard clause was to undergo a drasti c chang,e i n
its wording as a result o f Brandei s '

suggestion ; _ the final draft o f the

second safeguard was strengthened by eliminating reference to Jews in
countries other than Palestine who were "fully contented with
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thei r existing nationality, " and making the second safeguard applicabl e ,
w1 thout excepti on,
essence ,

to "Jews in any other country" than Palestine .

In

Britain would apply on October ) 1 , 1917, what the American

Government belatedly declared in November of 1959 that "other governments
are full y aware that the United States Government does not condone the
invol�tary identification of its (Jewish) citizens with a foreign state 11 ; 63
and reaffirmed on April 20,

1964, when the Department of State said i t

"does- rtot regard the ' Jewish people '

,
law • . 64

concept as a concept of international

Another way of expre ssing the Zionist concept i s what the final

second safeguard means and protects against in the ongoing sixty-nine
year old Zionist ideological objective·: Can a Jewish American, as an
exampl e ,

claim the Jewish "nationality" that Zionism contends he possesses

(even though he does not in fact assert i t ) ,

and at the same time,

remain

compatible with those citizenship obligation& and rights imposed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States?

Zionism maintained that their

concept of a continuing "Jewish people" throughout the history of mankind
was implicitly (note, not exi>licitly) recognized in the Declarati on.
view has ignored the second safeguard provi sion of the Declarati on,

This
"It

being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
the •

• •

rights and political status of Jews in any other country • .. 65

'Ihi s

provision was speci fically designed t o avoid the juridical and poli tical
cons·aquences of the involuntarily encompassing "Jewish people" nationality
concept which violates the legal tenets of nationality status in inter
national law. 66
Consequentl y, the Balfour Declaration and later internati onal
instruments,

such as th' Covenant and Mandate for Pale stine ( July 24, 1922)

denied the Zionists juridical authority for "the Jewish people" trans-

12.5
national nationality claims.

'Ihe safeguard clauses of these instruments

are so unequivocal that they can only be interpreted as prohibiting the
Zionist claims. 67 Moreover, in tenns of contemporary nationality law
the Zionist claim to represent a "Jewish nation" in which every Jew i s
and remains a de facto natural citizen until he claims it de jure i s
unprecedented, without legal foundation in in��rnational law. 68

Consequently, how is it juridically possible that the notion of

a continuing "Jewish people" throughout the history of mankind, rejected
in the Declaration, could be , the Zionists argue , implicitly recqgnized
in the Declaration?

Ironi cally, thi s opprobrious Zionist ascription was
.

.

rejected in the final declaration as aresult of the direct intervention
of the American Zionists led by Brandei s.

Despite Zionism ' s latter de-

sires to simply ignore the Cabinet' s rejection of their "Jewish people"
concept in the second safeguard , ironically, ··it was Weizmann himself who
accepted this rejection 69 by writing to the Cabinet70 after October 4
(the intent to i ssue the Milner-Amery draft proposal remained after this
date ) , that
in order to avoid any misunderstanding I respectfully suggest that

the �art of the declaration in question (the safeguard pertaining to
Jews) be replaced by the following words: ' the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country of which they are loyal
citizens . ' 71
Weizmann explicitly agreed to the rejection of "the Jewish people"

Zionist negotiation

objective , 72 Even if Weizmann was attempti ng a vague

nuance by adding "of which they {Jews) are loyal citizens" (which was not
included in the change telegraphed by Brandeis to him), he again failed
because the Cablnet accepted the unequivocal Brandeis recommendation "the
rights and civil poll tical status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. " 73
It i s significant to note that Brandeis and Balfour considered {Wei zmann
continued to adhere to Jewish State ulterior motives in violation of the
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declaration and Mandate ) the issuance of the declaration not to be the
end of Zionism ' s plot for a Jewish State . 74

American Zionist aims were

outlined to Balfour during a private session among him, Felix Frankfurter, 75

Lord

Eustace Percy, 76 and Brandei s . 77

Brandeis explicitly stated to Balfour:

First, that Palestine should be the Jewi sh homeland and not merely
that there be a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
'lbat, he assumed,

is the commitment of the Balfour Declaration and will, of course ,
be confirmed by the Peace Conference . 78

Brandeis was seriously in error; a Jewish sovereignty over Arab
Palestine was not the commitment of the declarati on.
Under the direct insistence of anti-Zionist Jews in Britain,
among other reasons , the framers of the declaration recognized that the
nationalist aspirations of some Jews could endanger the rights and poli tcal
status of anti-Zionist Jewry--those who did not seek an involuntary transformation of their religious commi tment into a nati onalist political com
mitment, nor jeopardize their political rights in their respective countrie s . 79
Chaim Weizmann, the Zioni sts' leading negotiator, has stated :
But we have never wanted Palestine for the Zionists; we wanted
Pal estine for the Jews. .'l'he development of Palestine Jewry i s not
0
a party affair .
'lbe Balfour Declaration i s addressed to all Jewry. 8
By the mere acceptance of the declaration by the Bri tish Cabinet
and , in 1924, by the United States i n the Anglo-Ameri can Conventi on which
incorporated the entire declarati on,

the political Zionist definiti on of

"the Jewi sh people" was not introduced into customary international law;
Zionism simply succeeded in publicly distorting the reli gi osity of Jewish
terminology. 8

1

Not coincidentally, while the language of this concept

was studi ously vague , neither on the British governmental pro-Zionist
nor on the Zionist side was there any dispositio�, at the time,

to probe

deeply into thP. meaning of "the Jewi sh people"--still less was there any
agreed interpretation. 82

But the Zionist misuse of the declarati on i s
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typical because Zionism ' s interpretation intentionally ignores the safeguards and deliberately treats the declaration as consisting only of the
"favour" clause which i s only a "declarati on of sympathy with Jewish
Zionist aspirati ons . "

It should be noted that, despite the Cabine t ' s

denial and rejection of "the Jewish people" concept--to which the Zionists
assented in the final draft of the declaration8 3�-nei ther the Zionist
Organization nor the State of Israel ,
Organization,

which controls the World Zionist

has ever acc�pted any limitation on the Zionist conceptual

membership i n "the Jewish people " . 8

4

As for example ,

i n December,

1961,

Israel declared :
'Ibe connection between the Jewi sh people and the State of Israel

consti tutes an integral part of the Law of Nati ons*
The Balfour
Declaration and the Palestine Mandate given by the League of Nati ons
•

•

•

•

to Great Bri tain constituted an international recognition of the

Jewish people •

• • •

85

Between October 4 and November

2,

ensuing Zionist politi cal pres-

sure tactics by Weizmann reveal Zionism ' s critical concern that the MilnerAmery draft ,

without substantial changes and retaining the safeguard s ,

would become the final Cabinet declarati on.

The political pressure tac-

tics failed to produce a statement consistent with Zionist objectives of

(1)

"Palestine being reconstituted as the Nati onal Home of the Jewi sh

people,

11 86

(2)

recogni tion of "the Jewi sh people" concept. 8 7

Weizmann

understood the distinction between the Balfour draft (which was actually
the earlier Zionist draft) and the Milner-Amery draft :
• • •

the one adopted on October 4, after Montagu's attack--shows a pai n

ful recession from what the Government i tself was prepared to offer88

*concerning the Zionist alleged historic title and right to

Palestine i t i s significant that an Israeli legal writer,

Yehuda

Blum , does not even mention the Balfour Declarati on in a book deal

ing with historic title s : Historic T.itles in International Law
( 'Ibe Hague ,

1965 ) .
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whi ch to the Zionists were demands li sted abov e .

Whatever h i s subsequent

vacillation, 89 he declared that "we did not dare to occasion further delay
by pre ssing for the original (Zionist) formul a " ; 90

hence,

Weizmann did

accept the declarati on with both safeguard clauses and a substantiaJ.
weakening of the " sympathy" clause i n whi ch the Cabinet "view(ed) with
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people" rather than "accept the principle that Palestine should be reconsti tuted· as the national home of the Jewish people . "

At the Cabinet meet-

ing of October J 1 , Lord Curzon succinctly stated the difference between
the original Zionist demands and what they were to get; he
recognized that some expre ssion of sympathy with Jewish aspirat.ions

would be a valuable adjunct to our propaganda ,

though •

• •

we should be

guarded in the language used in giving expressi0n to such sympathy.91
The actual declaration i tself is prefaced in the Balfour l e tter

to Lord Rothschild as a "declaration of sympathy, " not a governmental
1
"promi se. 192

'Ihe writer is not splitting a fine hai r .

There i s a world

of difference between an agreement explicitly specifying a "promi se" and
one declaring " sympathy" with ·a cause.
pathize i s to commiserate.

To promise i s to pledge;

The difference is much too obvious;

to symWei zmann

perceptively understood i t as the "painful recession" in whi ch "We saw the
differences only too clearl y . "

The sympathy expression, i n contrast t o the

more specific desire for a Cabinet principle,
be quickly observable :

commitment , or promise should

the sympathy clause promi ses nothing.

'!be interesting question remains as to why,
tral political objectives were rejected

by

if the Zionists'

cen-

the Cabinet (asswning theoreti-

cally that the Cabinet pro-Zionists empathized wi �h Zionist politi cal de
sires) the Cabinet issued .a declarati on?

The answer i s quite simple :

The

British Government in the midst of the world war received some propaganda
benefits from the declarati on93 ( except in the Arab lands where every at-

129

tempt was made to suppre ss its publication94 ) , and the Briti sh for -postwar

imperial reasons symbiotically used but subtended the Zionist scheme

in Palestine .

And Zionist leadership used the declaration as a hook on

which to hold the Middle East policies of successive British Governments .
'!his debunks the proposition that the British had any sort of altrui stic
motivation to assist Zionist political goal s .

The Cabinet, in fact,

after careful consideration of six drafts and both Jewish anti-Zionist

and Zipnist memorandum , issued a declaration which met Jewish anti - Zionist
criticisms, including the protection of the rights of the Arab Palestinian
people ,

and repudi ated Zionist one s .

.

.

Thi s indicates that the Cabinet,

as a result of the intervention of the anti - Zionists, probed far ·too
deeply from the Zionist standpoint and rejected the Zionist objectives
with deliberation and preci sion,
have been chagrined,

though some of the Cabinet members may

such as Balfour . 9 5

'Ihe year 1917 was a grave one for the Allies.

'Ihe Russian :revo-

luti on weakened and jeopardized the fight against the Central Powers on
the eastern front, and the Germans were about to transfer divisions from
the Russian to the western front before the United States sent soldiers
to France.

No·t ignoring the fact of' postwar Bri tish imperial aims in

the eastern Mediterranean , 9 6 William Ormsby-Gore, 9
Secretary for the Colonies,
declarati on for Churchil l ,

7

Parliamentary Under

wrote a memorandum on the origins of the
then Secretary of State for the Coloni e s :

'!he earliest document i s a letter dated 24th April 1917 in which a
certain Mr Hamilton sugge sted that a Zionist mission should be sent

to Russia for propaganda purpose s .

( Britain)

I t i s clear that a t that stage

were mainly concerned with the question of how Russia
(then in the first stage s of revoluti on) was to be kept in the ranks
• • •

of the Allies.

At the end of April the Foreign Offi ce were con-

sul ting the Bri tish Ambassador at Petrograd as to the possible effect

in Russi a of a declaration by the Entente of sympathy for Jewish

national aspirati ons.

The idea was that such a declarati on might

counteract Jewish pacifi st propaganda in Russia.

r1
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In the same month (April 191 7 ) Mr. Balfour , then Secretary of State
for Foreign Affai rs, went on his official mission to the Uni ted States
' to scp eme out ways of co- operating with them in prosecuting the
war ' . 1 J 'Ihe Foreign Offi ce note observes that 'during this visit
the policy of the declaration as a war measure seems to have taken
more defini te shape ' .
It was supposed that American opinion might
be favourably influenced if (Britain) gave an assurance that the
return of the Jews to Palestine had become a purpose of British
poli cy.98
( Original document . )

[

On

of

June 13,

1917,

Sir Ronald Graham, 99 Assistant Under Secretary

State for Foreign Affairs, prepared a memorandum to Lord Hardinge ,

permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs :
We ought therefore to secure all the political advantage we can out
of our connection with Zionism and there i s no doubt that thi s
ad.van�� will be considerable, especially in Russia • • • I submit
for consideration that the moment has . come when we might meet the
.
wishe s of the Zionists . . . . 100
Synopti cally,

the minutes of the War Cabinet session of September

3 report that in consideration of a proposal declaration (another draf't) ,

Lord

Robert Cecil ,

the Acting Secretary of State · for Foreign Affairs,

who was replacing Balfour temporarily because the latter was in the United
States, declared :
'Ihere was a very strong and 0enthusiastic organization (the Zioni sts),
more parti cularly in the United States ( the Provisi onal Commi ssion

for General Zionist Affairs), who were zealous in thi s matter (of a
declarati on), and his belief was that i t would be of most substantial
assistance to the Allies to have the earnestness and enthusiasm of
these (Zionists) people enlisted on our side .
To do nothing was to
risk a direct break with them • • • • 101
On October 4 Balfour discussed the need for a declaration with the
Cabinet members:
• • • that the
Gennan Government were making great efforts to capture
the sympathy of the Zionist Movement.
'Ihis Movement • • • had behind

it the support of • • • Jews •
other countri e s . 102

• •

in Russia and Ameri ca, and possibly in

After the October 4 Cabinet session, at which a declarati on was
avoided , Ronald Graham addre ssed a memorandum to Balfour:
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regretting the Cabinet' s delay in giving an assurance to the Zionists
as thi s delay would throw them into the anns of the Gennans.
The
moment • • • this assurance i s granted the Zionist Jews are P f5Rared to
start an active pro-Ally propaganda throughout the world.
J
Balfour gave attention to thi s request during the Cabinet session
of October 3 1 :
·

If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal , w e should
be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both i n Russia and
Ameri ca. 104
Lord _ Curzon agreed with Balfour :
However, he recognized that some expre ssion of sympathy with Jewish
aspirati ons would be a valuable adjunct to our propaganda , though . . .
we should be guarded in the language used in giving expression to
such sympathy. 105
Firsthand confirmation does not preclude the Zionist historical

source of Samuel Landman, a leader of the Zioni st-Rev i sionists and secre-

tary of the World Zionist Organization from

1917

to

1922,

who stated :

After an understanding had been arrived at between Sir Mark Syke s and
Weizmann and Sokolow, i t was resolved to send a secret message to
Justi ce Brandeis that the British Cabinet would help the Jews to gain
Palestine i n return for active Jewish sympathy and for support i n the
U . S . A . for the Allied cause, so as to bring about a radical pro-Ally
tendency in the United State s . 106
Secret messages were also sent in cipher through the Forei gn
Office to the Zionist leaders in Russia to obtain their supportfor the
Allied cause .

Messages were also sent to Jewish leaders in neutral

countri es in order to strengthen the pro-Ally sympathi e s of Jews everywhere.
The Zionists had accurately foreseen their way to Palestine, an objective
which they had found impossible "to sunnount by ordinary political means"
prior to the world war .

107

Herzl ' s prophecy that the Zionists would get

Palestine " not from the goodwill but from the jealousy of the Powers, " 108
was being made to come true in the close wartime collaboration between

the British officials and the pro-Ally based Zionists in England .

Lastly,

the October J1 session of the Cabinet authorized Balfour not to declare
Jewish or Zionist· acqui sition of sovereignty over Arab Palestine or the
/
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grant of sovereignty over the land to "the Jews11 109 but to make "the
following declaration of sympathy with the Zionist aspirations" to Lord
Rothschild the nominal head of Zionism in England.

Early in 1923, the

Duke of Devonshire, who succeeded Churchill as Secretary of State for
the Colonies, prepared a ·memorandum on British policy in Palestine from 1917:
Briefly stated, the object [of the Balfour Declaration] was to enlist
the sympathies on the Allied side of influential Jews and Jewish
organi sations all over the world
It is arguable that the negotiations
with the Zionists did
have considerable effect in advancing the
date at which the United States Government intervened in the war.
However that may ·oe , it must always be remembered that the Declaration
was made at a time of extreme peril to the cause of the Allies
'!he Balfour Declaration was a war measure
desi.gned to secure
tangi. ble benefits which it was hoped could contribute to the u1timate victory of the Allies. 110
• • •

• • •

• • •

• • •

• • •

Lord Curzon, who even after its ·issuance did not understand the
meaning and intention of the Balfour Declaration, except to acknowledge
that Weizmann was furtive about actual Zionist goal s, disclosed in a
.
memorandum dated October 26, 1917, Weizmann'.s . negotiation technique : 1 11
He once told me that 2, 000 interviews had gone to the making of the
Balfour Declaration. With unerring skill he adapted his arguments
to the special circumstances of each statesman . To the British and
Americans he could use �blical language and awake a deep emotional
undertone ; to other nationalities he more often talked in terms of
interest. Mr. Lloyd George was told that Palestine was a little
mountainous country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour the philo
sophical background of Zionism could be surveyed; for Lord Cecil
the problem was placed in the setting of a new world organization;
while to Lord Mi.lner the extension of imperial power could be vividly
portrayed . To me, who dealt with these matters as a junior officer
of the General Staff, he brought from many sources all the evidences
that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish national home
to the strategical position of the British Empire , but he always in
dicated by a hundred shades and inflections of the voice that he be
lieved that I could also appreciate better than my superiors other
more subtle and recondite arguments. This skilful presentation of
facts would, however, have been useless unless he had convinced all
with whom he came into contact of the probity of his conduct and
the reality of his trust in the will and strength of Britain . 112
Zionist actions clearly reveal , and quite often are stated .
that the avowed intention of Zionism has always been the establi shment

lJJ

of a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine, including its environs
such as Transjordan.

And Balfour clearly understood the meaning of

the "Jewish national home " ; he privately confided to his Prime Minister
Lloyd George in a letter dated February 19 , 1919, from the Paris Peace
Conference :
'!he weak point of our position of course ·is that in the case of
Palestine we deliberately • . • decline to accept the principle of
self-determination. If the present (A.Tab) inhabitants were con
sulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish verdict. Our
justification for our policy i s that we regard Palestine as being
absolutely exceptional • • • • 11J
Balfour goes on to explicitly ad.mi t the intent of "giving the "
Zionists Arab Palestine "providing that home can be g1 ven them without

.

.

either dispossessing or oppressing the ·present (Arab) inhabitants . " 1

14

In 1947-1948 Zionist military power would be utili zed to forcefully
dispossess the majority Arab Palestinian population though Balfour
never lived to see that moment.

And the Ziollist mili tary infrastructure

would be constructed, w1 th the direct assistance and training of British
mandatory authorities in direct violation of the Mandate provi sions.

1 34

.

Chapter Five
1'Ihere was no international law authority for the British Government

to make a promi se of Arab terr! tory (which was under Turkish sovereignty)
to Zioni st terri torial aspirations, for even the international law of
peace and war of the war peri od juridically di sallowed a British terri
torial concession to the Zionist nationalists.
'!'he Hague Convention No.
IV entitled "Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land , " in addi tion
to prohi bi ting expli cit juridical limitations upop belligerents, in
cluding juridical limi tati ons upon states or groups acting as mili tary
occupants, decrees i n its Preamble : "Until a more complete code of the
laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem i t
expedient to declare that, i n cases not included i n the Regulations
adopted by . them , the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nati ons, as they
result from the usage s establi shed among civilized peoples, from the laws
See 36
Ublic conscience • • • • "
of humanity, and the dictates of the
:{>
Stat. pt. 2, p . 2277 at 2279-80 (1910),
2
Balfour ' s letter was privately add.res�ed to another Engli sh citizen.
Zionist propaganda gave it a sacrosanct character and called i t the
"Balfour Declaration" to clothe i t with importance.
While Zionists took
pains to publicize i t widely, they also took care not to mention the

safeguard proviso in the letter that guaranteed and protected the right s
o f the Arab people who were referred to as " the non-Jewish communities"
in Palestine which represent·ed 9 3 per cent of the· population of Palestine.
3
1he same legal consideration appli e s to the vari ous parti tions
schemes, especially to the partition resolution adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nati ons on November 29, 1947 : legally possessing
no right of soverei gnty over Palestine the United Nations could not
validly partition the Arab country, nor dispose of i t , nor grant any
right of soverei gnty to the Zionist Jews over any part of Pal estine.
International law recogni zes only the illegality of depriving indigenous
people of their natural and imprescripti ble rights of sovereignty
over their own country.

4Temperle , ed . , A History of the Peace Conference of Paris
r
(London, 1924 ) , p . 173-74.
5At the 17th Zioni st Congre ss i n Basle, in July of 1931, Wei zmann
declared, " , , • I often asked myself what we, I and my frl ends who were
speaking for the Jewish peopl e , could answer were we asked to ' show our
credentials' and to prove our right to act as the repre sentatives of
world Jewry.
'Ihat no such question was ever put i s perhaps the strongest
proof of the i'ntui ti ve understanding of those men who spoke with us on
behal f of Great Bri tai n , and who saw us, not as the nominated or elected
representatives of thi s or that group , but as the spokesmen of a people

in the making.
And this atti tude i s the more surprising when one re
members that these so-called 'big Jew' and the official Jews ( such as

Montagu ' s group ) , were than very strongly opposed to Zionist ideals and

1J5

aspirati ons . "
Quote i s from Elmer Berger, "Disenchantment of a Zionist, "
fftddle East Forum (Beirut: American University, April 1962)
•

.

6
Trial and Error, p . 259.
'Ihe words "Compromi se formula" refer to
the denial of the primary Zionist objective which was that "Palestine
should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish peopl e , "
which was emendated by the I·alner-Amery draft.
7
0Claims To Constitute • The Jewish People·• , " John Norton Moore , ed . ,
The Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton: Prinqeton University Press, 1974),
Vol. I, p. 107.
'!he Mallison study i s an excellent legal explication
of the Zionist "the Jewish people" nationality concept.

ff

Ibid . , p . 108.

9

rn 1947, the Zionist Organi zation/Jewish Agency publicly interpreted
the phraseology of the Balfour Declarati on: "The phrase ' Jewish Zionist

aspirati ons' • • • referred to the age-old hope of Jews the · world over
that Palestine shall be restored to i ts· ancient role as the ' Land of
Israel . '
These aspirati ons were formulated. as a concrete aim at the
first World Zionist Congre ss at Basle, Switzerland , in 1897, under the
leadership of Dr. Theodore Herzl, in these word s : ' Zi onism alias to

create a publicly secured, legally assured home for the Jewish people
in Palestine . • "
'Ihe same Zionist source prov:lded the Zionist inte rpre
tation of the words "national home for the Jewish people" : "The phrase
'the establi shment i n Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish peopl e '
was intended and understood. by all concerned to mean a t the time of the

Balfour Declaration that Palestine would ultimately become a ' Jewi sh
Commonweal th' or a ' Jewish State , ' i f only Jews came and settled there
in suffi cient numbers . "
'Ihe�e statements are quoted from Jewish Agency
for Palestine, Book of Documents Submitted to the General Assembl
of
the United Nations, ed . , Abraham 'l'ulin,
New York, 1947 , p . 1 and 5 .
'Ihe inaccuracy of the Zionist statement that the alleged meaning 0£ an
ultimate "Jewish State" was "i ntended and understood by all concerned"
is historically obvious, al though i t i s kind of the Zionists to reveal
their actual illegal aims i n Palestine both before and after the Balfour
I would specifically direct criti cs to the Zionist memorandum
Decarati on.

of about September 22, 1917, which declared, "What the Zionists do not
want i s : ( I I ) To set up a Jewish Republic or other form of State in
Thi s Weizmann-Mark Sykes memorPalestine or any part of Palestine . "

andum explicitly refute s the Zionist Organi zation/Jewish Agency
interpretation of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration made i n 1947.
Additionally, Sokolov, president of the World Zionist Organi zation in
1917, wrote in 1918 : " I t has been said, and i s still being obstinately
repeated by anti-Zi onists agai n and agai n , that Zionism aims at the cre
But this i s wholly fallaci ous.
ationof an independent ' Jewish state . '
See
'Ihe 'Jewish state' was never a part of the Zionist programme "
Nahum Sokolov, History of Zionism,

pp. xxiv-xxv.

•

1600-1918 (London, 1919 ) ,

Vol .

I,

Sokolov is Gimpl y being atrociously deceptive because

in the Zioni st draft proposal of July 18, 1917,

Sokolov (1861-1936)

stated explicitly that he wanted Bri tai n to "accept ( s ) the principle

that Pal estine should be reconsti tuted as the national home of the
Jewish people , " and in the Zionist draft of July 12, 1917, Sokolov
along with other Zionist officials wanted the British to accept the
"principle of recognising Palestine as the National Home of the
Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up 1 ts
nati onal life in Palestine" under the protection of a Western power.
10stein,

The Balfour Declarati on, p. 468.

11Ibid.
2
1 Ibid . , p . 468-69 .
Note the specific Zionist conceptual phraseology in the words "recongnising, " " the National Home , " " the Jewish
people ; ff "national life , '·' all of which means the creation of the
Zioni st Jud.enstaat over Arab Palestine.

13Ibid. , p. 469.
Note the specific reference to " the Jewish people"
and the "Jewish nationality" which depict the Zionist conception of a
transnational nationality racial entity�

Difficult interpretive problems

concerning the scope and meaning of these phrases were never explicated
by the Bri tish governmental Zionists and the Zionists Jewish negotiators
were certainly not voluntarily providing any clear definitions of these
As Sir Harold Nicolson declared in
ideologi cal-philosophical words.
reference to the Bri tish Foreign Offi c e preliminary draft and the
protesting Zioni sts' preliminary drafts of July 12 and 1 8 , "We believed
that we were founding a refuge for the di sabled (Jews) and did not
See Stein, op. ci t . ,
foresee that 1 t would become a nest of hornet s . "
p. 468, n . 24.

14The use of the term " National Home" in this Zionist draft was a
continuation of the euphemism0 deliberately adopted since the First
Zioni st Congre ss i n 1897, when the term "Heims ta tte" was employed
instead of Herzl • s "Judenstaat" term meaning "Jewish State . "
As has
been shown, Nord.au, the inventor of the term "Heimstatte , " coined i t
"to deceive by its mildness" until such time as " there was no reason
to dissimulate our real aim , " which was an exclusive Jewish State .
See Syke s, Two Studies in Virtue : On the basi s of Nordau ' s manuscript
"The Prosperi ty o f His Servant , " p . 160,

footnote 1 .

1.5wei zmann makes specific reference to the Bri tish Government invoking
"favorable action on our demands" which to the Zionists meant a
"reconstituted" Jewish State over Palestine.
See Chaim Weizmann, "'Ihe
Balfour Declaration , " N. Gordon Levi n , Jr. , ed . , The Zionist Movement

in Palestine and World Politi c s, 1880-1918 (Lexington, �11..s s. : D . C .
Heath and Company, 1974), p . 191.
Significantly, Sykes , as Weizmann
detailed, "understood entirely what was meant by ( Jewish) ' nationality"'
and "the idea of a Jewish Palestine . "

1J8

2.5J:b1.d.
26Ibid . , p .

,

2

.

00,

27It would have been . impossible for even such committed Zioni sts as
Lloyd George and Balfour to represent a declaration as having support
from Jews following the resignati on of the only member of the Cabinet
in prote st.

28Levin , op. cit. , pp;· 194-9 5 .
Actually, the Zionist draft to whi ch
Wei �ann refers had already been rejected by its replacement with the
Milner draft of August, which was not cabled to Brandeis.
Obvi ously,
Weizmann ' s omission was intentional .
9
2 Ibid . , P• 195.
JOibid . , p . 194.
31�oliti cal Zionism emphasi zed the importance and need of � politically
independent Jewish State over Arab Pal esti ne .
Relevant to the desire
of a territory by poli tical Zionism i s the premeditated policy of
"gradualism" first developed by Chaim Weizmann and inherited by subsequent
leaders, even at the present day.
In accepting the Bal four Declarati on,
the Churchill White Paper, and the partition plan of the Peel Commi ssion,
Weizmann did not really agree to their terms or intend to abide by them .
'Ihroughout his tenure as the recogni zed leader of organi zed Zioni sm , he
tried ceaselessly to circumvent the restri ctions of official British
policy without openl y challenging their legality until the 1940 s .
Emphati cally, the limitations h e sought to overcome were directly related
to the Zionist Jewish State scheme.
A disturbi ng problem to Zionist

"gradualism" is the ongoing vivid discrepancy between its statement and
its scheme , a dichotomy that led to a format based on expedient equivoca
tion and quiet duplicity.
Zionist design and intent were concealed by
equivocati on of statement and purpose after the Milner draft proposal

of the Balfour Declarati on which radi cally denied acceptance of Zionist
objectives over Palestine.
32stei n, The Balfour Declarati on, p.
supplied by Stein.
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Materi al in brackets

33Thi s group included such important Bri Ush Jews as Lucien Wolf,
Claude Montefiore and 3ir Mathew Nathan .
Nei zmann sugge sted to Brandeis
in the United States via cable that anti-Zionist opposition had to be
overcome; that it would "greatly help i f Pre sident Wilson andyourself
support the text (wired to Brandeis September 19 ) .
Matter most urge n t . "

Weizmann also sent a telegram t o two leading New York Zioni sts, asking
them to "see Brandeis and Frankfurter immediately discuss my last two

telegrams with them , " addi ng that i t might be necessary for him to come
On October 9 Wei zmann cabled Brandeis

to the Uni ted States himself.

lJ9

again stati ng
have found an
member of the
to injure the

difficulties from the "assimilants" opposi tion : "They
excellent champion • • • in Mr. Edwin Montagu who i s a
Government and has certainly made use of his position
Zionist cause . "

4
3 'Ihe Jews of Bri tain in 191 7 totalled about )00, 000 of whom only
8 , 000 were Zioni sts.
See Stein, op. ci t . , p . 66.
3.5i.evin, op. ci t . , p . 186.
Emphasis in the quote i s from the
ori ginal diary entry of Weizmann.
6
'!he last t�o words in the draft were
3 stein, op. ci t . , p . 521.
added two days later ( i bi d . , pp. 524, 525, n . 31 ) .
Note the· Zioni st
rac�al doctrine i n th� phrase "the Jewish race . "
37Amery, a professed Zionist, along with W . G. Ormsby-Gore and
Winston Churchill, Amery ' s school friend at Harrow , had dominated
almost the entire decade between 1919-1929 of Bri tish-Palestine rela
tions.
In the fight against the 1939 Passfield White .Paper ( whi. ch
announced the Bri tish Government ' s intention to suspend Jewish immi
gration, restric t Zionist-Jewish land purchase s, and reduce the ir
regula.r power of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which was a shadow
Zionist government ) the Zionists were strongl y backed by such important
Zionist non-Jewish individua.ls as Stanley Baldwi n , Sir Austen Chamberlain .
General Smuts, Sir John Simon and Amery.
Lord Passfield was the Bri tish
For an example of
Colonial Secretary and author of the White · Paper.
the fashion i n which Jewish constituent votes are effectively used
to suppre ss anti-Zionist policies, see Alan Bullock, The Life and
Times of Erne st Bevi n : Trade Union Leader 1881-1940 , Vol . I (Lo ndon:
Heinemann , 1960), chapter entitled "The Second Labour Government,
1929-1931 , " in which placating the Engli sh-Jewish vote took the form
of, on November 4, 19J1, of Bevin i ssuing a statement declaring that
his Labour Government had no intention of stopping Jewish immigration
into Palestine nor of setting liml ts to the expansion of the "Jewish
Facts concerning the Zionist shadow
National Home" in Palesti ne .
government i n Palestine are included i n the Anglo-American Commi ttee
of Inquiry, Report to the United States Government and His Maje sty' s
Government in the Uni ted Kingdom : " There thus exists a virtual Jewish
nonterri torial State Q:-hrough the Jewish Agency] with its own executive
and legi slative organs , parallel in many respects to the Mandatory
Admini stration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish Nati onal
This Jewish shadow Government has ceased to cooperate with the
Home.
(British) Administration in the maintenance o f the law and order, and i n
the suppression o f terrori sm. " (p. 39 )
8
The words "pro-Arab" does not
3 Quoted in Stein, op. ci t . , p . 520.
mean that any Arabs had any role in the private negotiati ons; in fact,
the Arabs did not even know of the private discussions which would lead
to the i ssuance of the Ilalfour Declaration.
So extensive was the in
fluence of the Jewish community at Whitehall that the Cabinet paid more
attention to expre ssions of opposition to Zionism when they came from
Jews than when they came from Arabs , whose land the Cabi net was illegally

bartering away in the style of nineteenth century imperial diplomacy.
One decision of the War Cabinet declared, "Before coming to a decision
(the Cabinet) should hear the views of representative Zionists as well
as of those who held the opposite opinion, and that meanwhile the
declaration, as read by Lord Milner, should be submitted confidentially
to a) President Wilson, b) leaders of the Zionist Movement, c ) repre
sentative persons in Anglo-Jewry opposed to Zionism . .. See PRO CAB 23/ .
The Cabinet simply ignored the Arabs whose land they were arbi tarily 4
giving to the Zionists as their "national home. "
39stein, op. cit. , p. 522.
40Levin, op. cit. , p . 196.
41-Ibid. , p. 197.
42Ibid . ,

P•

198.

43Ibid.
44Ibid. The suggestion of 0Jewish people" actually came from
Brandeis in the United States.
45The Council of the English Zionist Federation with Weizmann pre
siding decided on Jewish pressure group tactics on October 1 1 . Weizmann
attempted in a letter to Herbert Samuel of October 18 ( the day Montagu
sailed for India) to reach a 0satisfactory arrangement" with anti
Zionists Sir Phillip Nagnus and Sir Stuart Samuel but this also failed.
46Weizmann, Trial and Err'or, p. 242. The First World War had enabled the Zionist movement to illegally extract the Balfour Declaration
with its ambiguous "Jewish national home0 idea. The intended ambiguity
of the Balfour Declaration (and the Palestine Mandate ) had served the
Zionist purpose. It would still take the Second World War to bring
the opportunity for the exclusive Judenstaat which was the Zioni st
goal . As for example, on April 28, 1944, Weizmann, contrary to his
officious denials of Palestine becoming a Jewish State during the dec
laration' s negotiations (along with Sokolov' s public denial ) , while
dining with :Dri ti sh Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, a member of the
British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and Chief Political
Officer in Palestine and Syria 1919-20, disclosed his desire for the
whole of Palestine as a Jewish State. See Meinertzhagen, Middle East
Diary 1917-1956, pp. 191-92. When Weizmann was asked why he had
favored partition under the Peel Plan of 1937, he declared that he had
done so because "he knew that war was inevitable and he thought that
if there was only a small Jewish Palestine, the Jews might have gained
by conquest what they wanted in a general world ·war." Yet, conversely,

.. - -
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he would cunningly declare a few years later to the Uni ted Nations
Specia;J. Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) "With regard to Zionism employing
organized Jewish terrori sm in Palestine often under Jewish Agency
direction in order to forcefully di�ve out the mandatory administra
tion in direct violation of the Palestine Mandate and international
law, "I hang my head in shame when I have to speak of thi s fact before
you.
See 'Ihe Guardian, November 23, 1974, p. 16, Wei zmann was
President of the World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency for
Pa} 0st1ne from 1921 to 1931 and again from 1935 to 1946.
ti

47
weizmann, Trial and Error, p . 419.
48
Ex:cellent reading selections are : David Ben-Gurion, tlBri tain s
Contribution to Arming the Hagana, ti Jewish Observer and the Middle
East · Review, Septem�r · 20, 1963, pp. 13-14. As chairman of the Jewish
Agency for Palestine, 1935-48, he wrote, tl'Ihe most successful and com
plete cooperation between the Jews and the British was achieved with
the establishment of Special Night Squads by a distinguished Briti sh
Officer, Captain Charles Orde Wingate. This was a practical step to
wards the establishment of a Jewish military force within the frame
work of the British Army.
See Leonard Mosley, Gideon Goes to War
(London: Arthur Barker Ltd . , 1955) , Chapter 4, 110rde Wingate and
Moshe Dayan 1938, ti who wrote tl'Ihe first occasion Wingate chose to take
the Jews into action against the Arabs caused one of the biggest rows
in the history of the Palestine Mandate , and nearly got him sacked on
the spot. t1 See David Ben-Gurion, t1Qur Friend : What Wingate Did For
Us, " Jewish Observer and Mi.ddle East Review, · September 27, 1963,
pp. 15-16. Ben-Gurion wrote : "The disturbance in Palestine brought
(Wingate) back to the East. In the autumn of 1937, Wingate was posted
to an intelligence unit at Haifa. He sought contact with the Jews,
and met Emanuel Wilenski, head of the Hagana' s Intelligence Service • • • •
A short time later, Wingate ·met Dr. Weizmann, myself, Shertok (later
renamed Sharett) and Eliahu Golomb (a founder of the Haganah and mem
ber of its High Command ) . He told us of his plans for the establi sh
ment of a Jewish Army • • • , " The Hagana' s Special Night Squads were
broken up as World War II approached although the Jewish Agency still
used these uni ts as part of the overall Jewish underground army assaults
against the British administration in Palestine from 1939-1948 and
against the Palestinian Arab population.
•

ti

49

wingate ' s superior officers of the Palestine Mandate administra
tion recorded in his service file, t1Qrde Wingate , D . S . O . A good sol
dier, but as far as Palestine i s concerned he i s a security risk, and
not to be trusted. Places the interests of the Jews before the interests
of his own country. Not to be permitted to enter Palestine again . "
See Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, September 27, 1963, p . 16.
Ben-Guri on, who collaborated with Wingate in the latter 1930' s, wrote
of Wingate ' s military assistance to the Hagana, . tl'Ihe Hagana ' s best
officers were trained in the special Night Squads, and Wingate ' s doc-
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trines were taken over by the Israel Defense Forces, which were estab

lished twelve days after the birth of the Jewi sh State" ( i bid . , p . 16 ) .
Wingate, chief trai ner of Hagana ' s young officers who were chosen from
all distri cts in Palestine and convened at Ei n Hared on September 13,
1938, declared a t a parting meeting with the Hagana elite, " I am being
sent away because we are too good friends.
'!hey want to strike at me
and at you.
But I promise you I will come ta.ck, and i f I cannot do i t
in the regular way, I will come ta.ck as an illegal immigrant" ( i bid . ,
P• 16) .
-

50At this time Amery was Secretary of St:ate for India.

On Septem

ber 29, 1938, Wingate was ordered home to England from Ein Hared; he
departed Palestine on October 12 and returned in December of 1938
but was not penni tted to return to his chief training functi ons at
.
Eln Hared .

1
5 see Martin Gilbert, Winston s . Churchil l , Vol . III : 'Ihe Challenge
of War 191�1916 ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co . , 1971 ) .
)�on-Commissioned Officers.
See Robert John and Sarni Hadawi ,
'!he Pale stine Diar
1 14-194 , Vol . I : Bri tai n ' s Involvement (New York :
New World Press, 1970 , p . 335.
Haining personally disagreed with
the appoi ntment of Wingate ' s role, but w1 th Prime Ninister Winston
Churchill ' s support ( Churchill agreed with Wei zmann ' s Jewish Anny and

Jewish State proposi tion at their private me�ting on December 17, 1939
when he was still not elected to lead the Bri tish Governmen t ) , Haining
went along with the trai ning proj ect.
53At thi s time Weizmann was president of the World Zionist Organi
zation and Palestine Jewish �gency •
.54Dill was appointed C . I . G. S . in May,
55rbid . , P •

1940.

335·

6
5 while Weizmann presented a memorandum to Churchill for Sir John
Dill, C . I . G . S . , at their meeting at Brendan Bracken , the Bri tish Colo
nial Office insi sted that there should be approximate pari ty i n the
number of Jews and Arabs recruited for uni ts i n Palestine.
Weizmann
despaired because according to his memorandum he wanted the following:
(a) recrui tment of the greatest possible number of Jews in Palestine
for the fighting servi ces, to be formed into Je�sh battalions or larger
formati ons; ( b ) officer cadres , suffi cient for a Jewish division in the
first instance, to be picked immediately from Jews in Palestine, and
trai ned in Egypt; ( c ) the formation of a Jewish "desert uni t" ; ( d ) the
recrui tment of Jewish refugees i n England ( for the Jewish uni ts in the
�[ddle East ) .
The codicil to this request was that the Jewicll units

be exclusively Jewish and totally separated from Palestine Arab mili tary
units.
Interestingly, to the Jewish Stern terrori st group, whi ch had

1 4J

the quiet support of the Palestine Jewish Agency officials, mili tary
cooperation td th the British was absurd .
Stern, their leader, directly
stated that his group would fight not only the Bri tish in Palestine
but Dri tish imperialism everywhere .
By now i t i s well known that their
methods were terrori stic as well against the Palestinian Arabs because
the Sternists did not mince words about their desire for a "Jewish"
State over Palestine .
For them, there was a war only between Jews
and goyim (non-Jews which included Arabs ) .
5
7AJnery ' s pro-Zionism predates 1914,
cussed in this paper •

though that phase i s not dis

�

8
.5 Public Records Offi e , Foreign Offi ce, 371/3384.
Amery, while
in the Cablnet Secretari at, submitted a memorandum in January, 1917,
which argued that Bri tain should do all in her powers to obtain " a
continuity of territory or of control both i n East Africa and between
Egypt and Indi a . "
59

weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 260.

6 0stein, op. cit. , p . 531

62w

. Thomas Mallison, Jr . , " 'Ihe Bal.four Declarati on: An Appraisal
in International Law , "
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod , ed . , '!he Transfonnation o f
Palestine ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p . 84.
6

�etter to the American· Council for Judaism from Parker T. Hart,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
United States Department of State, on November 12, 1959 ·
Hart was
speci fying " the status of American citizens of the Jewish fai th0 because
Israel was still attempting to involuntarily impose the "Jewish people"
Zionist concept upon Americans of the Jewish religion.
64i.etter from the Uni ted States Department of State to the American
Council for Judaism dated April 20, 1964, and addressed to Rabbi El�er
Berger ( then executive vice president o f the American Council for Judai sm )
by Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Tal bot.
See Whiteman, Digest of
International Law, VIII, (1967 ) , p . 35.
This letter was drafted for
Tal bot by the Legal Adviser' s office.
65
A decision of mandatory powers including the Uni ted States was made
on April 25, 1920, "to accept the tenns of the mandate s ' articles as
given below with reference to Palestine on the .understanding that there
was inserted in the proces-verbal an undertaking by the mandatory powers
that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed
by the non-Jewish communi ties in Palestine. H
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66

For American constitutional law prohi bi tions against religious

discriminati on, see Cantwell v . Connecticut, J10 U . S . 296 (1940 ) ;
Hackworth , Dige::;t of International Law, Vol . III (Washington , D . C . :
U . S . Dept. of State , 1942), p . J52; Adler and Margali th, With Firmne ss
in the Ri ht: American Di lomatic Action Affectin
Jews 1840-1 4
1946 , pp. 249 , 250, 251; ·..r . Thomas Mallison, Jr. , "Zionist-I srael
Claims on ' The Jewish People ' Are Unconstitutional , " Issues (publi shed
by the American Council for Judai sm ) , Winter, 1962-196J , p p . 1 - 1 6 , 1 2 ;
Lurie v . Uni ted State s , 2J1 U . S . 9 (191 J ) ; M . Cherif Bassiouni and Eugene
M. Fisher, "'Ihe Arab-Israeli Conflict--Real -and Apparent Issue s : An
Insight Into Its Future From the Lessons of the Past , " St. Johns Law
Revi ew, January, 1970, pp. 41 5-424, 415; M. Panhuys, 'Ihe Role of Nationality
in International Law (19 59 ) .
Axiomatic knowledge o f the American
constituti onal system declares that the Government has the legal obligation
to pro tect the citizen ' s undivided citi zenship/nationality status, and
that the citizen has the right and duty of undivided national attachment
to the Uni ted States soverei gnty.
The only recognized exception to the

undivlded nationali ty/ci tizenship status of the Uni ted States citizen
is the legal status of dual nationality (jure sanguini s ) in whi ch case
the Unt ted St.a.+.es recogni zes the le g
a
l status of dual nationality with
certain juridical limitations and qua
'Ihe Zioni st-Israel
lifications .
claimed system of transnational legal "rights" and "obligations0 to be
arrogated upon and arbitrarily exacted from United States citizens of
Jewish religion has nothing in common with the recognized le�l exception
of dual nationality.

6
71ord Curzon , at the War Cabinet meeting of October 4, "urged strong
objections upon practical grounds" to the Milner draft proposal and the
Milner-Amery redraft proposal .
'Ihe minutes of the meeting show that
Curzon asked, 0How was 1 t proposed to get rid of the existing majority
of Mussulman (Palestinian Arab peopl e ) inhabi tants and to introduce the
Jews i n their place? • • • To secure for the Jews already in Palestine equal
civil and religious rights seemed to him a better policy than to aim
at repatri ation on a large scale ( i . e . , a Jewish State over Palestine ) .
He regarded ( the Jewish State Zionist scheme ) • • • as sentimental idealism,
whi ch would never be realized, and that ( Britain) • • • should have nothing
Incidentally, two weeks after the 1918 Armi stice Lord
to do w1 th i t . "
Curzon , a member of the War Cabinet who succeeded Bal four as British
Foreign Secretary, stated categori cally: '"Ihe Palestine situation i s
thi s .
I f we deal wi th our commi tments, there i s first the general
pledge to Hussain i n October, 1915, under which Pal estine was included
in the areas to whi ch Bri tain pledged itself that they should be Arab
and independent i n the future . "
See Public Records Offi ce document
CAB 27/24.
68

For an excellent legal explication of this contemporary internati onal
law doctrine see Bassiouni and Fisher, i bid . , pp. 415-424.
Also see
Elmer Berger, The Jewish Dilemma (New York : The. Devin-Adair Co . , 1946 ) ,
The Zionist concept of a
"Part I : The Myth of ' a Jewh;h People . "'
subjective "Jewish nation, 0 existing through more than 20 centuri e s
without tarri tory, government, or poitical continuity, and imposing
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limitati ons and obligati ons upon all adherents of the Jewish religious
faith, regardl ss of ethnic origin, choice of nationality or time of
conversi on to Judaism (or for that matter continued adherence to Judai sm),
has no foundation or precedent i n any recognized legal doctrine ; more
over, as early as 191 7 , in the second safeguard claune of the Balfour
Declarati on, the British Government denied its acceptance as ei ther
a legal or politi cal d�ctrine.
69

weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 261.
proposal herein .

See also the Zionist draft

70weizmann was agreeing t o the change sugge sted by Louis ::Bran.d eis.
71weizmann, op. ci t . , p . 261.

Emphasi s mine.

72Ma.llison, 'Ihe Balfour Declarati on, op.

ci t . , p. 9 3 .

7Jwi th the exc�ption o f the sirigula_r word "civil . "
7�feizmann, op. ci t . , p . 301.
Also see Lloyd George, Peace Treaties,
p . 1139·
Balfour was still the Foreign Se cretary at thi s ti;;ie .
75president Wilson ' s Consultant at the Paris Peace Conference i n 1919.
76Bri tish diplomat, later Conservative Member of Parliament, 1921-1937 .
??Chairman of Provisional Commission for General Zionist Affai rs,
Uni ted States, 1914-1916 and Associate Justi ce , Supreme Court of United
State s, 1916-1939 .
For the full
78Publi c Records Offi c e , Foreign Offi ce 8 00/21 7 .
Frankfurter memorandum of the meeting see Walid Khalid! , ed . , From Haven
to Conquest (Beirut: '!he Institute For Pal estine Studi e s , 19 7 1), pp.
195-200.
79see &1.win Montagu' s memorandum entitled "The Anti-Semitism of the
Pre sent Government , " Public Records Offi c e , Cabinet No. 24/24 (August
23, 191 7 ) .
80Paul Goodman, ed . , Chaim Weizmann (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd . ,
1945 ) , p . 203.
One of the principal purposes of the iterated claims
to "the Jewi sh people" i s to obtain the assent of governments other
than the Government of Israel through the implied processes of agreement
of customary in.ternational law even though such other governments have
never over the past seven decades given express international agreement
to the Zionist entity of "the Jewish people . "
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8 1'1h e harshest martial forms of nationalism and ethnocentrism are

Israel ' s fundamental
to be found i n the early history of Judai sm.
Zionism proceeds from
laws are "based upon classic Zionist ideology.
the social experiences of those Jewish inhabitants (by reli gion) of
Russia and Poland whose unassimilated condi tion (which was as much
desired ) , great numbers and dense aggregation had given them the im
Hence, they responded i n
pression of being a separate nationality.
stinctively to the two political impulses of the European world of the
nineteenth century , nationalism and expansi on by colonizati on.
'!he
case was in no way altered by the recognized fact that the Jewish
nati onalists exploited Jewish religious sentiment about Zion and
"Israel" in the same way that the promoters of the crusades had once
exploited Chri stian feelings about the tomb of the Redeemer and other
Chri stian symbolisms in Jerusalem and the Holy Land .
· 82'1h
e anti-Zionist Jewish interventioni sts did extrapolate "the
Jewish people" Zioni st concept without the willingness of the Zioni st
negotiators to lend cooperative apprai sal to Zionist jargon .
.
83weizmann de�lared, " I t i s one of the ' i fs ' o f history whether we

should have been intransigent, and stood by our guns.
Should we then
have obtained a better statement? • • • Our judgment was to accept, to
press for rati fication , "

See Trial and Error,

84see W. Thomas Mallison,

Jr. ,

p . 261.

"Zionist..:.rsrael Claims On ' 'lbe Jewish

People ' Are Unconstitutional , " Issues, Winter, 1962-196 3 , pp. 1-16.
An interesting picture of Zionist support among anti or pro-Zionist
Jews i s given by Herbert Adams Gibbons ("Zionism and the World Peace , "
'lbe Century Illustrated I·�onthly Magazine, January, 1919) who covered

the Pari s Peace Conference< " • • • Jewish friends have been urging me for
a year to wri te for publication what I have said i n private conversation
about the danger to the world from the erection of a Zionist state in
Palestine.
When the idea of a Zioni st state i n Palestine is broached,
I have found opinions strongly pro and strongl y contra among Ameri can
Jews, mostly pro among Bri tish Jews, and mo stly contra among French
Promi nent Jews in the i ntellectual and busi ness and commercial
Jews.
world, whose names and statements appear i n Zionist publications i n favor
of the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour letter, have assured me
privately that they view the whole ( Zioni s t ) movement with the gravest

misgivings, and that they openl y sponsor the project simpl y because at
the pre sent moment no Jew can without inj ury to himself throw cold water
on Zionism" ( p . J70 ) .
'lbe "Zionist interpretation of the Balfour letter"
i s also clarified by Gibbons: " • • • the Zionists have not interpreted the
declaration of the Rritsh Government according to its clear wordi ng.
From the day of its publication they have l ooked upon the letter • • • as
official Bri tish sanction to the establishment of a Jewish state in
Palestine by means of wholesale immigration and buyi ng up of the land.
'Ibey consider it as a recognition of Jewish nationality in the sense
of separate political and civil status for the Jew from the international

point of view" (p. J69 ) .
Gibbons also states: "The Grand Rabbi of France
stated a few months ago that there are only a hundred thousand Zionists i n
the world outside of America,

Russian or Rumanian origin •

that most of the Zionists i n li...rance are of

• • • "

(p.

371 ) .
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8 5see Criminal Case No. 40/61 (Di stri ct Court Jerusalem,

Israe l ,

December 11-12, 196 1 ) , aff ' d , Criminal App. N o . J36/61 ( Supreme Court,
Israel , May 29, 1962 ) .
I t has already been shown that the British
Cabinet rejected the Zionist claim.
86weizmann, Trial and Error , p . 260.

8911 I t i s one of the ' ifs' o f history whether we should have been

intransigent, and stood by our guns.
Should we then have obtained
a better statement? • • • Our judgment was to accept, to press for
rati fication."
Ibid . , p . 261.
90
Ibid. , p . 207.
91

Ingrams , op. ci t . , p . 17-18 •

92

The writer has no idea where the phrase "political proml se clause"
ori ginated and ls not parti cularly concerned w1 th i t s derivation because
the historical explication of the evolution of the Declaration reveals
that "His Majesty ' s Government view with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" is not a promi se.
93
Klaus J . Herrmann,

"Poli tical Response to the P,alfour Declaration
in Imperial Germany : German Judai sm , " The Middle East Journal , Summer,
1965, pp. 303-320.
See the section of the article subti tled Counter
acting the Balfour Declarati on, pp. 313-320.
94
Ronald Storrs ,

The Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York: Arno

Pre ss, 1972 ) , p . 358; Doreen Ingrams,
Offi c e , CAB. 27/23.

op. ci t . ,

p. 20, 2 2 ; Public Records

95

nalfour was prepared to concede the Zionist-sought "principle" of
the reconstitution of Palestine as the national home of the Jews; when
thi s failed he was privately prepared, regardless of the Balfour
Declarati on, to furti vely assist Zionism in Palestine .
Interestingly,
Herbert Samuel , himself a leading Zionist and one of the first to insist
that the Bri tish Cabi net favor Zionism, interpreted the Declarati on i n
a speech i n the House of Lord s April 23, 1947, a s not agreeing t o the
creation of a Jewish State over Palesti ne.
Samuel stated , "The Jewish
State • • • i s not contained in the Balfour Declaration . • • . 'nlere was no
promise of a Jewish State .
What was promi sed was that the Bri tish
Government would favour the creation of a Jewish National Home--the
term was most carefully chosen--in Pal estine .

'Ihe Declarati on did not

say that Palestine should be the Jewish National Home ,

but that i t favoured

a Jewish National Home in Palestine, without prejudice to the civil and

reli gious rights of the Arab population. "

This quote l s taken from

'
1 48

Vi scount Samuel ' s speech in the Palestine Debate i n the House of Lords,
Samuel was appointed Bri tish High Commi ssioner to
April 23, 1947.
Palestine under the Mandate from 1920 to 1925.
96

see Elie Kedouri e ,

Middle Eastern Studi es,

"Sir Ma.rk Syke s and Palestine 1915-1 6 , "

Vol . 6 , No.

J, pp. )40-)45.

97
onnsby-Gore was not ooing candid because he ignored his own role
and the British-Zioni st entrenous which developed much earlier than
April 24, 1917.
98
Public Record.s Office,

Cal::d. net Papers, 24/158.

99

Graham is privately descriood by Weizmann as "of considerable
See Trial and Error,
help in bri nging about the Balfour Declaration . "
page 23 1 .
Graham was in the confidence of Sir Mark Sykes and was
of unfailing help to the Zionists.
100Ingrams,

op. ci t . , p . 8 .
declaration in July.

Zionists drafted their versions of the

1 01Public Records Office, Cabinet Papers, 23/4.
l

02
I bi d .

'

1 03public Records Offi ce,

Forei gn Offi ce,

37 1/3054.

104Public Records Offi ce, Cabinet Papers, 23/4.
Lord Curzon agreed
with Balfour by stating " that he admi tted the force of the diplomatic
arguments in favour of expressing sympathy" with the Zionists' aims.
1 05Ibid.
1 06Rooort John and Sarni Hadawi , 'Ihe Palestine Diary 1914-1945,
Vol . I (New York: New World Press, 1970), p . 72.
The approach to the
Zioni st movement by Mark Sykes, as repre sentative of the Bri tish
Government, began as early as four days after Bri tai n' s declaration
of war on Turkey in Novemoor of 1914.
The informal committee of Zionists
and Ma.rk Syke s met privately on February 7, 1917, at the house of .Moses
Gaster, the ( Roumani an) Chief Rabbi of the Sephard.i c (Spanish and
Portuguese) congregations in England .
Gaster opened the meeting with
a statement that stressed Zionist support for Bri tish strategic i nterests
in Palestine which were to be an integral part of the agreement be tween
them .
Sykes, Balfour, Lloyd George and Churchill , as claimed in their
subsequent statements, were of the opinion that proclaimed Allied sup

port for Zionist aims would especially inf1.uence the United Gtates to

play an active and major role in the war and would have a strong

political repercussion i n Russia and with the Central Powers of Germany
and Austro-Hungarian.
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0
i 7Re ort of the Twelfth Zionist Consrre t; s (London: Central Office
of the Zionist Organization, 1922 , p . lJff.
108stein, 1he Balfour Declaration, p . 25.
109see for example , Norman Bentwich, Palestine of the Jews
(London,
1919 ) , p. 195·
Bentwich, a Zionist Jew who held for several years
the offi ce of Attorney General of Palestine guring the Mandate,
declared on a number of occasions that Zioni st/Jewish sovereignty
was no part of the "Jewish national home" i n Palestine.
1 0
1 Public Records Offi c e , Cabinet Papers, 24/159 .
For an academic
perspective of the interest of the Central Powers i n their own version
of a declaration as an effort to their war plans see Klaus J . Herrmann,
op. ci t . , pp. 303-320.
1here is no doubt that the declaration had
Balfour re
substantial propaganda value to Bri tain and the Alli e s .
cognized the propaganda value of the declarati on.
So did Lloyd George .
Propaganda reasons are referred to i n . the ESCO Study at page 1 1 7 :
"1he essential reason, accounts agree , ·was strategic a nd had t o do
with the need of strengthening :Sri tai n ' s 11-feline to the East . "
And
at page 118 : "Through the Balfour Declaration Great Erl tain ultimately
strengthened and extended her position in the whole Near Eas t . "

The Lasswell study, Propaganda Technique in the ':1orld War (1927 ) ,
declares at page 176: "General Ludendorff regarded the Balfour
Declaration as the cleverest thing done by ·the Allies in the nature
of war propaganda and lamented the fact that Germany had not thought
of i t first . "
See Stein, op. cit. , pp. 533-542 concerning Zionist

contacts with the German Government during the war .
A cauti ous German
Government wartime statement concerning Zionists and Palestine, i ssued
on January 8 , 1918, i s quotsd. i n Stein at pages 602-603 •
.

1 1 1 eurzon asked : " ( a ) What i s the meaning of the phrase ' a nati onal
home for the Jewish race i n Palestine ' , and what i s the nature of the
obligation that we shall assume i f we accept this as a principle o f
British policy?"
Strangely, Curzon, the anti -Zionist opponent of the
Balfour Declarati on and the Jewish State scheme in Palestine, and who
had vetoed a knighthood for Weizmann in 1920, declared to the Cabinet
in 1923 that i t would be impossible for any Brl ti sh Government to with
draw from the pro-Zionist policy "wi thout a substantial sacrifice of
Ironi cally, Curzon
consistency and self-respect if not of honour . "
added to Zionist allurements: "1hose of us who have disliked the policy
Quotes are taken from Bernard
are not prepared to make that sacri fice. ti
Wasserstein, "A Vision of Mount Zion, ti The Guardian, November 23, 19 74,
p. 15.
For Curzon ' s criticisms o f the Zionist Palestine scheme see
Ingram s, op. cit.
112Taylor, Prelude to I::;rae.l , p . 24.
It was c·. P . Scott, the
publisher of The t·lanchester Guardian who opened the doors of Downi ng

Street to Weizmann.
In December, 1914, Scott introduced Wei zmann to
Lloyd George .
That was only the beginning of Scott' s help.
He advised

Weizmann how to play hi8 card s in the hlgh level poll tics of the Bri tish
Government.

Scott told him,

for instance, how Lloyd George i�nored

letters but answered telegrams and how l';alfour' s "indolence" left him
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in the hands of his officials. Scott personally lobbied his important
friends in the Cabinet on behalf of the Jewish national home in
Palestine.
113
Ingrams, op. ci t . , p . 6 1 . We must recall that this private declaration of British intention came after the issuance of the Balfour
Declaration.

CHAPTER V I

THE MANDATES SYSTEM
In the Autumn of 1921 I returned to London where I was called
to supervi se the drafting of the covenant of the· British Man
date in Palestine .
The rough draft should have been submi tted
to the League of Nations i n order that i t might adopt a reso
lution upon i t .
Afterwards the Conferenc e of St. Remo approved
the very idea of the Mandate . 1
--Chaim Wei zmann
'J.he mandate specifically aims at an independent and eventually
2
self-governing Palestinian state or ' commonweal th'
.

•

•

•

--Sir Eri c Graham Forbes Adam

I feel there are no further observations that I can usefully
o:ffer on this oft-redrafted ( the Palestine Mandate) document.
All that now remains i s , i f your Lordship approves, to submi t
i t to the Cabinet, after first showing it to the Zioni sts . )
--Lord Robert Gilbert Vansittart
The hi story of Palestine from the insti tution of the mandate
until 1939 was the history of an Arab people i n almost continuous

re-

bellion as they saw themselves gradually subjugated by piecemeal Zionist
.

conquest which became full mili tary conquest in 1947-48.

Over the period

from 1920 to 1948 the Palestinian people observed their right to selfdetermination being systematically denied by Bri tish deference to world
Zionism and minority status imposed upon them through the mandatory' s
military occupati on.

Remembering the natural and legal rights of the

Palestinian Arab people even in the juridical context of the Covenant,
Arti cle 5 of the Palestine Mandate legally assured the native inhabitants
that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine
territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under control
.·
of, the Government of any foreign Power. "
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Through the incremental Zionist
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fai ts accomplis under Bri tish administration during the mandate period,
the Zionists began gradually to translate the idea of "a national home"
in the Balfour Declaration into an exclusivist sovereign Jewish state ;
in 1947 ,

the Zionists accepted the principle of a "Jewish" state but kept

silent on its extent and boundari es, and shortly before the Bri tish Mandate arbi trarily tenninated ,

the Zioni sts began to expel the Palestinians
.

and made an all-out effort to grab the whole of Palestine and face the
world with an ill egal fai t accompli .

But the fai ts accomplis of I srael

still do not constitute a norm for international law.

With this cognizance

in mind we can proceed to analyze the legal interpretation of the mandates
system because the modern probl em of Palestine involves certai n legal
i ssues which i t i s essential to decide authori tatively before any solution
consi stent w1 th international law and justice can be reached. 4
Brierly asserts that there are certain modes of acquiring territory, the most important modes being categori zed as occupation,
conquest, prescription,

and accretion . 5

But,

at Versailles,

cession,

the Entente

Powers implemented a new political facade for acqui ring terri tories,

the

mandates system .
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the colonizing
states of Europe introduced fo:ms of staking out their claims in territori es where for one reason or another they were for the time being
able or unwilling to make an effective physi cal occupation.
devi ces, besides colonial protectorates ,
came the mandates.

un-

Among these

spheres of influence, and leases,

But Arti cle 22 of the Covenant of the League of

Nations created a new status for terri tories surrendered by Ge:many and
Turkey to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers ,
Powers being the Uni ted States, Great Bri tain,

these wartime

France, Italy and Japan .

ii

'lhe guiding principle of the new institution was declared to be that the
•::·

It
ll'·

�,'.·..' .

;
·

well-being of these peoples formed a "sacred trust of civilization" ; and
this trust was to be carried out by placing them under the "tutelage" of
different members of the League as "mandatories on behalf of the League . "
Of the thirteen mandates, divided into three classes known as A, B and C,
the British mandate over Palestine (which included the a.rea known as Transjordan) was in the A class. 6

.

These A class mandate countries were described

in ·the Covenant, not very ingenuously, as "independent nations", but
"subject to the rendering of admini strative advice and assistance until
such time as they

are

able to stand alone . "

The mandatory state, unlike

a protecting state , was in theory disinterested, and 1 t assumed obligations
both to the population under mandate and to the League .

'!be Palestine man-

date became anomalous in that the party i ssuing the very poll tical Balfour
Declaration was not selected as the mandatory state by the Palestinian
people and Bri tain unilaterally imposed the establishment therein of a
"Jewish national home" , a policy which the mandatory power confUsingly
had

to reconcile w1 th 1 ts more important and obviously preeminent legal

obligation to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine .
The mandatory system was supposedl y inst! tuted as an attempt to
deal w1 th one of the most difficult of world pro bl.ems in the post-war
period; namely, how to interrupt the Powers' competition for Turkish and
Gennan terri torial

war

spoils while still imparting some sort of agreed

entrenous for acquiring administrative control in the fonner enemy terri tortes,

The mandatory system had some curious dichotomies; for example ,

the Covenant provided that the wishes of the communities were to be the
principal consideration in the selection of Class A mandatories, but
actual selection was made by the Allied Powers alone.

Moreover, if the
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system was considered to be a good one or legally impartial why was i t
limited to ex-Gennan and Turkish terri tortes?

Another interesting failure,

as i f intended , was that the League had strangely no power to coerce a
mandatory power or to verify its reports by direct investigation; i t had
to rely on public opinion and the spirit of willing cooperation to make
its criticisms effective.

Thus Bri tain was knowingly left to administer
.

the Palestine Mandate in anyway i t so detennined.
On

the mandate system there had been much discussion of the

question of sovereignty over mandated territori es; for example the cyclical argument goes "did i t reside in the League?"

But the League did

not appoint the mandatory powers, hence i t cannot revoke the mandates,
or at any rate it cannot do so at discretion, and it exercised no governing powers i n the terri tori.es or over the mandatory powers.

But the man-

datory must account for its actions, the te?:ritories were not annexed to
mandatory dominions, and the populations did not take the mandatory' s
nationality.

It would appear that the powers exercised by the mandatory

states were supposedly inconsistent with any eventual solution to the
tennination of mandates.

ActUally, the mandates were quite clear i n

tenns o f the eventual self-detennination o f the people in the territories.
But this clarl ty came only from the International Courts of both the League
and United Nations era although we may include the treaty obligation proposed by the Pennanent Mandates Commi ssion, adopted by the League Council
and accepted juridically by all the League members.
'!'he League of Nations was an association of states which, while
retaining their respective sovereignty, agreed . wi th one another to pursue
a certain juridical line of conduct on the international mandates system
as laid down in the Covenant Article

22: this i nstrument became the legal

.1 55

international convention ( treaty) through which the indigenous occupants
of all the mandated areas occupied a new position in international law
and received a new international legal status, this being adopted by the
Council in April 1923.7 'Ihe Council accepted with slight modifications
the following draft resulution of the Permanent Mandates Commi ssion:
The Council of the League of Nations,
Having considered the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on
the national status of the inhabi tants of terri tories under B and C
mandates.
I� accordance with the principles laid down in Article 22 of the
Covenant : Resolves as follows :
( 1 ) The status of the native inhabitants of a mandated territory i s
di stinct from that of the nationals of the Mandatory Power and can
not be identified therewith by any process having general application.
( 2 ) The native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not invested
with the · nationality of the Mandatory Power by reason of the protection extended. to them.
(3) It is not inconsistent with ( 1 ) and (2) above that individual
inhabitants of the mandated territory should voluntarily obtain
naturali zation from the Mandatory Power in accordance wi �h arrange
ments which i t i s open to such Power to make, with this object under
its own law.
(4) It is desirable that native inhabitants who receive the protection
of the Mandatory Power should in each case be designated by some form
of descriptive title which will specify their status under the mandate . a
The members of the League accepted this resolution and inasmuch
as A terri torles by Article 22 were provisionally recogni zed as independent nations, the international legal principle adopted in this resolution
applied to the Palestine Mandate. 9 Its relevancy to the A mandates was
not discussed by the Council and Permanent Mandates Commission because
i t was already presumed that A mandated territories approximated indepen
dent states. 1 0 With regard to Palestine, the juridical precedent explicitly establishing the precise position of the B and C mandated territories
in the juridical principle on the question of the occupants' legal status
was later applied to the Palestinian people .
The :British legal code for administering the Palestine Mandate
was called the Palestine Order-in-Council instituted in 1922.

Legal

citizenship qualifications were created under the Palestinian Citi zenship
Order-in-Council , 1925: the provisions of this Order were based upon the
Treaty of Lausanne and Arti cle 7 of the Palestine Mandate which declared
that "The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting
a nationality law.

'!here shall be included in this law provisions framed

so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestine citi zenship by Jews who

d

take up their pennanent residence in Pale tine . .. 1 1

This article i s un-

equiv0cal that the nationality i s the Palestinian nationality, and that
the Jews who took up their pennanent residence in Palestine--even against
the collective will of the Palestinian inhabitants--could take up this
nationality. 12

Explicitly, Article t �f the Palestinian Citizenship

Order, 1925, declares that
Turki sh subj ects habitually resident in the territory of Palestine
upon the 1 st day of August, 1925, shall become Palestinian .citizens. 1 J
The extent of the open violation of the Palestine citi zenship
laws by immigrant Jews i s revealed by the fact that, al though Brl tain in
1922 and 1939 specifically _rejected the notion that Jewish immigration
could be allowed against the will of the Arab inhabitants when i t reached
such proportions as to change the Arab character of Palestine, 14 i t i s
estimated that over one-half of the 700 , 000 persons of Jewish faith present in Palestine in 1947 who were estimated to consti tute some 45 per
cent of the entire population of Palestine were not Palestinian nationals .
Palestinian nationality did not exist and was

so

15

recorded on official doc-

uments including passports , which were i ssued only to Palestine ' s nationals .
Noting that the Palestine nationality entity was juridically implemented
and recognized by the international community through the League and
United Nations as well as other non-member states and assuming, therefore,
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the validity of the estimate that only one-half or approximately 350, 000
persons of the Jewish faith were Palestinian nationals

( this

estimate in-

eludes those who completed immigration requirements and were eligible for
Palestinian nationality ) , less than one-third of the entire population

�

l.i1

I

dictated

( and

by armed force ) the outcome of. .the future of Palestine

against the express will of two-thirds of ·the remaining legitimate na-

"

tionals.

This i s not considered in international law a valid expression

of self-determination
tionment of

56

( even

less justi ft.able i s the terrl tori.al appor-

per cent of Palestine to a "Jewish" state which would

have included a 50 per cent Arab population with the Jews owning less
.

.

than 10 per cent of the total land area where they were to be established
as the ruling body--a settlement which no self-respecting iri.1.igenous people
could accept from an alien immigrant population ) .

By denying the Palestinian

Arabs, who fonned over two-thirds majority of the country--actually a
larger majority percentage when the number of illegal and non-national
Jewish faction i s consider�d--the ri gh t to decide the question of self
detennination, the Uni ted Nations had violated its own Charter. 16

In

international law, the de facto presence of illegal occupants who are nonnationals cannot be given de jure recogni tion neither by the United Nations
in a parti tion plan predicated on the basi s of a semblance of application
of a right of self-determination nor under the indigenous circumstances
of municipal naturali zation/citizenship legal provisions, especially in
the case of Palestine where the nationality statutes were invoked by the
international conv ention of the Palestine Mandate.

In effect, and i n

violation o f international law, the United Nati ons nullified the
Palestinians' right to implement self-detennination by including i n the
category of people eligible to vote persons

( nonnationals )

who did not
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prefer nor qualify under the Palestinian nationality legal criterion.
Another often overlooked violation of international law which
illegally impaired the legitimate right to the exercise of self-detennination to the indigenous Arab population of Palestine previous to the
radical Zionist mill tacy demographic transfomation in

1947-48 lies in

the violation of the international mandates system and its successor
the Uni ted Nations trusteeship system.

'lhese systems did not juridically

envi sion, nor did they in legal theory pennit, a trust terri tory to be so
irregularly administered by a mandatory as to allow an imposed or forceful demographic transfomation designed to radically and irreparably
alter the indigenous character of that terri tory and change its population
for aliens.

To allow a trustee to inject aliens into the population of

trust territori es against the will of the original native people and to
subsequentl y recogni ze in these aliens the ·same rights as i n the original
native people i s a flagrant violation of the mandate and trusteeship
system .

For the United Nations to then act on the basis of these illegally

imposed cond.1 tions is in

gravest

manifest derogation of its international

juridical obligations to the original indigenous population and their legit
imate rights already insti tuted by the international convention
whi ch were to be guarded as a "sacred trust . "

( treaty ) ,

To be i n accoroance with

legitimate criteria determined by the juridical rights and obligations
stemming from the trusteeship system and its international stated purposes
to which i t was morally and legally bound the right of self-detennination
in the case of Palestine should have been considered by the Uni ted Nations
when i t politically opted for terrl tortal parti tion.
The question of the legal definition and purpose of the inter-

!
·I

I
I
I

national mandate and trusteeship systems will now be analyzed with appro-
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priate juridical interpretations by the international courts of justice .
In the South-West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v . South Africa; Liberia v . South
.I

,

I
,
l

I

Africa) the International Court of Justice, in its judgment of July 18 ,
1966, unquestionably clarified the meaning of the mandates system . 1 ?
When the juridical decision was made with regard to the future of these
territories which as a consequence of the war of 1914-1918 had ceased to

be under the sovereignty of the states whi ch fonnerly governed them, and
which "were inhabited by peoples considered "not yet able" to assume a full
measure of self-government, two principles were considered to be of paramount importance: the principle of non-annexation and the principle that
the well being and development of such. peoples fonned "a sacred trust of
civilization . "

With a view to giving practical effect to these principles,

an international supervision, the mandates system was created by Article
22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations•

A "tutelage" was to be es-

tablished for these peoples and this tutelage was to be entrusted to certain "advanced" nations and exercised by them "as mandatories on behalf
.
of the League. " A legal review of the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the case of the status of South-West Africa, July 1 1 ,
1950, iterates the two principles of "non-annexation" and "sacred trust of
civili zation. "
'nle decision of the Court of July 1 8 , 1966 in the South-West Africa
Cases should be given careful explication because the Court was very careful to analyze the intent of the Mandates System and i n the legal· context

at the time the system originated.

The writer has been careful to include

only the more significant provisions of the Court ' s advisements and has
underscored certain passages to add emphasis.
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16.

It is i n their capacity as former members of the League of

Nati ons that the Applicants appear before the Court; and the rights

they claim are those that the members of the League are said to have
been invested w1 th i n the time of the League.
Accordingly, in order

to determi ne what the rights and obligations of the Parti es relative
to the Mandate were and are ( supposing i t still to be i n forc e , but
without prejudi ce to that questi on ) ; and in particular whether (as
regards the Applicants) these include any right individually to call
for the due execution of the ' conduct' provisions, and ( for the

Respondent) an obligation to be answerable to the Applicants i n
respect o f i t s admi nistration of the Mandate, the Court must place
i tself at the point in time when the mandates system was being
instituted, and when the instruments of mandate were being framed.
The Court must have regard to the situation as i t was at that time,
which was the cri tical one, and to the intentions of those concerned
as they appear to have existed, or are reasonably to be inferred , in

the light of that situation.
Intentions that might have been formed
i f the Mandate had been framed at a much later date, and in the know
ledge of circumstances, such as the eventual dissolution of the
League and its aftermath, that . could never originally have been
foreseen, are not relevant.
Only . on this basi s can . a correct
appreciation of the legal rights of the Parti es be arrived a t .

'Ib i s view is supported by a previ ous finding o f the Court ( Rights of

United States Nati onals in Morocco, I . C . J . Reports 1952, at p . 189 ) ,
the effect of which i s that the meaning of a juridical notion in a
historical context, must be sought by reference to the way in which
that notion was understood in that context.

17. It follows that any enquiry into the rights and obligations of
the Parti es in the present case must proceed principally on the basis
of considering, in the setting of their period, the texts of the
instruments and parti cUl,ar provi sions intended to give jµridical
expression to the notion of the ' sacred trust of civilization' by
insti tuting a mandates system •
.

...

19 .

.

.

.
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.

...... ....

As is well known,

. . . . .
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.

.

. . .

.

.

.......

. .

.

.

.....
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..

the mandates system originated in the decision

taken at the Peace Conference following upon the world war of 1914-1918 ,
that the colonial terri tories over which, by Article 1 19 of the Treaty

of Versailles, Germany renounced 'all her rights and titles' i n favour
of the then Principal Allied and Associated Powers, should not be
annexed by those Powers or by any country affiliated to them, but
should be placed under an international regime, in the application to

the peoples of those terri tori e s , deemed ' not yet able to stand by
themselves ' , of the principle , declared by Article 22 of the League
Covenant , that their ' well-being and development' should form a ' sacred
trust of civili zati on ' .
'!be type of regime specified by Article 22 of the Covenant as constituting the ' best method of giving practical effect to this principl e '
;'

20.

was that ' the tutelage o f such peoples should be entrusted to advanced
nati ons •

• •

who are willing to accept i t ' , --and here i t was specifically

added that i t was to be ' on behalf of the League' that ' this tutelage
It was not pro
should be exercised by those nations as Mandatories' .
vided that the mandates should,

either addi tionally or i n the alternativ�

r
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I

be exercised on behalf of the members of the League in their individual
capaci ties.

The mandatories were to be the agents of,

the League , --and not of,
ually.

21

or trustees for

or for, each and every member of i t individ

the Mandatory, in agreeing to accept the Mandate, had under
taken ' to exerci se i t on behal f of the League of Nations'
The
effect of this recital , as the Court sees i t , was to register an
implied recogni tion
( b ) on the part of both the Mandatory and the
Council of the League , of the character of the Mandates as a Juridical
r�gime set within the framework
of the League as an i nstitution
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49. '!he Court must now tum to certain questions of a wider character
. 'lbroughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly,
that humanitarian considerations are suffi cient in themselves to
generate legal rights and obligations, and that the Court can and
It i s a
should proceed accordingly.
The Court does not think so .
court of law, and can take account o f moral princpl es only in so far
as these are given a suffi cient expression in legal fonn.
Law exists,
i t is said, to serve a social need; but preci sely for that reason it
can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline.
Otherwi se,

•

i t is not a legal servi ce that would be rendered .

Humani tarian considerati ons may constitute the ins?ira.tional
basis for rules of law, just as, for instance, the preambular parts
of the United Nations Charter constitute the moral and political

50.

basi s for the specific legal provi sions· thereafter set out.
Such
considerati ons do not, however, in themselves amount to rule s of law.
But
All States are interested--have an interest--in such matters.
the existence of an 'interest' does not of i tself entail that this
interest i s specifically juridical in character.

51 .
It i s in the light of these considerations that the Court must
examine what i s perhaps the most important contention of a general
character that has been advanced in connection with this aspect of the
case, namely the contention by which i t i s sought to derive a legal
right or i nterest in the conduct of the mandate from the simpl e
in order that this
existence, or principle, of the ' sacred tru st'
•

•

•

.

interest may take on a speci fically legal character, the sacred trust
1 tself must be or become somethi ng more than a moral or humani tari an
ideal .
In order to generate legal rights and obligations, i t must be
One such
given juridical expression and be clothed in legal fonn.
fonn might be the United Nati ons trusteeship system , --another, as
contained in Chapter XI of the Charter
52. I n the present case, the principle of the sacred trust has as
•

•

•

•

As such, i t
its sole juridical expression the mandates system .
constitutes a moral ideal given fom a s a juridical regime in the
shape of that system .
But i t i s necessary not to confuse the moral

ideal with the legal rules intended to g1. ve i t effect.
For the
purpose of realizing the aims of the trust- in the particular form of
any given mandate , its legal rights and obligations were those, and
those alone, which resulted from the relevant instruments creati ng

the system , and the mandate itself, within the framework of the

League o f Nations.

.I

I
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53. 'Ihus it i s that paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Covenant, in
the same breath that it postulates the principle of the sacred trust,
specifies in terms that, in order to give ' effect to this princpl e ' ,
the tutelage of the peoples of the mandated terri tories should be
entrusted to certain nations, 'and that this tutelage should be
exerci sed by them ' as mandatories 'on behalf of the League • .
It
was from this that flowed all the legal consequences already noticed.

54 .

I

l.

To sum up, the principle of the sacred trust has no residual
juridical. content which could, so far as any particular mandate i s
concerned, operate per s e to give rise to l egal. rights and obligati ons
outside the system as a whol e : and, within the system equally, such
rights and obligations exist only in 'so far as there i s actual.
provision for them .
Once the expression to be given to an idea
has been accepted in the form of a particular regime or system, its
I t i s not per
legal incidents are those of the regime or system.
missible to import new ones by a process of appeal to the ori ginating
idea--a process that would, ex hypothesi, have no natural limi t .
Hence, although , as has constantly been reiterated , the members of
League had an interest in seeing that the obligations entailed by
the mandates system were respected, this was an interest whi ch,
according to the very nature of the system itself, they could
exerci se only through the appropriate League organs, and not individ
ually
.
. . . . .
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, it so happens that there i s in fact one test that can be
9 3.
applied, namely by enquiri ng what the . States who were members of the
League when the mandates system was insti tuted did when, as Members
of the United Nations, they joined in setting up the trusteeship
system that was to replac e the mandate s system.
I n effect, as regards
structure , they did exactly the same as had been done before, with
only one though signi ficant difference
, the Trusteeship Council
was to play the same sort of role as the Permanent Mandates Commission
had done, and the General Assembl y (or Securi ty Council in the case
of strategic trusteeships ) was to play the role of the League Counci l ;
and i t was to these bodies that the various administering a.uthori ties
became answerable
•

•

.

•

•

•

•

•

•

.

•

As was said i n the separate opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender i n
Certain Expenses o f the Uni ted Nations (Article 1 7 , paragraph

2,

o f the

Charter ) :
' A general rule i s that words used in a treaty should be read as having
the meaning they bore therein when i t came into existence • • • • this
18
meaning must be consistent with the purposes sought to be achieved
•
•

•

•

•

Since World War I and the implementation of the mandates system
it has been the duty for a mandatory to prepare the peoples of the mandates

to stand by themselves in the context of their own self-determination.
There can be no question that Britain failed its international legal
obligations to the Pal estinian people .

The evidence has been their

destructi on as a national people i n their own indigenous territory.

J'!

·1

Earlier, in its advisory opinion of July 11 ,
Status of South-West Afri ca,

1950, International

the Court made the following observations

regarding the legal nature of the Mandates System, a situration in which
the ' Union of South Afri ca maintained that the mandate over South-West
Afri ca had lapsed and that it could annex the terrl tory to the Union
Government :
I t i s now contended on behal f of the Uni on Government that this Mandate
has lapsed , because the League has ceased to exist.
'nlis contention i s
based o n a misconception of the legal situation created by Arti cle 22

of the Covenant and by the Mandate itself.
The League ·:as not, as
alleged by that Government, a ' mandator ' in the sense in which this
term is used in the national law of certai n States.
I t had only

The
assumed an international function of supervi sion and control .
' Mandate' had only the name i n common with the several notions of
mandate in national law.
The object of the Mandate regulated by inter
national rul es far exceeded that of contractual relations regulated
by national law.
The Mandate was created, in the interest of the
inhabitants of the terol'i. tory, and o f humani ty in general , as an inter
national institution with an international object--a sacred trust of
civilization.
It is therefore
by analogy from the notions of
other legal conception of that
lating the Mandate constituted

not possible to draw any conclusion
mandate in national law or from any
law.
The i nternational rules regu
an international status for the

Terri tory recogni zed by all the Members of the League of Nations
including the Union of South Africa. 19
I n this same decision a detailed analysis appears i n the separate
legal opinion,

to which the Court concurred , o f Judge Sir Arnold McNai r

in thi s same proceeding:

2. '!be objective character o f Arti cle 22 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations

From time to time i t happens that a group of great Powers,

or a

large number o f States both great and smal l , assume a power to create
by a multiparti te treaty some new international regime or status,
which soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durability extendi ng
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beyond the limits of the actual contracting parti e s , and giving i t
an objective existence.
Thi s power i s used when some public inter
est i s involved, and its exercise often occurs i n the course of the
peace settlement at the end of a great war .
In 1920 the Council
of the League had to deal with a di spute between Finland and Sweden,
which, inter alia, involved an examinati on of the exi sting condi tion
of a Convention dated March JO, 1856, between France and Great
Britain on the one hand and Russia on the other, whereby Russia, in
compliance with the ·desire of the other two States, declared ' that
the Aaland Islands shall not be forti fied, and that no mili tary or
naval base shall be maintained or created there ' . 20
.

Judge McNai r proceeded to explain the juridical precedents imparted· by the Commission in the Aaland I slands case,

transferring the

Commi ssion ' s legal interpretations to the mandates system :
It may seem a far cry from the Aaland Islands to South-West Afri ca,
but reference to this case i s demanded by the high standing of the
members of the Commission and by the relevance of their reasoning
I may also refer to the statement by the
to the present probl ems.
Pennanent Court in the SS. Wimbledon case • • • that as a resul t of
Arti cle )80 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 the Kiel Canal ' has
become an international waterway intended to provide under treaty
guarantee ·easier access to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations
of the world' --which was referred to as .'its new r�gime' •
The Mandates System seems to me to be an a fortiori case • • • • A large
part o f the civilized world concurred in opening a new chapter in
the life of between fifteen and twenty millions of people , and this
article (22) was the instrument adopted to give effect to their
,
desire.
In my Opinion, the new regime established in pursuance
of this ' principl e ' has more than a purely contractual basi s , and
the territories subj ected to i t are impressed with a special legal
status, desi gned to last until modified in the manner indicated by
Article 22 .
The dissolution of the League has produced certain
di fficul ties, but, as • . • they are mechanical difficul ties, and the
policy and pri ncipl es of the new insti tuti on have survived the im
pact of the events of 1939-1946, and have indeed been reincarnated
by the Charter under the name of the ' International Trusteeship
System ' , with a new lease of life , 21
But·, significantly, McNai r analyzed the underl ying policy and
Principles of Article 22 and of the mandates system :
Any Engli sh lawyer who was instructed to prepare the legal instru
ments required to give effect to the policy of Arti cle 22 would in
evitably be reminded of, and influenced by, the trust of English
and American law, though he would soon realize the need of much
adaptation for the purposes of the new international institution.
Professor Brierly' s opinion, stated in the British Year Book of
International Law , 1929, pages 217-219,

that the governing principle

of the Mandates System is to be found in the trust, and his quotation
from an article by M . Lepaulle, are· here very much in point, and i t
is worth noting that the historical basis of the legal enforcement
of the English trust i s that it was something which was binding upon
the conscience of the trustee; that i s wy i t was legally enforced.
It also seems probable that the conception of the Mandates System
owes something to the French tutelle •
..................
. ..... ...
..... . .. ......... .. ........... .
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'!here are three general principles whi ch are common to all these
institutions:
.
{ a ) that the control of the trustee , tuteur or curateur over the
property i s limited in one way or another; he i s not i n the position
of the nonnal complete owner, who can do what he likes w1 th his own,
because he is precluded from administering the property for his own
· personal benefit :
( b ) that the trustee, tuteur or cura.teur i s under some Y.ind of legal
obligation, based on confidence and consci ence, to carry out the
trust or mission confided to him for the benefit of some other
person or for some public purpose ;
( c } tha.t any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property
entrusted to him into his own patrimony would be illegal and would
be prevented by the law .
'lhese are some of the general pri nciples of private law which throw
light upon this new institution, and I am convinced tha� in its
future development the law governing the trust i s a source from
which much can be derived . 'Ihe importance of the Mandates System
is marked by the fact that, after the· experi ence of a quarter of a
century, the Charter of the United Nati ons made provision for an
'Internati onal Trusteeship System ' , which was described by a Reso
lution of the Assembly of the League of April 18th , 1946, as embody
ing ' principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the Leagu�• . 22
Another author! ty on the subject of the le·ga:J. nature and definition
of the mandates explicitly declared :
'!he terri tori.es or entities for which mandates have been conferred
and accepted are not States, although they may be States i n the mak
ing . They are populated. areas which the Principal Allied Powers have,
in consequence of their control thereof, and with the approval of the
Council of the League of Nations, placed under the administration of
designated mandatories on conditions set forth in the terms of the
particular mandates, and in pursuance of the requirements of the
Covenant. Those tenns and conditions indicate the measure of author
ity of the mandatories, and emphasize the obligation of each to accept
the cooperation and oversight of the League, and to make annual re
ports to the Council. The mandatory i s not free to deal with the
territory or people assigned. to it as though either were its own:
the relationship sharply differs from that existing, in an inter
national sense, between the Uni ted States and its colonial possessions
such as the Philippine I slands . A territory or entity under mandate
i s thus to be distinguished from the colonial possession which, i n
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international contemplation, i s a part of the State to whi ch i t belongs.
'!he outstanding, and perhaps novel , feature of the mandatory system
i s the international obligation imposed upon and accepted by the
mandatory to administer a terri torial area not its own, and not
constituting a State, under the supervi sion of an international
agency. 2 3

I
i
�
I
�

i

In the fi nal League of Nations study on the mandates system

�
�

: there appears the following authoritative expli cation of the main char-

�
'

! acteristics of this system :

�
�-'

�

l�
<

·

'lhe aim of the insti tution i s to ensure the well-being and develop
ment of the peoples inhabi ting the terri tories in questi on.
The method of attaining thi s aim consists in entrusting the tutelage
The acceptance by a
of these peoples to certain advanced nati ons.
nation of this mission carries with it certain obligations and
responsibilities established by law. Like guardians i n civil law,
they must exercise their authority in the interests of thelr wards-that i s to say, of the peoples which are regarded as minors--and
must maintain an entirely disinterested attitude i n their dealings
with them .
'!be terri tories with the admini stration of which they
are entrusted must not be exploited by them for their own profit.
Again, the phrase 'peoples not ye t able to stand by themselves' i s
used.. It follows from this and from the very conception of tutelage
that this mission i s not, in principle � intended to be prolonged
indefini tely, but only until the peoples under tutelage are capabl e
of managing their own affai rs. 24
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In a first group- - ' A ' Mandates ( Syria and Lebanon , Palestine and
Transjordan, and Iraq)--the nation is provisionally recognized as
independent, but receives the advice and assi stance of a .Mandatory
in i ts administration until such time as i t i s able to stand alone . 25
' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

'!be ' A ' Mandates differ appreciably from those of the other two
categori es.
In the countri es to whi ch they apply, the inhabitants
had reached a more advanced stage of development and their indepen
dence could, in principle, be recoP,n.ised by the Covenant itself,
subject to the condi tions which have been mentioned above.
The
mission of the Mandatories in these countries has therefore consisted
mainly in developing their capacity to govern themselves, and in
establishing their economic systems and social and other institutions
on a more secure footin g i n order to fit them to take their posi tion
as independent nations. 26
·

�

Succinctly stated, thi s authoritative League study described the

Purpose of the mandates system as "to fit (all .the mandated territories )
to take their position as independent nati ons. 1 1

Thi s author! tative source

I
,1

'1

i

,.,
'

'

f;,fl"

�
:

makes i t clear that Palestine was to be�ome a sovereign independent state
This same study unques-

for the indigenous Pal estinian Arab population.

t1onabl y confirmed Pal estine as an eventual independent state by i terating
that "A nationali ty law is to be enacted contai ning provisions framed so
as to facilitate the aequi sition of Palestinian citi zenship by Jews who
take up their permanent residence in Pal estine . .. 27
.

ly depicts that Pal estine was never to become,

� ;:;h

"Je

State",

that � s ,

This provision clear-

as Zionism maintai ns,

a

the Zionist "Judenstaat" envisioned by Herzl

and successive Zionist leaders over the past eighty years.
Consequently. in the legal opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the juridical status of So�th-West Africa of July

1 1 , 1950, ·

the Court specified international legal rules regulating the mandate trust
and expl1ci tly declared all mandated terri tori. es "are impressed with a
special legal status, designed to last" until native independence was
achieved .

Regardless of the collusive Zionist-British perfidy through

1939 the mandate system was predi cated on the existence of a Palestinian
national entity, which unde� the i nternational law was to develop into
complete independence as a nati on.

'!he right of self-determination was

reserved for the indigenous population,

However,

to provide the eventual

creation of a "Jewish national home"--and we should recall that the Br1 ti sh
understood the Zionist Judenstaat scheme regardless of what they were publicly assuring--the history of the Palestine Mandate reveal s that stringent
restrictions upon the right of self-determination were imposed by the
Brl ti sh

who autocrati cally controlled the Palestinian people under coloni

alist ad.mini strati ve policies, more often in op�n violation of its legal
mandatory responsibilities . 28

Significantly,

to the extent that the British

placed greater restrictions and roadblocks upon the right of self-determin�

ation,

tile

establi shment of the "Jewi sh national home" conflicted with

the more preeminent principle of the right of self-detennination and
mandatory juridical obligations

to

prepare Palestine for independence.

In essence, the legal doctrine failed juridical implementation because
the Bri tish failed in its international trusteeship responsibility.
'lhe principle of international law specifically applying the mandates
system ' s doctrine of self-determinati on was, in the case of the
Palestinian people, unfortunately but gri evously violated.

i.

Chapter Six

1

I!

1 chaim Weizmann was Russian by birth, British by naturalization before
the First World War, and in 1914 a lecturer in chemistry at Manchester
Universi ty, a seat acquired at the time of his first meeting with Balfour
in 1906.
Wei zmann was one of the leading Zionist negotiators whose
efforts led to the issuance of the Ba.lfour Declarati on.
2Doreen Ingrams ( comp . ) , Palestine Paners 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict
(New York : Braziller, 1973), p. 95.
Thi s quote i s taken from official
British Government documents. Sir Eri c (1888-1925) served in the Bri tish
Diplomati c Service and attended the Pari s Peace Conference 1918-1919 and
the San Remo Conference in 1920.
3
Brltish Public Records Office, Forei gn Office, 371 /5245: ci ted in
Ingrams, ibid . , p. 97.
From 1920 to 1924 Lord Vansi ttart was private
secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, who
became British Foreign Secretary in 1919.
'lbe quote i s. from a letter
Vansittart sent Curzon on August 2, 1920, pertaining to a new revised draft
of the proposed British version of the Palestine Mandate.

4To

have taken the Bri tish Government thirty years to find out that
the Mandate for Palestine was "unworkable" and Britai n ' s legal obligations
thereunder "i rreconciliable" after having created the problem in 1917
through the Balfour Declaration where none erlsted before, and after
flooding the country illegally with Jewish immigrants who were mainly
Zionists until the Palestine Jewish community became strong enough to
wrest the country mill tartly from i t s original Arab inhabi tants, and
then to wash its hands at the later hour of May 1948 and declare its
unwillingness to enforc e a solution "not accepted by both parti es" under
the pretext of "conscience , " does not speak well of either the British
conscience or intelligence.
The fact is that i t i s a very shameful re
action.
In the context of international law i t should be known that the
Palestine Arabs were--and still are--the victims of an aged Zionist plan
to wrest the area from its Arab inhabi tants; and when the time came,
Muslims and Chri stians were forcibly expelled and disposses sed on racial
and religious grounds by aliens who established themselves, in violation
of international law, as the government.
5
J . L . Brierl y, The Law of Nations (London: Oxford University Press,
19J6 ) , pp. 120-1)4.
6rn actual fact, also in definite violation of its mandatory
obligations, the British arbi trarily spl i t off the territory of Trans
jordan; i t was set up as a separate mandated territory although earlier
included in the Palestine Mandate.
?offi cially accepted by the Council at i ts meeting of April 23, 1923.
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81eague of Nations Official Journal, 1923, 4 : 604. It should be
noted that the distinct status which the United States accorded the
indigenous national s of the Philippines was referred to as a prece
dent for the proposed status of inhabi tants in the mandated terri
tories. See Ibid. , 4 1 569. The phrase "with this object under its
own law" refers to the municipal naturalization laws of the manda
tory state. At the time this resolution was adopted there existed
the problem of the ci tfzenship status of the large German colonial
population in the territory of South-West Af:rlca.
9It i s interesting to note that even �fore the League estab
lished the legal status of the inhabitants of mandated terri tories
the Supreme Court of the Union of South Africa in the case of
Christian v . Rex, South African Law Reports ( 1924 ) , Appellate Divi
sion, pp. 1 01 , 1 12, declared that "Article 22 [of the Covenant] de
scribes the administration of the terri tories and peoples with which
it deals as a tutelage to be exercised by the governing Power as man
datory on behalf of the League. 'Ihose terms were probably employed,
not in their stri ct legal sense, but as indicating the policy which
the governin'g authori ty should pursue. The relationship between the
League and the mandatory could not with any legal accuracy be de
scribed as that of principal and agen t . " The Court declared that the
residents of South-West Africa did not have the nationality of South
Africa.
10The phrase of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations -- "Certain comrnuni ties fomerly belonging to the 'furkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as
independent nations can be provi sionally recognized
" -- did not
apply to B and C mandated territories.
• • • •

1 1 'Ihis article alone should have made i t legally clear that Arab
Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State against the will
of the Arab population of the country. Moreover, officially clari
fying the Balfour Declaration in 1922, Winston Churchill ( then Bri tish
Colonial Secretary) stated that " the terms of the Declaration do not
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a
Jewish National Home but that such a Home should be founded in
falesti ne . " By this phrase, he said, was meant "not the imposition of
a Jewish nati onality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but
the further development of the exi sting Jewish com.munity
in order
that i t might become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may
an interest and pride . " See the Churchill Memorandum, Cmd. 1700,
take
Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist
Organi zation, 1922.
• • •

. • •
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12It should be noted that on the question of Palestine before
the United Hations in 1947-48, the General Assembly through the
' politics of the Western nations, turned down the only reasonable
suggestions, i . e . , a referendum in Palestine and submission of the
legal problems to the International Court of Justice. The Arab
delegations requested that legal aspects of the Palestine-Zionist
questi on be referred to the International Court of Justice as the
recourse provided by Article 36 of the United Nations Charter and
by Arti cle 26 of the Mandate whi ch provided: "The Mandatory agrees
that if any dispute whatever should ari se between the Mandatory
and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the inter
pretati on or the appli cation of the provi'sions of the mandate , such
dispute , if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted
When requests
to the Permanent Court of International Justice
fo� legal adjudi cation was voted on, the count was 20 for, 21
against. Also noted, that by denying the Palestinian Arabs, who
fonned the two-thirds majority of the country, the right to decide
for themselves, the United Nations had violated its own Charter.
'Ibe action of the United Nations was also contrary to the legal
principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter of August 12, 1941,
which specified that Britain and the Uni ted States "desire to · see
no terrl torial changes that do not accord w1th the freely expressed
wishes of the people concerned . " It added that the two Powers
"respect the right of all peoples to choose the fonn of gov1:.:rrunent
under which they w111 11 ve. "
• • • • "

1 3sir }nchael McDonnell, ed. , The Law· Reports of Palestine
(London: Waterlow and Sons Ltd. , 19)4), p. 215.
14woodward and Butler, eds. , Great Brita.in Foreign Office,
Documents on Briti sh Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (1946). At that time,
the British stated that the Balfour Declaration did not contemplate
the disappearance or subordination of the Arabl e population, language
or customs in Palestine or the imposition of the "Jewish nationality"
upon Palestinian Arabs.
151t is estimated that, alone, in the seven years after 1939
250;000 Jews entered Palestine illegally.
16H . Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950); M. Shukrl , The
Concept of Self-Detennination in the United Nations (1965); Bowett,
"Self-Detennination and Poli ti cal Rights in Developing Countri es," 1966
Proceedings American Society of International Law , 129. The subsequent
history of the United Nations corroborates the proposition that i t i s more
than a recognized concept and has become a general principle of interna
tional law. See, e.g. , the General Assembly's request of the Commi ssion
on Human Rights to study ways and means "which would ensure the right of
peoples and nations to self-determination . " G.A. Res. 421 , 5 U . N . GAOR
Supp. 20, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950 ) . At its Seventh Session the
General Assembly stated that "all peoples shall have the right of selfdetennination . " G.A. Res .545, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at--, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(1952). The Commission on Human Rights prepared several resolutions on
the matter that were adopted by the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 837, 9
U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 21, U.N. Doc . A/2890 (19.54); G.A. Res. 9 U.N. GAOR
·

•

·
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Supp . 2 1 , at 20, U . N . Doc. A/2890 19.54 ) : G . A . Res. 7J8, 8 U . N . G�OR
195 ) : G . A . Res. 612, 7 U . N . GAOR
Supp. 1 7 , at 18, U . N . Doc. A 26 30
Supp . 20, at 5, U . N . Doc. A 2361
1952 : G . A . Res. 6 1 1 , 7 U . N . GAOR
1952 : . G . A . Res, 648, 7 U . N . GAOR
Supp . 20, at 5, U . N . Doc. A 236 1
Supp . 20, at 33, U . N . Doc . A/2361 (1952 ; G . A . Res. 637, 7 U . N . GAOR
Supp. 20, at 26, U . N . Doc. A/2361 (1952 : see also Colonial Resolution,
G . A . Res. 1514, 1 5 U . N . GAOR Supp . 16, at 66, U . N . Doc. A/L. 323 (1960).
At its Tenth Session the General Assembly examined the draft articles
of the Covenant on Civil and Politi cal Rights and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cul tural Rights, which were subsequently adopted
on Dec. 16, 1966.
G . A . Res. 2200, 21 U . N GAOR Supp. 1 6 , at 49, U . N .
Doc. A/6:;+6 (1966 ) .
See also Eagl eton, Sel f-Determinati on i n the
United Nati ons, 47 Am . J . INT ' L . L . 88 ( 1953).
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The terri tory of South-West Africa was one of the German overseas
possessions in respect of which Germany by Arti cle 119 of the Treaty of
Versailles renounced all her rights and titles in favor of the Principal
·

Allied and Associated Powers.

Judge Jessup,

in a 119-page di ssenting

opinion i n the South-West Afri ca Cases , di sagreed with his colleagues.
While South
Today, South-West Afri ca is the territory called Nami·bi a .
Afri ca has sought to annex it, the International Court of Justice and
the United Nations have respectfully advised and determined that the

"Namibian" people shal l receive self-detennination and that South Africa
i s to desist from terrl tori.al incursions having annexati oni st designs.
18
rnternational Court of Justice Reports 1962, 186, p . 151 .
19

Internati onal Court of Justice Reports 1950,

128,

p.

132.

Today

South-West Africa i s commonly referred to as Namibia and i s frequently
mentioned in the news as the ongoing cor.t1.ict between South Africa and
the Namibian people contigues.
20
Ibid. ,

128, p . 153,
The Aaland Islands are a strategic i sland
group at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, controlled by Finland
since 1921.
This Convention became an integral part of the General

Treaty of Peace between seven States in 18,56 which brought the Crimean

War to an end.
Sweden claimed that this status of demili tari zati on was
still in force in 1920 in spi te of many intervening events, and that she ,
though not a party to the Convention or Peace Treaty , was entitled to
the benefit of i t : her claim was based on the allegation of an inter
national servitude.
As the Permanent Court of International Justice had
not then come into existence, the Council of the League set up a
Commi ssion of Jurists, Professor F. Larnaude (Presiden t ) , Professor

A . Struycken and Professor Max Huber, and referred certai n legal questions
to them .
They received wri tten statements and heard oral arguments
on behalf of Finland and Sweden.
'!be Jurists rejected the argument
based on an all eged servitude and reported that the provisions of the
Convention and Treaty of 18_56 for demilitarization were still in force . :
"These provi sions were laid down i n European interests.
They constituted

L
"

l
I

' '

special international status, relating to mili tary considerations,
It follows that until these provisions are
for the Aaland Islands.
duly replaced by others, every State interested (including Sweden:
which was not a party ] has the right to insist upon compliance with
them . I t also follows that any State in possession of the Islands
must conform to the obligations binding upon i t , ari sing out of the
system of demili tari zati on established by these provi sions. t1
a

1
2 Ibid.

'

p

I

154.

2
2 Ibi d . , 128 , pp. 148-150.
McNair added : "Nearly every legal
system possesses some insti tution whereby the property (and sometimes
the persons) of those who are not sui juri s , such as a minor o r a
luna�i c , can be entrusted to some responsible person as a trustee or
The Anglo-American trust serves this purpose , and
tuteur or curateur.
another purpose even more closely akin to the Mandates System, namely,
the vesting of property in trustees, and its management by them i n
order that the public o r some class of the public may derive benefit
or that some public purpose may be served .
The trust has frequently
been used to protect the weak and the dependent, i n cases where there
i s ' great might on the one side and unmight on the other' , and the
English courts have for many centuri es pursued a vigorous policy i n the
admini strati on and enforcement of trusts . "
3
2 I . Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by
the United States (1945), pp. 102-J .
. ..
4
2 League of Nati ons, 'nle Mandates System, Origin, Principles,
Appli cation ( 1945), Vol . I , A . 1 , pp. 23-24.
5
2 Ibid . , p . 24.
26Ibi d. ' p . 27.
27Ibid . ' p . 30.
28 vincent Sheean, Personal History ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company , 1969 ) , p . )8 1 .
Vincent Sheean reported from Palestine in
1929 after a lengthy residence that the Palestinian Arabs "had no
politi cal rights of any kind, no parliament or council or legi slature ,
and were governed by ukase. '!be law was whatever the (British ) high
comroi ssi oner wanted it to be . ti

CHAPTER VII
'lliE QUESTION OF LEGAL TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

'Ihe wea.k point of our position of course i s that in the case of

Pal estine we ( the Bri tish Government) deli berately and rightly

decline to accept the principle of self-determinati on . 1

--Arthur Balfour
So far as Palestine i s concerned the Powers had made no

declaration of policy whi ch,

at least i n the letter,

not always intented to violate , 2

they have

--Arthur Balfour
The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the

policy of the Allies i s even more flagrant in the case of the

"independent nation" of Palestine than in that of the "indepen

dent nation" of Syria .

For in Palestine we ( the Allies) do not

propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of
the present (Pale stinian ) inhabitants of the country,

though

the American Commission has been going through the form of ask

ing what they are . 3

--Arthur Balfour
Dr Weizmann took the view that •

• •

i t was desirable that the

(Zionist) commi ssion should sttri.ve to produce certain definite

fai ts accompl i s ,

such a s •

munity in Palestine .

• .

• •

the organi sation o f the Jewish com

on an autonomous basi s ,

so that when the

time comes for the Peace Conference certain definite steps will

have been taken whi ch will give the Zionists some right to be
heard at the Peace Conference. 4
--Ormsby-Gore
'Ihe problem which we have to work out now i s one of tactics,

strategy,

the general strategic idea as I conceive i t ,

not

being the

gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until that country
becomes a predominantly Jewish State •

• •

, :But i t i s questionabl e

whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy
really mean s . 5

--Sir Hubert Young

'Ihi s chapter can necessarily give only a brief but hopefully
concise interpretation of the question of legal sovereignty in the the
case of Palestine.

President Woodrow Wilson particularly contributed

to the juridical concept of self-determination of peoples and to the
1 74
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of legal sovereignty6 :
People are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another

by

an in"tternational conference or an understanding between rival s

a.nd antagonists.

National aspirations must be respected;

peoples

may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent.
"Self-determination" i s not a mere phrase .
principle of action,
their peri l .

by

It is an imperative

which statesmen will henceforth ignore at

We cannot have general peace for the asking,

the mere arrangements of a peace conference .

or

It cannot be

pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful
states . 7

·
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'Ihe creation of the League of Nations provided the first opporty for a sustained effort for both the development and codification

of international law. 8

Regarding the i ssue of legal sovereignty,

Advi sory Opinion of Jul y 1 1 ,
Africa,

1 950,

in its

International Status of South-West

the International Court of Justice made the following observat-

ions regarding the legal naiiure of the Mandates System9 :
It i s now contended on behalf of the Union Government that this
Mandate has lapsed,

because the League has ceased to exist.

'!his

contention is based on a mi sconception of the legal situation created
by Article

was not,

22

of the Covenant and by the Mandate itself.

as alleged by that Government,

The League

a "mandator" in the sense in

which this term i s used in the national law of certain States .

had onl y asswned an international func tion of supervi sion,
control .

and

It

'Ihe "Mandate" had only the name in common with the several

notions of mandate in national law.

The object of the Mandate reg

ulated by international rules far exceeded that of contractual rela

tions regulated

by

national law.

'Ihe Mandate was created ,

interest of the inhabi. tants of the terri tory,
general ,

in the

and of humanity in

as an international institution with an international object-

a sacred trust of civili zati on.

It is therefore not possible to draw

any conclusion by analogy from the notions of mandate in national law
or from any other legal conception of that law.

'Ihe international

rules regulating the Mandate constituted an international status for

the Territory recogni zed by all the Members of the League of Nations,

including the Union of South Afri ca. 1 0

'Ihe legal nature of the Mandate s System appeared in the separate
opinion of Judge Sir Arnold McNair in this same proceeding.
the legal objective of Article

22

He stipulated

of the Covenant of the League of Nations:

From time to time it happens that a group of . great Powers,

number of States both great and small ,

or a large

assume a power to create by

a mul tiparti te treaty some new international regime or status,

which

II'

r
�
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soon acquires a degree of acceptance and durabili�y extending beyond

the limits of the actual contracting parti e s ,
jective exi stence .

involved,

I· 1

[

,

• • • •

and giving i t an ob

'!hi s power is used when some public interest i s

11

McNair referred to the creation of "true objective law11

12 and

•special le gal status" instituted by Article 22 of the Covenant :

� • • Article 2 2 proclaimed the principle that the well-being and devel

opment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that
securiti es for the performance o f thi s trust should be embodi ed in
the Covenant" .

A large part of the civilized world concurred in

opening a n�w chapter in the life of between fifteen and twenty

millions of peopl e s ,

and thi s article was the instrument adopted

to give effect to their desire .

In my opinion,

the new regime

establi shed in pursuance of thi s "principle" has more than a purely
contractual basis,

and the terri tories subjected to i t are impressed

with a special legal status , designed to last until modi fied in the

manner indicated by Arti cle 22.
produced certain difficulties,
mechanical difficulti e s ,

The di ssolution of the League has

but ,

as

I shall explain, they are

and the policy and principles of the new

insti tuti on have survived the impact of the events of 1939 to 1946,

and have indeed been reincarnated by the Charter under the name of
the "International Trustee ship System" , with a new lease of life . 1 3

On July 24,

1922,

the Palestine Mandate was approved by the Council

of the League of Nations; i t was to become effective officially on December
22, 1923.

It is interesting to observe the attempt by the Vati can to stop

its approval because Cardinal Gasparri ,

the Papal Secretary of State ,

subnitted a critical memorandum dated May 1 5 ,

1922,

attacking the Mandate

provision pertaining to the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration;
Gasparri declared,

inter alia,

Cardinal

that this proposed article was incompatible

with the Covenant of the League .

It is extremely interesting to notehow

the Bri tish Goverrunent answered thi s attack because Bri tain was compelled
to expli citly define i t s mandatory policy in Palestine,
was to receive the Mandate for Pale stine .

though i t as yet

Bri tain issued a special Command

Paper answering Gasparri ' s severe critici sm s :
His Majesty ' s Government fully share the opinion expressed by Cardinal
Gasparri that arti cle 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations

would be incompatible with a mandate that proved to be an instrument

for the subjection of the native populations for the benefit of another
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,,

nationality. H . M . G . contemplate that the status of all citizens
of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and that
it has never been intended that they or any sect of them should
possess any other juridical status. Regarding Cardinal Gasparri ' s
allusion to article 11 of the draft mandate in support of his con
tention that " the Jews are to be given a privileged and· preponder
ating position as against other nationalities and creeds" , this was
answered by the assertion that "the Jewi sh people
are ready and
willing to contribute by their resources and effo�ts to develop the
country for the good of all its inhabitants"
, 14
•

.

.

•

.

•

In the final League of Nations study on the Mandates System there
appears the fol�owing account of the main legal characteristics established

by the provi sions of Article

of the Covenant:

22

Without going into controversial questions regarding the legal nature
of the mandates, i t may be said that the followi ng main principles
emerge from these provi sions :
. . . .. . . . ... ..
. . . . . . . . . . . .
..... .... ... . . ... ..... ....
Again, the phrase "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves" i s
used.
It follows from this and from the very conception of tutelage
that this mission i s not, in principle , intended to be prolonged
indefinitely, but only until the peoples under tutelage are capable
of managing their own affairs. 15
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

•

.

•

•

.

.

.

.

'

.

.

.

'Il1is same study of the Mandates System declare s :
In a first group--"A" Mandates (Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and
Transjordan, and Iraq)--the nation i s provisi onally recognized as
independent, but receives the advice and assistance of a Mandatory 6
in its administration until such time as i t i s able to stand alone . 1
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The "A" Mandates differ appreciably from those of the other two
categories. In the countri es to which they apply, the inhabitants
had reached a more advanced stage of development and their indepen
dence could, in principle , be recognized by the Covenant i tself,
subject to the conditions which have been mentioned alx>ve.
The
mission of the Mandatories in these countri es has therefore consi sted
mainly in developing their capacity to govern themselves, and in
establishing their economic systems and social and other institutions
on a more secure footing in order to fit them to take their position
as independent n
ations. I?
Article

22

of the Covenant, the legal charter of the 119.ndates

System, clearly enumerates that Palestine was to become an independent
state .

As regards the termination of the Mandate, Article

2818

stipulated

that this could only come about by the establishment in Palestine of an
independent government.

The terms of the mandates did not involve any

t
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'ession of territory or transfer of sovereignty to the mandatory.

The

ntemational Court of Justice has confirmed this principle with regard
the mandate for South-West Afri ca:

. i

11 r,i.·

HI ·
i '.

.

.

! · ''

I

I ..

'!he terms of this Mandate, as well as the provi sion s of Article 22
of the Covenant and the principles embodied therein, show that the
creation of this new international institution [1 . e . , the mandat�
did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of sovereignty
to the Union of South Africa.
The Union Government was to exercise
an international function of administration on behalf of the League,
with the object of promoting the well-being and development of the
inhabi tants . 19
Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter20 of the Uni ted Nati ons

'
'

legally incorporates the trusteeship system, the direct successor of the
League ' s mandates system . 2 1

The legal emphasi s of the trustee ship

is

also clear i n that the promotion of
the politi cal , economic, social and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the Trust Territori es and their progressive develop
ment toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate
to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples
and the freely expressed wi shes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each Trusteeship Agreement .22
Cattan observe s that
In all the instances where the sovereignty of a nation was revived
or restored on its terri tory, notwithstanding its conquest and
annexati on, the conquerorv s annexati on was fully effective, and
despite it s effectiveness the legitimate title was restored. 2 3
under international practi c e , the relationship between sovereignty
and property has served to determine the legitimacy of title of a
State to the terri tory that i t occupies.
Although in its politi cal
aspect sovereignty means the supreme power of a State over a certain
terri tory and its people regardless of the legitimacy of its origin,
in its legal aspect sovereignty involves a broader and more fundamen
tal concept: the legal and inalienable title of a king or a nation
to a terri tory. 24
• • •

The same broad concept of legitimacy of title also explains the
survival of Austria ' s sovereignty during the period of its forced
union with Germany i n 1938 until its formal re-e stabli shment in 1945 ,
the restoration o f Czechoslovakia ' s personality and territory after
its occupation and dismemberment by Germany in 1938, and the restoration
of Albania' s sovereignty after its invasion and annexation by Italy
i n 1939 .
All these States were restored despite their complete annex
ation and even extinction as political entiti e s , 15
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I'
I

Tilese various cases o f restoration of States and their terri tori es
can be considered as constituting applications of the modern pri nciple

that conquest i s not a source of titl e .
In the past the fai t accompli ,
such as conquest or annexation, i f successfully maintained, constituted
a source of title to territory under international law.
Thi s situation

has now changed . 2 5
Van Kleffens,
cattan,

Fauchil e ,

Ha1 1 , 26 Donati27 and Grotius28 affirm

that in legal theory and in actual international practi ce the

relationship between sovereignty and property ( territory) has been juridically applied :
Under the influence of Roman law sovereignty with regard to territory
was long regarded and interpreted i n terms of property • . • In modern
times 1 t still has had i t s votari e s i n various countri e s . 29
Le territoire d ' une nation est sa proprie"t� exclusive.
nation a le droit d ' en user .30

Seul e ,

cette

Brierly declares that " territorial sovereignty refers not to a
relation of persons to persons,
itsel f,

*

nor to the independence of the State

' but to the nature of rights over terri tory •

• •

Terri torial sovereign

ty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership i n private law • 3 1 . 1132
Lauterpacht confirms Bri erl y :
'lhere i s , i n fact , no ground for assuming that the science o f inter
national law will di scard the analogy between terri torial sovereignty

and property in private law, even if i t does not go the length of
identifying the two conceptions.33

As regards Zioni sm-Israel pretension to legal sovereignty over
the Arab country of Pale stine ,
by war,

the principle of no acqui sition of territory

states Quincy Wri gh t :

i s impli cit in the international law o f t�e 19 th century which held
that mili tary occupation of the terri tory of a recogni zed state gave
I t was affirmed in the Panno title to the occupied .territory.
*Thi s i s the Zioni st ideologi cal prescription to "rights" i n Palestine.

It is based upon the fallacious "the Jewish people" concept, a Zionist

political doctrine not accepted as international law.
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Ameri can Conference of 1890 and in the Bogota Charter of the Organiza
tion of Ameri can States in 1948 as a principle of American inter

national law, that territory could not be acquired by conquest; in
the League of Nati ons Covenant which guaranteed the territorial
integri ty and political independence of its Members against external
aggression; and in the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928 by which
the partie s renounced war as an instrument of national policy applied
in the Manchurian situation by the Stimson Doctrine of 19 32 .
'!he
Atlanti c Charter oppo sing terri torial acqui sitions in World War II,
the Nuremberg Charter and Tri al punishing the crime agai nst peace

on the bases of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, also affirmed this pri ncipl e . 34
Another question regarding violation of international law trustee-

ship obligations i s :

Can the League or Uni ted Nations parti tion a trust

territory under any circumstances?

Professor of international law,

M.

Cherif Bassi ourd )5, maintains :
'nle

•

.

.

answer i s "no , " unless the "people"

(of the terri tory) so choose,

whi ch again demonstrates that we invariably revert to the right of
What then of the • • • population unable to coexist
self-determination .
with the remai ning (populati on) . . ? '!he answer to this is that it i s
.

purely an internal question subj ect only to the secure guarantees

of the human rights of the minority under the principles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the vari ous covenants.
In
no event can the situation give rise to an internationally cognizable
right of cessation and the imposed e stabli shment of a new state popu
lated w i th nati onal s from a multi tude of other states to the exclusion
of the original national s of the existing state . 36
Lauterpacht states that "title by conquest has been abolished . n3

7

Ca.ttan writes:
In several resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conf1.ict and

Israel ' s annexation of Jerusalem after the war of 5 June 1967 , both
the Security Council and the General Assembly have proclaimed "the
inadmi ssibility of the acquisition of terri tory by war" or "by military
conquest" .
In other words, conquest cannot give title and thi s r gard
g
less of whether a conquest i s or i s not by itself an aggression . 3

Referring to the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acqui sition of
terri. tory by war" laid down in Security Council resolution 242 of November
22, 1967, Q.uincy Wright states:
'Ihe pri nciple goes beyond the principle "no frui ts of aggre ssion" .
It says there shal l be no terri torial fruits from war, uslng the latter
tenn in the material sense of a considerable use of armed force .

Its application,

therefore , does not depend on determining who was the
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"aggressor" i n the 1967 hostilities, a difficult que stion to answer .

'!here can be no doubt that , whether or not Israel was the aggressor,
9
its occupati ons of terri tory were achieved by the use of armed force . 3
Says Lauterpacht,

"International law"

will not recogni ze acquisition of territory accomplished i n di sregard
of the accepted form s .
Not every acquisition i s a lawful one.
The

di ctum ".Besi tzstand g1eicht Rechtszustand" (possession i s law) has
no valid.i ty in international law.
Mere force unaccompanied by a

legally recognized form of acqui sition does not confer a legal titl e . 40
Cattan agai n observe s :
'lhe general pri nciple o f law i s that a right cannot ari se from a
Hence , all the cases of revived or survival of State sovereign
wrong .
ty despite conquest and annexation can also be explai ned by the maxim
A claim to a territorial title whi ch
ex i njuria jus non ori tur.
originates in an illegal act is invalid. 41
'lhe Covenant of the League of Nati ons, approved by the Pari s Peace
Conference on 28 April 1919, and incorporated into the Treaty of
Versailles on 28 June 1919, also discarded any idea of annexation

of the terri tories sei zed from Turkey during the First World War.
Article 22 of the Covenant envisaged a new status under international
law for the Arab communi ties detached from the Turkish Empire and,

ll

i t i s important to note, declared that "t eir existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recogni zed . " 2
The legal effect under international law of the detachment of Palestine
from the Turkish Empire and of the recognition of its people as an

independent nation was to make of thi s country a separate . and indepen
dent State in whi ch was vested legal sovereignty over the terri tory
of Pale stine . 43

Erlich declare s that the legal meaning of the words "provi sionall y
recognized" in Arti cle 22 of the Covenant i s as follows:
Obviously, thi s does not mean that the exi stence as a nati on, or
relative independence whi ch i s expressly recogni zed, will be condition
al ; on the contrary, the inferior situation of a mandated territory

constitutes a transitory phase in the development of peoples under
tutelage towards real independence .
'!his appears clearl y from the
last words of he sentence : "until such time as they are able to
iJ_
stand alone" .
Regarding Arti cle 22 Duncan Hall points out:

Underl ying Arti cle 22 was the assumption of independent national
The drafters of the Covenant took as their
sovereignty for mandate s .
starti ng-point the general notions of "no annexation" and " self

deterrninati on" . 45
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In the case concerning the International Status of South-West
ca

in 1950 the International Court held that Article 22 postulated

, , , two principles were considered to be of paramount importance; the
principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being
and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization. 46
Consequently, the indigenous inhabitants of the mandated ter' tori.es were the beneficiaries of this trust. 47

Van Rees, Vice-President

f the Pennanent Mandates Commi ssion, held the view that sovereignty over
,jJf
'11

-:;i-

terri.tory resided in its original indigenous people :
Enfin, un dernier groupe d ' auteurs--di vise en deux fractions--le seul
groupe qui a tenu compte du principe de non-annexion adopte par la
Conference de la Paix, soutient que les auteurs du Pacte ont voulu
tenir en suspens ou bien la souverainete elle-meme sur les territoires
sous mandat poui une periode equivalente a la duree des mandats
respectifs (Lee D . Campbell, The Mandate for Mesopotamia and the
rinci le of trusteeshi in En lish law, p . 19; A . Mendelssohn
Bartholdi , Les mandats africains traducti on), Archiv fii.r Politik und
Geschi chte, Hamburg, 1925) ou bien l ' exercice des pouvoirs souverains
dont furent provisoirement charg�es certaines nations en qualite de
tuteurs . D ' apres ce dernier point de vue la souverainete elle-meme
serait detenue, depuis la renonciation des anciens Empires, par les
communautes et les populations autochtones des differents territoires.
En d ' autres termes , les anciens Empires ayant renonce a leurs droits et
titre s sur les terri toires en question sans qu'il y ait eu transfert
de ces droits et titres a d ' autres Pui ssances, la souverainete, qui
appartient a ces divers peuples et communautes jusqu9au noment de
leur soumi ssion a l ' Allemagne et a la Turquie, rena.'.t t automatiquement
du fait de la renonciation susdite. (Paul Pie, Le r�gime des mandats
d ' apres le Traite de Versailles, RGDIP , Paris , 1923, p . 14; Albert
Millot, Les Mandats internationaux, Paris , 1924, pp. 114-118; J .
Stoyanovski , La theorie generale des mandats internationaux , Paris,
pp. 83 and 86.)48
Van Rees also pointed out that the legal postulate which held

that legal sovereignty resides in the indigenous people (not colonizing
aliens) of the mandated territory
i s the only one which at least takes into account the principle of
non-annexation unanimously adopted by the Peace Conference . 49
• • •

In its resolution adopted in 1931 the Instftute of International Law
described the mandated territories as subjects of international law. 50
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In the case of Palestine Quincy Wright observed :
Mandates were classified into three types : "A", ''B" and "C" .
This
classi fication was made in a "descending order of political indi vidu
ali ty" according to their international status and the degree of
authority given to the Mandatory.
'!be "A" mandates applied to Iraq,
Palestine, Syria and Leb:l.non • • . I t i s to be remarked that only in
the case of "A" mandates were the communities concerned recognized
by Arti cle 22 of the Covenant as independent nati on s . 51
,

/

Pelichet has observed that the international personality of mandated territori e s , recognized by the Covenant Arti cle 22 was accepted as
a "principle of international law • .. 52

'!be F.a.rl of Birkenhead , in referring

to Palestine in particular , declared :
'Ihe position of Palestine and Syria i s that they were integral por
tions of the Turki sh Empire (which has renounced all right or title
to them : Arti cle 1 6 of the Treaty of Lausanne , 1923) , they have
become , administrati vely, partially dependent now upon an appointed
mandatory State, but they are acknowledged--in the terms of Article
22 of the Covenant--to be entitled to provisional recognition of
independence . • • 'lbe status of Palestine and Syria resembles very
closely that of States under suzerainty . 53
'Ihe pri nciple that sovereignty lies in the people of the mandated
territory itself was recently applied to terri tories held under trusteeship
in accordance with the Charter of the Uni ted Nations.
ships possess the same legal affiliation.

Mandate s and trustee-

In the case of Societ� A . B . C .

v . Fontana and Della Rocca, the Italian Court of Cassation held that
sovereignty over the territory of Somaliland i s vested in its popula
tion, although , under Arti cle 2 of the Trusteeship Agreement (of the
United Nations ) , the ad.mini strati on of the terri tory , for the period
specified in the Agreement, has been entrusted to Italy • .54
Oppenheim expressed the same legal view as the F.a.rl of Birkenhead :
In considering the question of sovereignty over trust territories • • • the
di stinction must be borne i n mind betReen sovereignty as such (or what
may be descri l:>ed as residuary sovereignty) and the exerci se of sovereign
ty.
'Ihe latter i s clearl y vested with the trustee powers subject to
supervi sion by and accountability to the United Nati ons.55
Cattan has declared that in regard to Palestine in particular and
mandated terri. tori.es i n general :

1

1
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• • •

the grant by the Counci l of the League of Nati ons of a mandate to

the Bri tish Government to admini ster Palestine did not depri ve its

people of their sovereignty,
entity.

nor the State of Palestine of its own

The legal status of Pal estine under international law during

the British mandate and upon its terminati on on 1 5 May 1948 can,
be sununari zed as follow s : during the currency of the man-

therefore,

date the people of Palestine enjoyed an independent international

status and possessed sovereignty over their land; Palestine possessed

its own statehood. as well as its own identity, which were di stinct
from those of the mandatory Power;
cally its own though ,

however,

in fact ,

its admini strati on was theoreti -

it was exercised by the Manda-t.ory;

. • . .

the full exerci se of sovereignty by the people of Palestine

was restricted by the powers of administration entrusted to the

mandatory Power;

upon the terminati on of the mandate the Mandatory ' s

powers of administration came to an end and,

as a resul t,

the

restri ctions upon exercise of full sovereignty by the people of

Palestine ceased,

so that by virtue of thi s right,

virtue of their right of self-determination,

as well as by

they became entitled

to rule themselves and to determine their future in accordance with

normal democrati c principle s and procedure s .

'Ihe first and funda-

mental rule in any democracy i s the rule of the majority.
however,

'Ihi s rule,

was not respected by the General Assembly of the United Nati ons,

which di sregarded the will of the majority and recommended in 1947,
in circumstances and under political pressures already mentioned,

parti tion of the country between Arab and Jewish State s .

the

The events

which followed and the emergence of Israel have prevented the Palestini�n

people from exercising their right of sovereignty over their own land . 56

Notwithstanding the prolific history of both League , United Nations, 57
and International Court of Justice advi sory opinions58 that uphold and
implement the principle of self-de terminati on,

international law specialist

L . Sohn agrees with Cattan :
With regard to the principle of self-determinati on,

although inter

national recognition was extended to thi s principle at the end of

the First World War and it was adhered to wi th regard to the other

Arab terri tori. es,

at the time of the creation of the "A" Mandates,

it was not applied to Palestine,

obviously because of the intention

to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there .
Actually, i t may well be said that the Jewish National Home and

9
the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principl e . 5
Firsthand support of Cattan ' s theme that political decisions have

been substituted for legal ones concerning Palestine comes from , among
many sources ,

Ambassador Loy W .

Henderson ,

who in 1947 as director of the

Offi ce of Near F.astern and African Affai rs in the United States Department
of State ,

wrote a then top-secret memorandum to the American Secretary of

18.5

State dated September 2 2 , 1947.

Henderson wrote :

'Ihese proposals [Qf the majority of the Uni ted Nati ons Special
Commi ttee on PalestinB ,

. • •

,

ignore such principles as self

determi nation and majority rule , 60

Stoyanovsky agreed that the people of a mandated area are not
deprived of the right of soverei gnty but are deprived only temporarily

of its exerci se.

'Ihe right o f sovereignty belongs to the inhabitants

of the mandated territory "by virtue of the principles of nati onality
and self-de terminati on which are the foundation of modern international
law. 1
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Recently released Vatican documents dating back to 1943 and re-

lating to the Palesti ne-Zi oni st issue succinctly commented on the Zionist
Jewish State scheme in Palestine;
aide to the Pope,

in one document, a leading advisor-

Cardinal Lui gi Magli one ,

criti cally added:

What criterion could be adopted for bringing a people back to a
territory where they lived 19 centuri es ago? 62
'Ihe King-Crane Commi ssion report underscored the Zionist violation
of the principle of self-determinatio n :

To subject a (Palestinian) people •

. •

to unlimited Jewish immi grati on,

and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land,

and of the
6
though i t kept within the forms of law. 3

would be a gro ss violation of the principl e just quoted,
people s '

rights ,

'Ihe Commission also recognized the le gal inconsi stenci es between
the Zioni st territorial objectives in Palestine and both the Balfour
Declaration and the Covenant of the League :
No Bri tish officer,

consulted by the Commi ssioners,

believed that the

Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arm s .

The

officers generally thought that force of not less than fi fty thousand
soldiers would be required even to initiate the program .

�

That of it

self is evidence of a strong sense of the i n ustice of the Zionist

program ,

on the part of the non-Jewish ( Arab) populations of Palestine

and Syria.
nece ssary,

Decisions,

requiring armies to carry out,

are sometimes

but they are surely not gratui tously to be taken in the

interests of a serious injustice .

For the initial claim,

mi tted by Zionist representatives,

that they have a " ri ght" to Palestine

eased on an occupati on of two thousand years ago,
ously considered . 64

often sub-

can hardly be seri
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Professor Berriedale Keith averred :
Moreover ,

i t is impo ssible not to recogni se the gravity of the

difficulty created for the mandatory by the fact that the adopti on
of the �rinciple of a Jewish national home

(in Palesti ne) runs

directly counter to the doctrine of the right of each people to
self-determination . 65

There i s authority concering the legal interpretation of an
"'

agreement i n which a beneficiary,

like the Palestinians in the Balfour

Declaration,

has no negotiating or decisional rol e .

Indi ans Case

(Great Bri tain v .

Uni ted States)66 the legal situation in-

volved an agreement in which the covenantees,

no

parti ci pant role •

In the famous Cayuga

The court of justi c e ,

the Indian claimants, had

sit ting as a tribunal ,

re

ferred to "universally ad.mi tted pri nciples of justice and right dealing11 67
as being the applicable criteria in interpreting the agreement in favor
of the Indians.

Significantly,

the opinion emphasized the unaccepted

method of " the harsh operation of the legal terminology of a covenant (or
agreement) which the covenantees ( the Cayuga Indians) had no part in
framing . .. 68

International law professors Oppenheim and Lauterpacht,

while

acknowledging that "many treati es stipulating immoral obligations have
been concluded and executed , " declared that " this does not alter the fact
that such treaties were legally not binding upon the contracting parties . 11 69
'Ihese international law scholars enunciated the legal doctrine applying
to "immoral obligations" i n the following very clear terms :
It i s a customarily recogni zed rule of the Law of Nati ons that im

moral obligations cannot be the object of an international treaty . 70

'Ihe most succinct and telling legal objection to Zionism ' s fai t
accompli in Palestine i s impli cit in the words of Secretary-General U
'Ihant i n h i s Annual Report to the 22nd Session of the United Nations:
People everywhere ,

and this certainly appli e s to the Palestinian refu

gees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future . 71
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The fai ts accomplis of Zionism have always been illegal from the
beglnning.

In thi s context American author Alfred Lilienthal wrote:

'Ihe United Nations dealt a severe blow to the prestige of inter
national law and organi zation by its hasty, frivolous, and arrogant
treatment of the Palestine question. '!he General Assembly turned
down the only reasonable suggestions--a referendum in Palestine and
subnission of the legal problems to the International Court of
Justice . 72
Article 22 embodied the legal acquisition of independent national
sovereignty for those areas coming under the jurisdiction of the mandates
system .

'!he drafters of the Covenant applied the principle of "no annexa-

tion" and " self-determination . "

The indigenous people of the mandated

terri tories were the beneficiaries of these two legal principles.

The

legal criterion under international law of the Palestine Mandate , regardless of the Allied-Zionist political deception, was to make the country a
separate and independent State in which was vested legal sovereignty over
the terri tory of Palestine .

According to the principle of self-determina-

tion, or legal sovereignty, which are accepted principles of international
law, the affairs of a country must be governed by the wishes of the majority
of indigenous inhabitants, not by immigrant nor by illegal strangers to the
land.

Any attempt to suppress the wishes of an indigenous majority i s

illegal .
In the context of internati onal law Israel could not and did not
acquire legal sovereignty over the territory of Palestine.

The forceful

emergence of Israel and its alien Jewish demographic occupation in 1948
and 1949 of various areas of the territory of Arab Palestine did not deprive the Palestinians of their legal sovereignty.

Consequently, the

illegitimacy of Israel ' s claim to the timeless Arab country is without
question.

Zionism ' s violent acquisition of the counilry of Palestine73
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of the nonns of modern international law and the juristic
, doctrine of the mandates system , whi ch was superceded by the same legal
i doctrine applicable to areas under the United Nations international trust•

eeship system, which encompassed Palestine.

The juri stic principle that

. legal sovereignty lies in the people of the mandated territory i tself
I

was transfonned even more explicitly to terr1. tori.es held under trusteeship in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

As regards

Zionist usurpation of Arab Palestine through force and illegal immigration,
Cattan iterates Oppenheim and succinctly clarifies the Jewish violations:
Neither can Israel der1.ve any title by occupation. In accordance with
accepted principles of international law, occupation as a means of ac
quir1.ng territory can only be conducted or conceived in the case of
a res nullius. Palestine was at no time terra nullius, so that it
was not open for occupation nor capable of acqui sition by any State
or any group of alien settlers. 74
Moreover, any indigenous majority or minority inhabitants forcefully dispossessed out of a country does not derogate, in international
law, from their full rights to their homeland and property; 75 and most
certainly does it not confer on an external invader, usurper, or aggressor
any juridical rights seized by force of arms. 76 Both the League and
United Nations prescribe to the international l aw principle that the
acqui sition of terri tory by force of arms is inadmissible; and this
principle , though not always subscribed to, has been confirmed inviolable.
I srael has invoked the 1947 partition resolution to justify its
occupation of Palestine terri tory.

Israel ' s occupation of Palestine ter-

ritory under the Armistice Agreements i s not and cannot, in international
law, be a legal source of title to the land of Palestinian peopl e . 77 In
fact, the Armistice Agreements specifically provided that
the armi stice lines are not to be construed as political or terri
torial boundari es and are delineated without prejudice to the ultimate
settlement of the Palestine Question. 78
• • .

1

!;d !�

it, :

f�

; ·

and
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Cattan analyzed the international law problem between Zionism
Palestine as follows:
In conclusion it can be said that Israel did not and could not gain
title to the terri tories which i t seized in 1948 and ·l949 whether
within or in excess of the boundaries of the partition resolution.
Neither did I srael acquire title to the territories which it seized
in 1967 . Its legal status i n both cases i s identical : it i s the
status of a belligerent occupier. And it i s immaterial whether
Israel i s considered a belligerent occupier or a conqueror. In
neither case can i t acquire sovereignty. 79
"Israel , " says Hedley

V.

Cooke ,

alone among all the countries of the world , possesses not a single
square i nch of territory which she could assuredly proclaim to be
her own in perpetuity. 80
Kissinger supports Cattan and Cooke .

The Zionist State of Israel ,

besides being an anomaly in the Middle East area, is there without any
legitimacy which has not been claimed by force .

At a news conference on

January 19, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger--for the first time
publicly--raised the question of Israel ' s need for "legitimacy" as the
only alternative to escalating armaments and mili tary confrontations.
Kissinger answered a newsman ' s question with the following:
The problem in the Middle East is to balance physical security
against legitimacy. There is no question that Israel ' s physical
security is best guaranteed by the widest extension of its frontier
and at no other point are they as physically secure as at the maximum
point of their extension. On the other hand, politically and in the
long term they may be militarily even less secure if they don q t
achieve legitimacy . 8 1 ( Emphasi s mine )
What Kissinger did not say, of course , is that in this equation
of "legi. timacy" versus on-going warfare , it is the Arab League sta tes8 2
(or "the Arabs" ) who are the principal judges of "legitimacy" precisely
because it has been Zionist usurpation of Arab rights ( Egypt ' s legal
sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula, Syria ' s legal sovereignty over the
Golan Heights, the Palestinians' legal sovereignty over Palestine ) which
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constitutes the essence of the history of . Zioni st/Israel ' s illegitimacy.
And

the Zionist State--for all its professions of peace--persists in

expanding,occupying and colonizing Arab territory acquired by offensive
war and in denying the rights of the Palestinians to self-detennination.
The legal title of the Palestinians to their natural homeland
remains unaltered .

One of the strangest features of the Palestine

Question i s that it should be necessary to demonstrate that the Palesti nian
Arab people have both a moral and legal case against Zionism in Palestine .
The actions of Britain after World War I in forcing or inflicting upon
the overwhelming but powerless Arab majority in Palestine a political
situation they were vehemently opposed to; 83 of the United States government after World War II in assisting the World Zionist movement to achl. eve
its aggre ssive "Jewish State" goals in Palestine;

84 of the League
of

Nations (and United Nations) in denying the Arab majority its right to a
plebi scite or i n refusing to refer the matter to the court of International
Justice for an expression of legal opinion before the League arbitrarily
assumed the mandate administration (or for that matter, recommending
partition in 1947; and of the Zionist Movement obtruding i tself against
the wishes of the Arab people of Palestine, and forcefully evicting the
Arab majority in 1948 ) , 85 all these acts constitute grave violations of
international law concepts.
What should become starkly evident i s that the present situation
in Palestine is the result of an extraordinary accumulation of injustices,
illegalities and violations--violations of international law and violations
of ordinary human rights and freedoms .

The number of wrongs i s appalling:

the Balfour Declaration; a mass Jewish inunigration forced upon the original
•

Arab inhabitants; the inequity of illegal parti tion; the usurpation of four-
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: ; fifths

of the territory of Pal estine by an alien minori ty; the forcibl e

displacement of i ts indigenous populati on and the plunder and coloni zation
of their lands and homes.
The crowning indignity was the creation of an illegal state.
Cattan ,

for example, demonstrate s first of all that Israel 0 s "hi storical

claim" to Palestine i s l:ased on 1X>th "legal and historical nonsense , "
and then deals with the validity and legality of the other claims of
Israel ' s statehood--the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate agreement,
the 1947 United Nations resolution on Pal estine , diplomatic recognition
of Israel by other states, mili tary occupation of terri tories beyond
those desi gnated i n the Parti tion Plan, and the alleged "sovereignty
vacuum" in Palestine.

In each case,

the Zionist State of Israel claims

are invalid and illegal, both within and without the 1X>undari e s of the

1947 Parti tion Plan .

Thus,

the exi stence of the State of Israel has

simply no msi s in international law;

instead, i t i s l:ased on the strange

principle that "wrong compounded constitutes right.

1186
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1noreen Ingrams, Palestine Pa ers

New York :

Braziller,

,

1973
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61.

Seeds of Conflict

1 17-1 22:

The extrac t is from Balfour ' s

vate letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George dated February

i ,

!! '

J

2Great Bri tain,

3woodward

Public Records Offi ce,

and Butl er,

(:4r
oreign Policy,

ed . ,

Foreign Office,

371/4185.

First Series of Docum.ents on Bri tish

IV (HMSO, 1952 ) ,

p.

'Ihi s extrac t i s taken from a

340.

l pr.i.vate letter to Prime Minister Lloyd George dated August

I

4Public Re c.ord s Offi c e ,

·:
··:

Foreign Office,

indigenous Arab Jews of Palestine,

�: as

the pretense of speaki ng for them.

11 , 1919.

Anti-Zionist

406/40 .

the Sephardim .group ,

much as the Pal estinian Arab population.

pro-Zioni st,

19, 1919 ,

abhorred Zionism

But Zionism also formulated

At this time

(1918)

Ormsby-Gore,

a

was British Liaison to the Zionist delegation at the Pari s

Peace Conference .
5rngram s ,

op.

The date of this extract i s August

cit. ,

p.

1918.

Thi s extract from Sir Hubert Young,

140.

senior offi cial in the Briti sh Colonial Offi c e ,

a

summari zes the Bri tish

deception in a private memorandum on negotiations with the Arab Delegati on
whi ch came to London in the summer of

1921.

6'Ihe di stinction between legal and political sovereignty i s of direct

bearing on the territorial and politi cal changes brought about by force

by the Jews in Pal estine since

1948.

the legal character of such change s .

It provides the gauge for apprai sing
"Sovereignty combines politi cal

and legal connotations relating to right and power , " Cattan observes in

Palestine and International Law

(1973) ,

p.

Bri erly declares in The

59 ,

Law of Nati ons

(1963),

juri sprudence,

where i t had i t s origin and where i t properly belongs,

p.

13,

that "One result of identifying sovereignty

with might instead of legal right was to remove i t from the sphere of

and to import i t into political science ,

where i t has ever since been a

source of confusion . "

For the difference between legal sovereignty

nati onal Law,

Clarendon Pre ss,

(de jure soverei gnty) and political sovereignty ,
( Oxford :

1966 ) ,

see Ian Brownlie,

pp.

Inter

Professor

100, 102.

Schwarzenberger expressed the di stinction between legal and political
soverei gnty a s ,

a level ,
See G .

"The last word is still not with law,

but power.

On such

the counterpart to legal sovereignty i s political sovereignty . "

Schwarzen'r..erger,

Hague Recueil,

(1955 ) ,

"The Fundamental Principles of Internati onal Law, "

p.

Pratique sur l ' Occupation,

215.

Professor Gaston Jeze,

(Pari s,

1896),

pp.

44-46,

Etude Th�origue e t

points out that a

belligerent occupier does not acquire sovereignty in law:

" Cette pri se

au profi t du vainqueur l ' acquisition du territoire occupe'.

. •

de possession, qui repose exclusivement sur. la force,
d ' abord que l ' Etat donte le terri toire est envahi
et que le vainqueur mainti enne son occupation.

victorieux scra une

n ' entr�ne pas

se refuse

Supposons

a

trai ter,

La domination de l ' Etat

souverainete' de fait et non de droi t •

• •

Tant que des

protestations se feront entendre , il y aura bi.en une domination de fai t,

mai s non un e'tat de droi t . "

193

See also Ian Brownli e , Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford,
1966 ) , who refers to the continued exi stence of legal personality under
international law despite the fact that the process of government i n an
area falls i nto the hands of another State , pp. 100-102.
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home for the Jewish peopl e '

i s not equivalent to making Pal estine into

a Jewi sh State"--this passage from the report refers to the Balfour
Declaration favor clause.
64Ibid. ,

P•

In

794.

1948

the Zionist conquest of Palestine was accom

plished by mili tary force including the use of terror and forceful dispossession.
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Nielsen,

Report of the Case Decided Under the Special Agree

ment Between the United States and Great Bri tain of Au
Washi ngton,
67rbid. ,

D.C. ,
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320.
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203, 307.
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Ibid . , p .

320.

I n appl ying these juridical criteria, i t should be

recognized that the purpose of the Bal four Declaration including the
first safeguard was "protective" rather than "harsh , " i . e . , the Bri tish
Government invoked the principle "it being clearl y understood that
nothing shall be done whi ch may prejudice the civil and religious rights
of the (Palestinian people ) . "
It follows, a forti ori , i . e . , with even
greater reason, that the entire Balfour letter "must be effectuated ac
cording to the ' uni versally admitted principle s ' of elementary justice . "
If the Zionist interpretation were accepted, the Balfour Declaration
would then be one of "harsh operati on . "
For an appraisal o f this legal
·

doctrine i n international law, see W . T. Ma.llison, Jr . , "The Balfour
Declaration: An Apprai sal i n International Law, " Ibrahim Abu-Lughod , ed . ,
'Ihe Transformation of Pal estine (Evanston : Northwe stern Uni versity Pre ss,
1971), p . 9 1 .
69
Lassa Oppenheim,

Peace ,
us

I

International Law ,

1955), p . 896.

editor Hersh Lauterpacht,

There i s no longer any reason for
to picture the highest Bri tish authorities as blinded by Zionist
(New York,

decepti ons.

It is obvi ous that the principal feature of the Balfour
Declaration as interpreted by the Jewish Zionists and British Gentile
Zionists i s its immoral character in violating, inter alia, the rights
of the Pale stinian Arab people whi ch were protected by the first safe

guard.

See, for exampl e , Weizmann , Trial and Error, p . 302; Abraham
Tulin, ed . , Book of Documents Sul:mitted to the General Assembl
of the
United Nati ons New York , 1947 , pp. 1, 5; Desmond Stewart, The Middle

East:

Temple of Janus (New York , 1971 ) , p .

284;

Richard Meinertzhagen,

'lhe Middle East Diar : 1 1 -1
6 (Londo n , 1959 ) ; Walid Khalidi , ed . ,
From Haven to Conquest
Beirut , 1971 ) , pp. 195-200; Chri stopher Sykes ,
Cross Roads to Israel ; Pale stine from Balfour to Bevin (London, 1965),
p. 78; W. T. Ma.llison, Jr . , " The Balfour Declarati on , " in Ibrahim

Abu-Lughod, op. cit . , pp. 93, 94, 95,
Zionist sources reveal that the
principal feature o f the declaration as interpreted by the Zionists i s
its immoral character i n intentionally violating, inter alia, the natural
indigenous rights and privileges o f the Palestinian people i n their own
homeland .
?Orbl.d .

'Ihe "plain-meaning" interpretation could be elucidated with

preponderant international law sources in order to sustain completeness
But this is not necessary be
in analysis of the Balfour Declarati on.
cause the availability o f the negotiating evidence provides a rare
historical account of accuracy in lucidly interpreting the declarati on.
It is sufficient, for the purpose o f this thesi s , to note that the Zionist
interpretation of the declarati on i s completely inconsistent and departs

from the negotiating history of the declarati on .
For the Mallison legal
exposition of the words i n the Bal four l e tter, see '"lhe Bal four Declarati o n , "
i n Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, op. cit. , p . 95.
71

22 U.N.

GAOR ,

Supp. lA, at p.

7,

U.N.

Doc. A/6701/Add . 1

(1967) . .
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Alfred M. Lili enthal , What Price Israel?, ( Chicago : Henry Regnery,
195J), pp. 73-74. See the Draft Resolution Referring Certain Legal
Questions to the International Court of Justi ce by Sub-Commi ttee 2 of
the United Nations Ad Hoc Commi ttee on Palestine, 1947 .
7
3see, for exampl e , Menachem Eeigin ( Begin) , The Revol t ; Avner,
Memoirs of an Assassin ; Marder, Haganah ; Peretz , Israel and the Palestine
Arabs; Jiryi s , The Arabs in Israel ; Erskine B. Childers, The Other
Exodus; Jacques de Reynier, Deir Yasi n .
The literature on the subject
of Zionist discrimination and oppression in Palestine-Israel i s profuse
but must be sought out. Concerning the Zionist alleged "historic right"
to Palestine i t i s significant that an Israeli legal writer, Yehuda Blum,
does not even mention the Balfour Declaration in a book dealing with
historic legal titles: Historic Titles in International Law ( The Hague ,
1965) .
'Ihi s omission is signi ficant because the declaration is employed
in the Declarati on of the Establishment of the State of Israel to be one
of the legal bases of that State, that i s, the Zionist territorial claim
to Arab Palestine.
74
Cattan, op. ci t . , p . 77 ; Oppenheim, op. ci t . , p . 555; G . Schwarzenberger, op. ci t . , p . 302 .
7.5w. T . Ma.lli son, Jr. , and s . V . Mallison, The Role o f International
Law in Achieving Justi ce and Peace in Palestine-Israel (New York: AMEU,
19 77 , part II , A and B.

77

cattan , op. ci t . , p . 62. Note the invalidity of the maxim ex facto
jus oritur ( the principle of effectiveness in the exercise of power).
Consult Cattan, ibid . , p . 63 for reasons invalidating the maxim.
Effec
tiveness does not confer a valid title to an illicit act.
Effectiveness
produces legal results i f , after a reasonable time, the illicit act is
It should be obvious to anyone that the
not effectively contested.
dispossessed Pal estinians (and the United Nations) have contested the
violent creati on of Israel on Palestine terri tory.
7
8see the various armi sti ce agreements of 1949 between Israel and
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria,
Note that these are not agreements
wi th the Palestinian people.

· 79Cattan,

op. ci t . , p . 82.

80Hedley V . Cooke, Israel, A Blessing and A Curse (London: Stevens
and Sons, 1960 ) , p . 186.
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8 1'lhe New York Tim e s ,

January 20,

1977, p .

16.

�

82There i s because of Zionist forceful usurpati on of the Palestine
: territory ( and a League mandated state) still a stateof war between
'Israel and the member states of the Arab League , of whi ch Egypt, Jordan
Syria are members. ·

!lan
d
�-l .
.;

3
8 In July 1919 a General Syrian Congress held at Damascus and attended
by Palestinian delegates passed a resolution electing Amir Faisal , son
of Husain i bn Ali (King of the Hejaz), King o f a united Syria (which
included Palestine) and rejecting the Balfour Declarati on .
King Faisal
was,

however, forcefully deposed by the French in July 1920.
In the
meantime President Woodrow Wilson, who had endorsed the declaration

before its pronouncement, and though failing to secure Anglo-French
Italian agreement to the formation of an inter-Allied Commi ssion of
Inqui ry, di spatched the Uni ted States 0King- Crane Commi ssion" to the
former Arab provi ces of the Ottoman lands to "ascertain the wishe s" of
their inhabi tants regarding the post-war settlement of their terri tori e s .
The King-Crane Commi ssion reported that 1 , 350 petitions, compri sing 72

per cent of the total received from the whol e of Syri a , were anti-Zionist
and that Zionist spokesmen contemplated the dispossession of the Arabs.

They recommended a serious modification of the "extreme Zionist program . "
Also generall y consult Ingram s , op. cit. ; and Robert John and Sarni Hadawi ,
The Palestine Diar 1914-194 : Britain ' s Involvement, Vol . I of The
Pal estine Di ary New York: New World Pre ss, 1970
•

4
8 Richard Stevens, Ameri can Zionism and U . S . Forei
(Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studi es, 1970 .
5
8 see,

for example,

Menachem Bei in,

The Revolt : Sto

of the Ir un

(New York : Henry Schwnan , 1951 ; Jon Kimch e , The Seven Fallen Pillars
(New York: F . A . Praeger, 1953 ) ; Dov Joseph, The Fai thful City: The Seige
of Jerusalem 1948 (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1960); Edgar O ' Ballance ,
The Arab-Is:rr:aeli War 1948 (New York : F. A . Praeger, 1957 ) ;
Sir John Ba.got
Gl�bb, A Solddier with the Arabs (New York: Harper & Bros . ,

1957 ) ;

Felicia Langer, " I sraeli Violations of Human Rights i n the Occupied Arab
Terri tori e s , " Ameri cans for Middle East Understandi ng (AMEU), Palaces of
Injusti ces (New York : AMEU, 1976 ) , pp. 22-26; Erskine B. Childers, "The
Other Exodus , " The Spectator, May 1 2 , 1961, pp. 672-675; Jacques de Reynier,
"Deir Yasin , " Khalidi , ed . , op. ci t . , pp. 761-766 .
de Reynier was head
of the delegation i n Palestine of the International Red Cross throughout
the period o f hostilities, 1948.

See also Great Bri tai n ,

The Anglo

Ameri can Commi ttee of Enquiry regarding the Problems of European Jewry
and Palestine , Lausanne, 20th April 1946, Report 1946, Command 6808
(London: HMSO, 1946 ) , pp. 39-42; Jiry i s , op. cit.
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It

.

should be noted that the Uni ted States Department of State i n

1948 acknowledged the d e facto usurpati ous acqui sitions of Palestine
terri tory :

" • • •

we must consider the role of the remaining Pri ncipal

Allied and Associated Powers.

It was these Powers whi ch allocated the

Pal estine mandate to Great Britain after World War I . "

Advi ser

( Gross )

to the Under-Secretary of State

See the Legal

( Lovett ) ,

memorandum ,

"Recognition of Successor States in Palestine , " May 1 3 , 1948,
ment of State, file FW 86?N . 01/5-1048 .
American Jewish writer Thomas Kiernan
Jews had no legal claim ,

( The

Arabs , pp.

The Zionists were European .

253-4)

MS . Depart

write s : "The

There was abso

lutely no biologi cal and anthropological connection between the pro
genitors of European Jewry-the Khazars-and the ancient Hebrew tri be s • •
The UN 9 s establishment of a Zionist Jewish nation on Arab soil and in
the midst of an overwhelming majority of Arab people • • • was a clear
violation o f the UN ' s principles on the self-determination of peoples
Incidentally, it should be knownthat
indigenous to specific lands. "
the UN withdrew its contemplation of Palestine ' s partiti on. This idea
was dropped •

•

!l!I
1

l
i'
I.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION : THE INVALIDITY OF THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
Is the Balfou:i;- Declaration valid i n public i nternational law?
Is it consistent wi th the preeminent international law principle of
the self-de terminati on of peoples?
occupier of Palestine,

1

Where did England,

the military

derive the l e gal authority to open up the

Palestinian country to permanent settlement by another foreign people ,
a group that Balfour knew methodically sought political sovereignty
in that land?

2

Did �·/ eizmann3 really believe the Zionists had a legal

claim to Palestine?

Because ,

he did write to a friend in 1914:

Don ' t you think that the chance for the Jewish people i s now
within the limits of di scucsion at last?
that we cannot "claim" anythi ng,

it;

I real i s e ,

of course,

we are much too atomized for

but we can reasonably say that should Palestine fall with-

in the British sphere of influence ,

a Jewi sh settlement there,

and should Britain encourage

as a Bri tish dependency,

in twenty to thirty years a million Jews out there,
they would develop the country,

t·;e

could have

perhaps more ;

bri ng back civiliza ion to i t
4

and form a very effective guard for the Suez Canal .
Amos Elon writes that in 1923,

Arthur Ruppin5 turned against

what Ruppi n called the "imperialist approach" of "political Zioni sm" :
At first,

like most of h i s (Arthur Ruppin) colleague s ,

looked the national aspi rations of the Arabs.
could be appeased through economic benefi ts .

he over

He assumed that they.

Eut earlier than most

he realised the shortsightedness of this approach .

By 1921 he was

already bitterly reproaching his fellow (Zionist) settlers for
wrongly aiming at the establishment of a nation-state

( "another

Montenegro" ) while at the same time ignoring the existence of an

Arab p obl e m .
�
ilege .

1he Balfour Declaration,

he felt,

was a paper pri v

In i t s own proclamation of statehood of Viay 14,
invoked three provi sions to justify i t s legitimacy:

1948,

Israel

'Ihe Balfour Declar

ationZ the Mandate of the League of Nations� and the 1947 Parti tion
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Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations .

None of

� these provi sions abided by the international law concept of the selfdetermination of an indi genous peopl e ;

on the contrary,

all three violated

the doctrine of self-detennination which gai ned recognition as a principle
Ironically,

of international law after World War r . 9

the mandate system

was supposedly justified as a means of aiding the establishment of selfgoverning institutions in the mandate countri es.
As pertains to the Ealfour Declarati on Sol Linowi tz has written:
The most significant and incontroverti ble fact in,

i tself the

Bri tain had no sovereign rights over Palestine ;

intere st;

however,

that by

For Great

( Balfour) �eclaration was legally impotent .

i t had no propri etary

The Declaration
was merely a statement of Bri tish i n tentions and no more . 1 0
•

t

I

I

t

t

t t

I

i t had no authori ty to di spose of the land.
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Generally overlooked in the refined search for intentions,

I

I

I

I

I

I I

I

I

however,

I

I

i s the paramount and all-important fact that at the time in question

England had ab::;olutely no right of dispod tion and no legal or
propri etary interest in Pal estine , which was then a Turki sh provi nce.
Regardless,

of what commitment England might have made ,

she was

neither soverei gn over Palestine herself nor was her action ratified

ei ther by Turkey ( the then legal sovereign) or the League of Nations
( the later sovereign ) . 1 1
Significantly,

Linowi tz declared that in "an ohjecti ve and infonned

decision with respect to legal rights involved in the creation of Israel
by the United Nations, " the "point of· departure for a legal analysis" of
the Palestine-Zionist confli ct "i s the Da.lfour Declaration.

111 2

The

mandatory scheme may have been propo sed with a high ideal and an altrui ctic
end in view,

but i t was adopted, however, only after the statesmen against

whom Woodrow �nlson was pitted had agreed that they would not have to
observe ei ther the spirit or the letter of the Mandatory clauses i n the
Covenant . 1 3

l·�reover,

Zionist consent to the inclusion::; of the Balfour

Declaration was reque sted--and received--before the Nandate was confirmed.
And the meaning of the declaration was authori tatively explained in the
British White Paper in 1922,

which sta.ted:
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Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the pur
pose i n view i s to create a wholly Jewish Palestine .

Phrases have

been used such as that Pal estine i s to become "as Jewish as England
l s English" .

His Majesty ' s Government

Nor have they at any time contemplated

•

•

•

.

•

•

subord ination of the Arabi c population,
Palestine . 14
·

have no such aim in view.
the disappearance or the

language or cul ture in

For all the distorted and mythologi zed political rhetoric the
Zioni sts have accredited to the declaration as a "legal title" to Arab
Palestine,

very few have perceived

that Zionist agreement to this official

interpretation was requested--and received--before the mandate was confi nned.

Said another way,

before the Eriti sh would incorporate the

declaration i n the mandate for Palestine,

Bri tain wanted the Zioni st

Organi zation to be very clear about the meaning of the declaration i n
that it did not mean that Palestine would become a Jewish State a s the
Zionists desired .

'!he Zionist Organi zation clearly understood thi s mean-

ing because '.ilei zmann ,

their president,

accepted the White Pa.per:

It was made clear to us that confirmation of the Mandate would be
condi tioned on our acceptance of the policy as interpreted in the

White Paper ,

which we did,

and my colleagues and I therefore had to accept i t ,
though not without some qual ms . 1 5

From a juridical standpoi nt the Zionists th emselves have mooted
the declaration ' s invalidity as legal title to Palestine by hi storically
acknowledging in 1922 the clear meaning of the declaration before the
British would enter i t s provi sions in the mandate text for Palestine .
Consequently,

how could Zionism and " I srael" invoke in i t s own proclama-

ti on of J•ia.y 14,

1948,

the League ' s mandate as a 1 egal instrument for

justification of their Judenstaat scheme in Palestine?

In 1922,

the Colonial Secretary, declared i n the House of Commons,

Churchil l ,

with reference

to the Balfour Declaration:
At the same time that this pledge was made to the Zioni sts,

an

equall y important promise was made to the Arab inhabitants in

Palestine--that their civil and religious rights would be effective-

l
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i.I

and that they should ijOt be turned out to make room
for the newcomers ( Jewish settlers) . 1 6

ly safeguarded.

t

1!

Herbert Samuel ,

the

himself a leading Zionist and the first to tackle

British �far Cabinet i n favor of the Zionist scheme in Palestine,

similarl y declared the Balfour Declaration as not involving the creation
of a Jewi sh State i n the Arab country.

For he stated in 1947 :

The Jewish State has been the aspiration of the Jewish people for
centuri e s .

be realized.

It is an aspiration which at the present day cannot
It is not contained in the Balfour Declaration

There was no promi se of a Jewish State.

•

•

.

What was promi sed was that

the British Government would favour the creation of a Je'.d sh National

Home--the tenn was most carefully chosen--in Palesti n e .

'Ihe Declara

tion did not say that Palestine should be the Jewish National Home,

but that it favoured a Jewish National Home in Palestine,

'.d thout

prejudice to the civil and relie;ious rights of the Arab populati on.1 7
All of the official public declarations of the Bri tish Government
declare that Palestine was never to come under the sovereignty of Jews
in that land,
Jews.

that the declaration conveyed no terri torial rights to the

Addi tional confirmation of this fact emanate s from the 3ri tish

Government ' s Statement of Policy issued · in October of 1930 which d.eals
at length with the meaning i t attributed to the " Jewish national home" ;
Eut this statement ( British Command Paper of 1922) has not removed
(Zionists) doubts,

and Hi s Majesty ' s Government therefore now declare

unequivocally that it i s not part of their policy that Palestine
should become a Jev.1. sh State .

They would indeed regard i t as con

trary to their obligations to the Arabs under the ;·landate,

as well

as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people i n
the past,

that the Arab population o f Palestine should be made the

subjects of a Jewi sh State against their wil1 . 18

Even though the Ea.lfour Declaration can 'be viewed as having envisioned something less than a Je•nsh State,

its greatest significance

lies in its political support for Jewish Zionist aspirati ons in Arab
Palestine which was an illegal interference with,
extraterritorial trespass upon.
Arabs i n their own homeland .

and an atrocious

the natural rightG of the Pale stinian

Even the commi ttee set up to analyze the
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McMahon-Hussein Correspondence (1915-19 1 6 ) , the Anglo-Aral!: Conference
of London in 1939, concluded that Britain had violated the natural selfdetermination rights o f the people of Palestine :
His Majesty' s Government were not free to dispose of Palestine without
regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine . 19
Even the Uni ted States Government, for as much as 1 t has shielded and
supported Zionism, has privately admitted its own illegal actions.
a

In

then top-secret memorandum to the Secretary of State of September 22,

1947, Ambassador Loy �L Henderson, then serving as the director of the
Office of Near Ea.stern and African Affairs in the Department of State,
stated :
1hese propo�al �

[p f the majority of
� , for instance,

the United Nations Special Corn
ignore such principles as self
determina tion and majority rul e . 'Ihey recognize the principles of
a theocratic racial state and even go so far in several instances
as to di scriminate on grounds of religion and race against persons
outside of Palestine . 2 0
rni ttee on Palestin

Jul e s P.asdevant, formerly President of the International Court
of Justice, has juridically postulated :
No state has the right to extend at will i ts mrn competence at the
expense of other States and other peoples. International law does
not recognize the �ritish State as having competence other than over
its own terri tories and over its O'tm subjects and nationals . 21
Professor Alan

R . Taylor of the School of International Service

at the American University in :·Jashington, D . C . , whose publications on
vari ous aspects of the Palestine confli ct have established his reputation
as a scholar, declare s :
1he Declaration was actually only an ambiguously worded expression
of sympathy for Zioni st aspirations addresr.;ed indirectly to the Zionist
Organization and without substance in international law .22
Significantly, no less a Zionist leader than Nahum Goldman himself
has pointed out that :
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'!he Zionist movement should never have lost sight of the fact that

i t represented an excepti on to the universally valid rule that a

terri tory belongs to the majority of the population that lives there .
In 19 39 ,

the British Government was much more expl i c i t :

23

it totally

rejected and repudiated the Zionist contention that Palestine was to
become the Jewish State.

While i terating i ts offi cial publi c mandate

policy previously clarified for the Zionists i n the Command Paper of 1922,
Britain officially declared that the "terms of the (Balfour) Declaration • . •
do not contemplate that Palestine • • • should be converted into a Jewish
National Horne"

( " • • • but

that such a Home should be founded in Palestine . " ) ,

that "His Majesty' s Government now declare unequivocally that i t i s not
part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State , " and
that Bri tain "desires to see established . • . an independent Pal estine State , " 24
If thi s was not clear to the Zionists the British mandatory also declared:
It has been the hope • • • ever since the Balfour Declaration was i ssued
that in time the Arab population • • • would become reconciled to the
further growth of the Jewish National Home .
fulfilled.

This hope has not been

The alternati ves • . • are either ( i ) to seek to expand the

Jewish National Home indefinitely

by

immigration,

against the strong

l y expressed will of the Arab people of the country ;

or ( i i ) to per

mit further expansion . • . only i f the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce
in i t .

'Ihe former policy means rule by force • • • contrary to the whole

spirit of • • . the League of Nations,

as well as to the . • • Mandate .

'lberefore His Majesty ' s Government • • • have decided that the time has

come to adopt in pri nciple the second of the alternative s referred
to above • • • • 2 5

'Ihat the Bri tish never legally acquired sovereignty over Palestine
i s revealed in the ruling of the International Court of Justi ce in the
case of the legal

status of South-West Afri ca ( Naffi)bi a) .

The Court adverted

to the le� nature of the mandate system under the League of Nations:
• • • 'Ihe provi sions of Arti cle- 22 of the Covenant • • • and the principles

embodied therein,

showed that the creation of this new international

Addi tionally,

the Court ruled that the change in a mandated ter-

institution did not involve any cession of territory or transfer of
2b
sovereign
.
ty • • • •
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rl tory

could not be effectuated "without proper consultation

• • •

of all

the peoples of the Territory i tself1127 and that the
Mand.ate was created , in the interest of the inhabitants of the
territory, and of humanity in general, as an international insti
tution with an international object--a sacred trust of civili zation. 28
Juridically, the Court ruled that
The Mandatory i s not free to deal with the territory or people as
signed to it as though either were its own . , . A territory or entity
under mandate is
to be distinguished from a colonial possession
• • •

• • • •

29

In an earlier case of Re Ezra Goralshvih (1925) the Palestine
Supreme Court applied the deci sion of the League of Nations Council that
inhabi tants of mandated territories were not be be regarded as nationals30
of the mandatory power.

But, significantly, this Court of British

composition ruled:
to hold that the petitioners are British subjects would involve
holding that the crown, having accepted the responsibility of gover
ning Palestine as a mandatory, has thereby acquired sovereignty,
a view for which no authority has been cited
31
• . .

• . . .

In short, the Court agreed that the British had no legal sovereign
jurisdiction over Palestine and its indigenous population.
Strangely, it is well known that the Balfour Declaration i s void
even by reason of its conf1.ict with assurances and pledges given by the
Bri tish Government to the Arabs and the Palestinians.

But its nullity

depends much more importantly upon reasons arising from the secret entrenous with a politi cal movement (Zionism) having no legal privileges and
rights in Palestine and from the illegal extraterritorial capacity of
Britain or the War Cabinet to make i t .

I t i s absurd to

think

that Britain

could, in the nature of international law, determine or dictate policy
over another nation ' s terri tory, a territory over which i t had no sovereign
rights. 32

The absurdi ty of this proposition i s best perceived by suggesting

that Britain· in 1917 could dictate or determine policies in the territory
of Arizona or Oklahoma, areas of the United States in which Britain would
have no juridical rights .

In other words, the declaration i s void and

invalid, per se, without the need of extraneous considerations .

Regard

less of its real meani ng, regardless of its safeguard which i s stipulated
in favor of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine--a safeguard which, in any
event, was openly and callously di sregarded by the mandatory and Zionists-
and regardless also of its incompatibility with pledges made to the Arabs,
the declaration is legally null and void for the following reasons.
Firstly, the British, as author of the declaration, possessed no
dominion or sovereignty in Palestine or the Turkish Empire enabling it
to make promises of any rights, whatever their nature and extent and how
ever extraterritorially imposed, in favor of Zionist Jewry of the world.
It i s immaterial whether these "rights" were meant to be terri torial,
political or cultural .

'Ihe declaration was, per se, void on the basis

of the international legal principle that a donor cannot give away what
does not legally belong to him.

Nonnan Bentwich, a Zionist Jew who held

for several years the office o f Attorney General of Palestine under the
mandate, declared himself, that the concept of "the Jewish national home"
did not mean or imply the grant of rights of political sovereignty to Jews
over Arab Palestine. 33
Secondly, but related to the first reason, the declaration i s
also void . o n the legal ground that i t violated the natural and legi.. timate
rights of the people of Palestine
who desired independence .

( more

importantly, of Greater Syria)

It was immaterial whether the declaration sought

to impose the creation of Zionist Judenstaat or simply of a "national home"
for emigrating Jews offered Palestinian citizenship; it was in either case
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invalid and could not, in any way, impair the rights of the Palestinian
people to determine their own course of statehood.

The legal right of a

foreign state to dispose of other people ' s territory in violation of their
right of self-determination i s not an accepted principle of international
law.

It should be ludicrous to even di scuss this rather obvious principle

of legal conduct.

Nonetheless, Balfour had already written in an

official

government memorandum dated August 1 1 , 1919, four months after the concept
of the Palestine Mandate was accepted and its basic self-governing ol:r
jectives (independence and statehood) laid down in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations whi ch was adopted April 25, 1919:
In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consult
ing the wishes of the present ( Arab) inhabitants of the country • • • The
four great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism i s • • . of far
profounder import than the desires . . . of the 700, 000 Arabs who now
inhabit that ancient land. 34
Considering that the concept of international mandates was pre
dicated upon the principle of self-determination of peoples , 35 Balfour' s
memorandum, after the intenational mandate system was adopted by the
League , i s seen perfidiously as a calculated and extreme violation of
the accepted international legal principle embodied i n Article 22 which
provided that
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turki sh Empire have
reached a stage of development where their existence as indpendent
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering
of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory un+il such
time as they are able to stand alone.
In the light of Balfour' s official statement how is one to see
the actions and designs of the British Government calling for an official
violation of the mandate trust as other than blatant perfidy, a calculated
and premeditated violation of an international l egal trust?
'Ihirdly, the declaration i s not the result of an agreement between
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states .

It i s no more than a letter addressed t o Lord Rothschild,

private Bri tish citizen,

a

who had no legal title in international law to

enter into an official contractual obligation ( there i s no legal con
tractual obligation in the declarati on ) ,

since its recipient,

a Zionist

Bri. tish subject, did not even represent "the Jewish communi ty" or the
Zioni st Organi zation whi ch,
nati onal law.

in any event, were not subjects of inter-

The Balfour Declarati on concerned a territory with which

Bri. tain had no legal relation;

consequently, neither :Britain or the Zionist

Organization could acquire the area of Palestine in regard to any terri. torial
interests they may have separately or entrenously had in mind.
Fourthl y,

some Zionists argue that even though the declaration

lacked initial juridical value,
Palestine Mandate .

J6

it was validated by its inclusion in the

The argument of an ex post facto validation of the de

clarati on by the Palestine Mandate has no legal l::a si s .
should be clear,

Because,

if, as

Britain posse ssed no legal sovereignty over Palestine and,

consequently , no legal authority to make the declarati on,

the inclusion o f

the declaration in the mandate did not and could not cure i t s invalidity.
Actually,

the inclusion of the declaration in the mandate system,

instead

of making i t legal , had the effect of invalidating the mandate i tself and
violating Article

22

of the League Covenant.

For an illegal agreement can

not make valid and legal what i s already inherently invalid and illegal . 37
Fifthly,

the opposition of the Palestine Arab Jews to the establi sh

ment of a Jewi sh national home in Palestine reveals that the Zionist scheme
was a foreign idea,

extrinsi c to Palestine.

Such an alien scheme could· not

be construed as a recognition of a right of self-determination in favor of
the Jewish community then living in Pal estine,

whi ch in any case represented

about three percent of the Palestine population . 38
scheme be considered even today

(1948 )

(Nor could thi s alien

as a national liberati on movement . )
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'Ihe Balfour Declarati on,

espoused as a legal title by Zionism-

Israel to establish a Jewish State in Arab Pal estine,
fraud .

is a hi storical

'Ihe declaration, historically and juridically analyzed,

does not

create a valid grant to Zionist Jewry of any legal rights in Palestine.*
As Henry Cattan ,

a jurist of international repute ,

said,

the

Declaration was nothing but an illegal and mischievous promi se
which has brought the most disastrous consequences to Palestine
and the Middle East. 39
Contrary to the Zioni sts' protestations,

the declaration does

40
not provide international authority for the Zionist state in Palestine .
It does not legally recognize "the right of ' tbe Jewish people'
national rebi rth" in Palestine,

to

neither in a historical analysis nor

international law.

*Thi s writer ' s opinion of the "Declaration" i s that it i s actually only an
l aspirati ons
ambigously worded expre ssion of sympathy for Zionist olitica
�
addressed to Lord Rothschild (another English citizen) and without sub
stance in international law.
It can in substance be equated even less with
the Gulf o f Tonkin resolution whi ch had absolutely no substance i n inter
national law.
Even Leonard Stein, as lawyer and Zioni st, after providing
his own historical and juridical analysi s , makes the judgment statement:
"The Declaration was a political and not a legal document • . • . " See Stein,
op. ci t . , p . 553.
Thi s writer agrees with Lasswell that the declarati on
can be regarded "as the cleverest thing done by the Allies in the nature of
The minutes o f the War Cabinet meeting held on October J 1 ,
war propaganda . "
1917, reveal James Balfour ' s own attitude o n the political need for a war
time statement: "The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that . • • •
If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal ( i . e . , the Zionist
program ) , we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda ooth in
Russia and Ameri ca . " See PRO CAB22/4.
The declarati on did provide a highly
effective platform from which the Zionists would incrementally advance
nati onalist Jewi sh state goals in Palestine with the aid of powerful and
officiously placed governmental pro-Zioni sts.
See, for exampl e , the Zionist
lobbyi st techniques in Michael Adams and Chri stopher Mayhew, Publish i t not . .
The Middle East Cover-Up (Londo n : Longman Group LTD, 1975),

Chapter Three

"Poli tical Pressures . "
Wei zmann himself confirms the success of Zionist
political techniques, for exampl e , in earl y 1930s: see Weizmann, Trial and
Error (New York : Harper Brothers, 1949 ) , p . 335.
Also see for intimacy of
Zioni st lobby' s contacts with British Cabinet Blanche Dugdale , Diaries of
Blanche Dugdale (London: Valentine Mitchell , 197J ) .
Zionist contributions
to political leaders,
exampl e ,

and the consequent influence of the Jewish lobby, for

in the Uni ted State$, are di scussed with frankness in an arti cle

by Dan Margali t in the Israeli newspaper Haare tz,
printed in Israeli Mirror,
October 1974.

September 20, 1974, re

Middle East International Publications,

No.

But it should be noted that had the Balfour Declaration

J4,

•

actually never existed,

Zionist nationalists would still have implemented

programs and activities seeking eventually an exclusivist Jewish State
in Palestine but their tasks would have been more difficult.
it should be

Because

recognized that the primary tactic Zionism utili zed to suc

ceed at its nationalist goal has been to organize and lead Jewish publ i c
poli tical. expression i n. countries that had the international power to
assi st them i n their political-national goal s .

Through organized domestic

Jewish publ i c opinion exacting collective political pressure s upon elected

government representatives the i nternational Zionist Organi zation

United States i t s satellite the Zionist Organization of Ameri ca
could have compelled political support from elected offi cial s .

)

(i n

the

felt i t
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Chapter Ei gh t

1

'lhe Bri tish Goverrunen t ,

as author of the Balfour Declaration,

had never possessed any l e gal sovereignty or dominion in Palestine .
2walid Khalid1 ,

ed. ,

From Haven to Conquest (Beirut:

1he Insti tute

interview among Balfour,

then Erl ti sh Foreign Secretary,

Felix Frank

For Palestine Studi e s , _ 1971),

pp .

19 5-200. Dr.

Khalidi. reproduced an

furter, President 1.'iilson' s consultant at the Pari s Peace Conference

i n 1919, Lord Eustance Percy,

Bri tish diplomat and later Conservative

Member of Parliament, and Uni ted States Supreme Court Justice
Brandei s ,

24,

in Hr .

:Balfour ' s apartment,

23 Rue Ni tot,

Pari s ,

on June

'!his informatio n i s derived from personal notations

1919 .

collected by Felix Frankfurter duri ng thi s private conference

and later reproduced in E.

Document8 on 3ri ti sh "?orei

L . Woodward and Rohan Butl er,
Polic

,

191

London : Her Majesty ' s Stationary Offi ce ,

-19

9,

1952 ) ,

'!hi s document i s reproduced for the Appendix.
3Richard P .

Stevens,

"Smuts and Weizmann :

Vol .
pp.

IV,

eds . ,

Ist Series

1276-78 .

A Study i n South Afri can

Zionist Cooperation, " Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Baha Abu-Laban,
Settler Re
Wilmette,

p.

18l�.

eds. ,

· mes in Africa and the Arab �'lorld : The Illusion of Sndurance

Illi noi s :

Stevens,

The ·i :edina Uni versi ty Press International ,
noted historican of Zionism, asserts that 11 •

1974 ,

• •

:Jeiz

mann' s relatively quiet academic years were suddenly changed by events
precipi tated by the outbreak of war in August ,

1914.

The entry of the

Ottoman !Bmpire into the conflict agai nst Britain opened new possibilities

for Zionist diplomacy.

A British advance into the Middl e East to

safeguard oil suppli e s and communi cati ons,

possibly paving the way

for Jewi sh settlement i n Palestine under Briti sh auspi ces,

had long

Now, with Bri tish forces in motion i n the area,
been expected .
saw the postwar possi bili tie s . 0
See Stevens, i bi d . , p . 183.
4
I bi d . ,

pp.

Wei zmann

183-84.

5Arthur Ruppi n ,

at the time of the Balfour Declaration,

was head

of the �·lorld Zionist Organi zati on ' s department of colonization in

Palestine.

A native of Germany,

he settled i n Pale3tine i n 1907 and

directed the first Zionist office in Jaffa.

Elon wri tes that he "headed

the main office of colonization--as a kind of 'minister'

of agriculture

and development i n the increasingly autonomous Jewi sh state within a
state"

( p . 177 ) .

6Amos Elon,

'.file I sraeli s ,

p.

177.

Significantly,

Elon,

an I srael i ,

admit:::; that "�.Jeizmann ' s origi nal aim i n securing the :Salfour Declaration
had been that Palestine should u1 timately be as Jewish as England was

English"

(p.

1 76 ) .

The insert "another Hontenegro" i s reported by

Elon to have been said by Ruppin.
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7The

precise passage i s ,

'"Ibi s right

]

national rebirth in i ts own country'

Declarati on of the 2nd November,
of the League of

1917,

�of the Jewish people to

was recognized in the Balfour

and reaffirmed in the Mandate

Nations whi ch, in parti cular, gave international

sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and

Eretz-Israel and to the

National Home . "

right of the Jewish people to rebuild i t s

Thi s quote i s taken from the Declaration o f the

EstabliGhment of the State of I srael ,
Israe l ,

laws,

Statute s ,

e tc . ,

1948, which i s reproduced in

Laws o f the State of Israel

translation ) , I ( Tel Aviv, 1948), p . J.
from the fourth paragraph .

9

The wording i n

se e M. Cherif Ea.ssiouni and Eugene M.

Fi sher,

(authorized

brackets i s

"'Ihe Arab-Israeli

Conf1.ict--Real and Apparent Issue s : An Insight Into its Future from
the Lessons of the Past , " ST.

Cherif Eassiouni ,

"The

' Middle

John ' s Law !ieview,

january ,

1970;

.M.

East' : 'Ihe Yd.sunderstood Conflict, "

The Uni versity of Kan!:.as La'.-1 :tevi ew,

Palestine and International Law:
Confl i c t

Henry Cat tan,
Spring, 197 1 ;
The Le£Tal Asne cts o:f the Arab-Israeli

London : Longman Group Ltd . ,

197.3 ; N . Shukri , The Concept
(19 6 5 ) .

of Self-Determination in the United Nations

10s ol M. Linowi tz, "Analysis of a Tinderbox: 'Ihe Legal Ba.sis for
the State of Israel , " American Bar Association Journal , June , 1957,
PP • 522-2J.
1 1Ibid . ,

p.

525.

12

p.

542 .

I bid . ,

Israel syrnpathy.

Significantl y ,

1.3Herbert Adams Gibbons,

Linowi tz wrote from a pro-Zionist-

"Are Handa tes a Sacred Trust?" '!'he Century

Illustrated Mon thly 1·'!agazine , Vol . 102, May to October, 1921 , pp. JOJ1 0 ; Herbert Adams Gibbons, "The Future of the Ottoman Race s , 11 The
Century Illu:::tratcd Honthly !<a�azine, September, 1919, pp. 6J4-L�2 , 636;

Professor ��erri edale Keith,

"handate s , 1 1 Journal of Comparati ve Legi s

lation and Internati onal Law,

IV (1922 ) ,

p.

72 ;

l;ark Carter ;iill s ,

"'Ihe Ha.ndatory System , " f....-nerican Journal of International Law,

XVII ,

(1923), pp . 50-62; Herbert Adams Ci bbons, "Defects of the System of
Mandate s , " Annals of the American Academy, July, 192 1 , pp . 84-90 ;

Robert Lansing,
14
Command

Peace Neg:otiati ons.

1700, pp. 12-2 1 .

21 5

l5
Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Erro r, p . 2 08 . 'Ihe text of Weizmann ' s
letter and the resolution of the �xecutive of the Zionist Organi zation
accep ting the Churchill Uhi te Paper' s interpretation of the Balfour
Declaration appear i n British White Paper, Cmd. 1700, pp. 28- 29 .
.

16

in

Hansard ' s Reports, House of Commons , July
parentheses are added for clarification.

17From Viscount Samuel ' s speech
of Lords, April 23 , 1947, p . 9 6 .
18

Cmd . 6019 , . pp . 3-4. i·Tords
to provide clarificati ons.
l9

Report of the Commi ttee,

in

Cmd.

in

4,

1922, p. )42.

the Palestine Deta.te in the Hou�e

parentheses are added

5974, March 16,

2°Forei n Relations of the 15ni ted S tate s 1
D . C . : US Government Printing Offi ce , 1971 , p .
21 Advi sory

Words

opi nion of July 1 1 , 1950. Se e
of International Law, Vol . I (196 3 ) , p. 623.

1939,

47, Vol .
1157.

Marjorie

by

the wri ter

P • 11 .

V ( Wa shi ngton ,
M.

�·lhi teman, Digest

22Henry Cattan, Palestine and International Law : The Le al As ects of
the Arab- Israeli Conflict \Londo n : Longman Group Ltd . , 1973 , p. 21 .
Alan R. Taylor , Thi; Zioni st I·'ind : The Ori a:i n s and D evel o ment of Zionist
1hought ( :3eirut: 1he Insti tute For Palestine Studies, 1974 , p . 8 2 .

23'Ihe Autobiogral)h of l'l::ihwn Gol(l..man (New Yo:::-k : !fol t, I'D.nehart and
:·li ns ton , 1969 , p . 285.
Goldman , a long-time Zi oni st from Germany, has
held several i mp ortant Zionist positions : President of the '.·Jorld Zionist
Organi zation, President of the Horld Jewish Congress, Chairman of COJO
( iforld Conference of J e�·Ti sh Organi za ti ons ) , Chairman of the �forld Confer
ence on Jewi sh Education, President of the Conference on JevTish Material
Claims Agai nst Germany, and Chairman of the Jewi.sh Agency Executive .
2�aymond Phi ne as Stearns, Pageant
Brace and World, Inc . , 1961 ) , p . 869 .

25Ibid . ,

of Europe (New York : Harcourt,

p . 870.

2 6Advisory opinion

of July 1 1 , 1950. Se e Marjorie
Digest of International Law, Vol. I (1963 ) , p . 62 0 .
27Ihi.d . , Vol . II,
28 Ibi d . , Vol . I ,

p . 1110.
p . 620 .

M . Whi teman ,
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29Ibi.d . , Vol . I , p . 62 .
3
0
3 Quincy Wright, "Some Recent Cases on the Status of Mandated Areas , "
'Ihe American Journal of International Law, XX, (1926 ) , pp. 768-772.
Italy sought the extradition of certain ex-Ottoman subje cts, resident
in Palestine , under the . Anglo-Italian Treaty of 187 .
'Ihe subjects
3
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground , among other reasons,
that they were exempt from extradi tion under the treaty provision
exempting " subjects of the Uni ted Kingdom , " and that even i f they could
not come under thi s designation, the treaty, which by the terms of the
Palestine Mandate was extended to Palestine, must be construed to
'Ihe Palestine Supreme
extend the exempti on to "Palestinian national s . "
Court refused the petition .
Also see Sir Michael McDonnell , ed . , The Law
31Ibid . , pp. 768-772.
Waterlow & Sons Limited, 19 )4 ) , PP • 21 5(London:
Repor�or Palestine
217' 50-52 .
2
3 'Ihe i nternati onaJ. law of war of the period did not allow Bri tain
to dispose of the mili tarily occupied terri tory of Palestine because
'Ihe Preamble of the Hague Conventi on Number I V
of Turkish sovereignty.
on the Laws o f War make s explicit that occupied terri tori es remai n under
the protection of the rules of international law.
33Norman Bentwi ch, The Mandates System (London: Longman, 19 0 ) , p . 24;
3
Norman Bentwi ch, Palestine (London : E . Benn, 19 4 ) , p . 101.
3
4
3 nocuments on Bri tish Foreign Policy
His Majesty' s Stationary Office .

1919-1939,

1st series, Vol . IV,

3.5rie Systeme des Mandats, Societe des Nations (Geneva, 1945 ) , p . 14;
A. Stott, Offi cial Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposal s ( Washington,
1921 ) , pp. 188, 265 ,
09 ; messages of President Woodrow Wilson of
3
January 8 , February 11 and April 6 , 191 8 .
6
3 shabtai Rosenne, Israeli spokesman at the Uni ted Nations, said with
reference to the Balfour Declarati on, "Its precise legal status at the
time i t was made may be open to discussion but that problem i s secondary
in view of the fact that the Council of the League of Nations incorporated
its text into the Preamble to the Mandate for Palestine . "
Quote i s taken
from J . W . Halderman , ed . , 'Ihe Middle Ea.st Cri sis (Oceana, 1969 ) , p . 48 .
37cattan , op. cit . , p . 2 1 .
8
3 The Palestinians, both Muslims and Chri stians, and all the Arabs
rejected the Balfour Declaration.
The indigenous Pal estinian Arab Jews
also rejected and opposed the concept of the establi shment of a Jewish
national home in Palestine .
Ronald Storrs, the first Bri tish Military
Governor of Jerusalem, wrote , "The religious Jews of Jerusalem and
Hebron and the Sephardim (Arab Jews) were strongl y opposed to political
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Zionism, holding that God would bring Israel back to Zion in His own
good time, and that it was impious to anticipate His decree . " See
Storrs , Orientations (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1945 ) , p. J40.
Additionally, Storrs wrote that, "In the numerous Bri tish constituenci es
enjoying a Jewish vote the Declaration was a valuable platform asset,
and there was good reciprocal publicity in the almost apocalyptic
enthusiasm telegraphed by politicia!'ls of standing to the Zionist
Organi zation . " See Storrs, 'Ihe Memoirs of Sir Ronald Storrs (New York :
Arno Press, 1972 ) , p . J6J.
39 cattan, op. cit . , p. 21. Arthur Koestler, an Israel i , has described
the Bal four Declaration as a document in which "one nation solemnly
promi sed to a second nation the country of a thi rd . " See Koestler,
Promise and Fulfilment (New York : Macmillan, 1957), p . 4 .
In 1926,
Koestler, a Zionist mem�er of the Jewish underground army in Palestine,
abruptly abandoned his studies at the Universi ty of Vienna and joined
the Palestine Zioni st kibbutz settlement of Hepbzibah . Note in the quote
the words "promised to a second nation" which obviously infers that
Koestler believed in the fallacious "the Jewish people" racial doctrine.
40It is axiomatic to understand that the Zionists during the Balfour
Declaration discussions, which were private and informal , sought three
specific political objectives: 1 ) 'Ihat Palestine be "reconstituted as the
National Home of the Jewish people" without regard to the rights of the
Palestinian Arab peopl e ; 2 ) 'Ihat all Jews ( the comprehensive Zionist
claimed entity of "the Jewish people" ) be recognized as a single nationality
grouping; J) 'Ihat a political connection be recognized between "the National
Home" and " the Jewish peopl e . " Subsequently, the most significant feature
of the final declaration was the refusal of the British Cabinet to assent
to any of these three central political objectives sought in the Zionist
July draft proposal . Even Stein, a Zionist historican of the Balfour
Declaration, agrees with this conclusion ( see The Balfour Declaration,
p. 552) . Considering that the Zioni st-Israel sovereignty (chapter one, page
12 of this paper) views the declaration as granting "legal authority" for
"the Jewish people" natio!'lali ty claims, and that the decl aration has been
used by the State of Israel as "legal authori t.y" for the Zionist-Israel
sovereignty, it should be immediately seen that since the three Zionist
political objectives were refused, these Zionist claims are sham and
sophistic. W . T. �iallison, Jr. , whose specialty i s international law,
arr1. ves at the same conclusion in, "Zionist Nationalism Versus Individual
Freedom , " John Norton Moore , ed . , 'Ihe Arab-Israeli Conflict, I (Princeton:
Princeton t:niversity Press, 1974), pp. 121-1)2 .
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the occupied areas, the. invading Jews gained
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control of the original inhabitants.
t

:

I

I

.,

'"
'

' . :·; " .

. .

,

�

.

·
· ·
,,...,,
_ ,.,,
oa i � ' ; King S�lomon ru l e d
..-_,

first

:� "

.... ... �

"

'

�
·)::'··'

/f

\�---

\

lj-

.·

, .. ·

' ';
I

'

and �-f. the area east of the Jordan River. The�r

--���
-

·. .

'/

r

lestine

!,
( . �
. ...."
....
.·

'; . � '
:��

,•

!

J
�

�

.

.· ,
·

.

..._

..
I

·"- .... ,...\IO!li.._.-·

·
. :

'

'

'

--r�· .

�

j..•

/
(

1 ,.

t.

�

.•

!�
:·�-

.

.

.

.... v

.
. ..
:•
..

1'RE DEAD SEA
. t
""'

.
.

,u

��}

·

.. .

\�\i,

'f�
\��

.,

I

/'.'
.

f
�

.

N
N
\.,}\

.

., A

. �

.

. .·

,

: -·

·-·�6 ...

. .

.

�

'

. .. �

�·

THE

DOVi/NFALL OF

THE HEBREW

· ; ..
KINGDOr.JI
t
,,
,
rl';�;�::';
'1
?"-' · ll).f <-· "' "'°A f.Sta
;:. :, i
,
H
.
l

'
-<·
.

{'

�<
·

.rf .

•

.I•

.

.,-

.

:

.

· · . '. "

'�

}

;

,

!I �
\

f) In 9 2 3 B . C . , d u r i n g t h e r e i g n of K i n g Solomon, t h e

.

.J

"

�

d a m of lsr<iel took t h e n o r t h e r n part w h i l e the south

·{

was dominated by the Kingdom of Judea.

'

® Jn 722 B.C . . the

�--.._.the Assyrians.

_/' .

0 In 586

n ort he r n

B.C .. the Babylonians brought to an end the

southern Kingdom, and the Hebrew reign in Pa l e s ti n e"",....#'

was termina ted . A very s m a l l number o f Hebrews

OThroughout this period the o r i g i n a l inhabitants kept
!
. '
·
.
th e .1 r continuous
resr d ence .in Pa I es t me.

�

.
(\
H
. \. f'

\\
.•...

\

..:� .

\:

..
\\· �:..

. 11·
fti
'l \

.i'

i·

<.

��1\-l;' ..l·

,�·

·:�i. .
� .

.\�

'
t .

.

.

)

.
��
: - '.-_;. :" �
·- .;;.· �;:';. �
:',0

�, "'
�· ;�
.
"�.
�
·

\'\.,;

.

.

�·

n
" L��

·,

.
.

/I

' ;·

�·i'JI
r

�
-� )- I �!:'"'

,.t

•

' ,' , t i

)) ""�

�\.

'

}

.

- ..
r

·

·..

.

.·· j \ , �; · .�::

..
·

\\....
.

chose to remain in the land as residents.

.

, "" n'Y i

.,!

{

.. �
/.t' .

.

\\..
..
:;;j ��

.

�.

kingdom was swept over by

f-r1

,

-.

l'

i

�

-""f ,.·

.- :�,, � ·

.;

;

.

·"'

�

Hebrew Kingdom suffered a rupturous s p l i t . T h e K i n g ·

.

�

1.

•

r· . .

.j'

-.}i�J.

.

'

)�.

!\)
!\)
°'

\\

-�

. .

..

. .
I

·--··

. . ... . . .
.

.

....

�....-....

r·· ..

::-·:-�

-·

INVASIONS CONTlNUE - THE INHABITANTS PERSIST
.}

·
·
.·

;

l

The Persian invas·ion.

..

"'··.,

..

,

..

·-· ·

""�

.-

�·-·,

.. , �

Greek

_

I:_
.
��
·
- .
. s.::..:. .: .
���
�
��--.:..�-�

'-.
r·

......

'€'./'
.. '

�.
. .
�

:·

I

�.

-··

'
'

'

.
..
........

.

..

\

-. .· ..
.

....

•..

�

O l n 64 B.C. The Roman .invasion.
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